Theories on Auctions with Participation Costs by Cao, Xiaoyong
THEORIES ON AUCTIONS WITH PARTICIPATION COSTS
A Dissertation
by
XIAOYONG CAO
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
August 2009
Major Subject: Economics
THEORIES ON AUCTIONS WITH PARTICIPATION COSTS
A Dissertation
by
XIAOYONG CAO
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Approved by:
Chair of Committee, Guoqiang Tian
Committee Members, Rajiv Sarin
Steven Puller
Ximing Wu
Head of Department, Larry Oliver
August 2009
Major Subject: Economics
iii
ABSTRACT
Theories on Auctions with Participation Costs. (August 2009)
Xiaoyong Cao, B.S., Huazhong University of Science & Technology;
B.A., Huazhong University of Science & Technology
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Guoqiang Tian
In this dissertation I study theories on auctions with participation costs with
various information structure.
Chapter II studies equilibria of second price auctions with differentiated partici-
pation costs. We consider equilibria in independent private values environments where
bidders’ entry costs are common knowledge while valuations are private information.
We identify two types of equilibria: monotonic equilibria in which a higher partici-
pation cost results in a higher cutoff point for submitting a bid, and neg-monotonic
equilibria in which a higher participation cost results in a lower cutoff point. We show
that there always exists a monotonic equilibrium, and further, that the equilibrium
is unique for concave distribution functions and strictly convex distribution functions
with some additional conditions. There exists a neg-monotonic equilibrium when the
distribution function is strictly convex and the difference of the participation costs
is sufficiently small. We also provide comparative static analysis and study the limit
status of equilibria when the difference in bidders’ participation costs approaches zero.
Chapter III studies equilibria of second price auctions when values and partici-
pation costs are both privation information and are drawn from general distribution
functions. We consider the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. It is shown that
there always exists an equilibrium for this general economy, and further there exists
a unique symmetric equilibrium when all bidders are ex ante homogenous. Moreover,
we identify a sufficient condition under which we have a unique equilibrium in a het-
iv
erogeneous economy with two bidders. Our general framework covers many relevant
models in the literature as special cases.
Chapter IV characterizes equilibria of first price auctions with participation costs
in the independent private values environment. We focus on the cutoff strategies in
which each bidder participates and submits a bid if his value is greater than or equal to
a critical value. It is shown that, when bidders are homogenous, there always exists
a unique symmetric equilibrium, and further, there is no other equilibrium when
valuation distribution functions are concave. However, when distribution functions
are elastic at the symmetric equilibrium, there exists an asymmetric equilibrium. We
find similar results when bidders are heterogenous.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
An auction is an effective way to extract private information by increasing the compe-
tition of potential buyers and thus can increase allocation efficiency from the perspec-
tives of both sellers and the social optimum when we do not have complete information
about bidders’ types. However, not every auction can be implemented freely. This
dissertation studies (Bayesian-Nash) equilibria of sealed-bid auctions for economies
with private values and participation costs under various information structure.
A. Motivation
The fundamental structure of auctions with participation costs is one through which
an indivisible object is allocated to one of many potential buyers, and in order to
participate in the auction, buyers must incur some costs1. After the cost is incurred, a
bidder can submit a bid. The bidder who submits the highest bid wins the object and
the payments to the sellers differ among various auction mechanisms. For example,
in first price auctions, the winner pays his own bid and in second price auctions, the
winner pays the highest bids among his rivals. If there is only one player in second
price auctions, the winner pays zero.
There are many sources for participation costs. For instance, sellers may require
that those who submit bids have a certain minimum amount of bidding funds which
may compel some bidders to borrow; bidders themselves may have transportation
The journal model is Journal of Economic Theory.
1Related terminology includes participation cost, participation fee, entry cost or
opportunity costs of participating in the auction. See Laffont and Green [12], Samuel-
son [37], McAfee and McMillan [30,31], etc.
2costs to go to an auction place; or they need spend some money to learn the rules of
the auction and how to submit bids. Bidders even have opportunity costs to attend
an auction.
With participation costs, bidders’ behavior may change. If a bidder’s expected
revenue from the auction is less than the participation cost before the auction, he will
choose not to participate in the auction. If the expected revenue from the auction
is bigger than the costs, the bidder will participate and submit a bid accordingly.
Even if a bidder decides to participate in the auction, since he may expect that some
other bidders will not participate, his bidding behavior may not be the same as in
the standard auction without participation costs. The number of bidders submitting
a bid in the auction is less than the number of bidders submitting a bid in the
standard auction without participation costs, which may in turn, alter the equilibrium
bidding strategy. For example, more bidders can raise coordination costs and will not
necessarily improve the revenue of the sellers (cf. Samuelson [37], Harstad, Kagel,
and Levin [14], Levin and Smith [21]).
There are some studies on the information acquisition in auctions. A bidder may
want to learn how he/she and the others value the item, and thus he/she may incur
a cost in information acquisition about their valuations2. A main difference between
participation costs and information acquisition costs is that information acquisition
costs are avoidable while participation costs are not. If a bidder does not want to
collect information about her own or others’ valuations, she does not incur any cost,
but she can still submit bids. Some researchers, such as McAfee and McMillan [30,31],
Harstad [13] and Levin and Smith [21], combine the idea of participation costs and
2Persico [36] studied the incentives of information acquisition in auctions. He found
that bidders have more incentives for information acquisition in first price auctions
than in second price auctions.
3the idea of information acquisition costs. Compete and Jehiel [8] investigate the
advantage of using dynamic auctions in the presence of information acquisition cost
only. However, information acquisition costs and participation costs can both be
regarded as sunk costs after the bidders submit bids.
Addressing the question of participation costs may have important implications.
One can characterize the bidding behavior in an auction with participation costs and
see how the equilibria will be different from those without participation costs, and
then one can derive the implications to the bidders, to the sellers and to the society
which, in turn, may be helpful for the optimal selling mechanism design, see Celic
and Yilankaya [6].
B. Literature Review
The study of participation costs in auctions mainly focuses on the second price auction
due to its simplicity of bidding behavior. In standard second price auctions, bidding
one’s own valuation is a weakly dominant strategy. There is also another equilibrium
in standard second price auctions as shown in Blume and Heidhues [1]: the bidder
with the highest value bids his true value and all others bid zero. This is referred to as
the asymmetric bidding equilibrium in the standard second price auction. However,
in second price auctions with participation costs, it is still true that if a bidder finds
participating optimal, he cannot do better than bidding his true value. Therefore, in
this dissertation when we consider second price auctions with participation costs we
only consider equilibria in which potential bidders use cutoff strategies; i.e., bid their
true values if they are greater than the corresponding cutoff points, do not participate
otherwise.3 All of our results about the uniqueness or multiplicity of the equilibria
3There may exist equilibrium in which bidders do not bid their true value when
they participate. See the example given in Remark 4 in Chapter II.
4should be interpreted accordingly.
Green and Laffont [12] were the first to study second price auctions with partici-
pation costs in a general framework where bidders’ valuations and participation costs
are both private information. However, their proof of the existence and uniqueness of
an equilibrium is incomplete additionally having imposed a restrictive assumption of
uniform distributions for both values and participation costs. There has been some
recent work in the literature on equilibria of the second price auction with partici-
pation costs in simplified versions where either only valuations or participation costs
are private, while the other is assumed to be common knowledge.
Campbell [5] considered the equilibria in second price auctions in an economic
environment with equal participation costs when bidders’ values are private informa-
tion and participation costs are common knowledge. He focused on the coordination
of equilibrium choice when multiple equilibria exist. Tan and Yilankaya [40] also
studied equilibria of second price auctions in an economic environment with equal
participation costs. They proved that the equilibrium is unique and symmetric when
bidders’ distribution functions for values are concave. They also considered the case
in which bidders are asymmetric in the sense that they have different valuation dis-
tribution functions while maintaining identical participation costs. Some others, such
as Samuelson [37], McAfee and McMillan [30,31], Levin and Smith [21, 22], Stageman
[38], and Menezes and Monterio [32] also studies auctions with participation costs.
All of these studies assume bidders’ participation cost are the same.
The assumption of equal participation costs, however, is stringent and unrealistic
in many situations. For instance, bidders may have different transportation costs for
traveling to auction spots. Bidders may also have different ability to learn more
information about the auctions. Some bidders can easily know valuations of other
potential bidders while others do not. Thus, it may be more general for one to study
5individuals’ behavior in second price auctions with different participation costs which
may include the equal participation costs as a special case when the difference of
participation costs approach zero.
Differentiated participation costs may also have additional implications. First,
they can be used to distinguish bidders. Bidders can use this information to decide
whether or not to participate in the auction. One can analyze how a bidder’s cutoff
point will be affected by others’ participation costs. Secondly, while Tan and Yi-
lankaya [40] mainly considered bidding behavior inside the same group, they did not
consider how the interaction among the different groups would determine and affect
the equilibrium behavior.
Chapter II of this dissertation aims to investigate the equilibria when bidders
have different participation costs, an analysis which will be more applicable in reality.
By considering bidders with different participation costs, we can investigate how
equilibria vary as participation costs change. We can also study the limit behavior of
the equilibria as the difference in participation costs approaches zero.
Kaplan and Sela [16] simplified the framework of Laffont and Green [12] in an-
other way. They studied equilibria of second price auctions with participation costs
when bidders’ participation costs are private information and drawn from the same
distribution function, while valuations are common knowledge.
Thus, up to now, the problem considered in Laffont and Green [12]has only been
answered in some special settings: either participation costs are commonly known or
values are publicly known. However, in reality, it is possible that both the valuations
and participation costs are private information. Some participation costs are observ-
able to the seller such as the entry fee; some are unobservable to the seller such as
the learning costs. A natural way to deal with this is to allow both valuations and
participation costs of bidders are private information and their distribution functions
6are general and may be different. Chapter III aims to give an answer to the question
raised in Laffont and Green [12] in a general framework4.
While bidding strategies are very nice and simple in second price auctions, the
same cannot be said to first price auctions. Studies of first price auctions in the
presence of participation costs, however, have received little attention, although they
are used more often in practice5, like the auctions for tendering, particularly for
government contracts and auctions for mining leases. The difficulty partly lies in the
fact that in first price auctions, bidding strategies are not so explicit, as compared
with the strategies in second price auctions. Bidders in first price auctions no longer
bid their true valuations. The degree of shading relies heavily on who others enter
the auction and the information inferred from the entrance behavior of those bidders.
The effect of the information inferred on the bidding strategy of first price auctions
is greater than that on second price auctions. Moreover, when bidders use different
thresholds to enter an auction, the valuation distributions updated from their entrance
behavior are different so that there may be no explicit bidding function and some
bidders may use mixed strategies. As such, it is more technically difficult to solve the
cutoff strategy since it is determined by the expected revenue of participating in the
auction at the thresholds, which in turn depends on the more complicated bidding
functions of bidders who submit bids.
Some studies on equilibrium behavior in economic environments with different
4It should be pointed out that the framework considered in Chapter III can be
applied to many other participation costs related economic issues. For instance, in
order to decide whether or not enter an undeveloped market, one needs to know the
possible revenue before he enters the market and compare that with the necessary
costs. To do this, one must also consider the possible entrance behavior of other
opponents.
5Samuelson [37] studies the entrance equilibrium of first price competitive pro-
curement auctions and related welfare problem, focusing on the symmetric cutoff
threshold.
7valuation distributions have been done which can be used to study the equilibria of
first price auctions with participation costs. Kaplan and Zamir [17, 18] discuss the
properties of bidding functions when valuations are uniformly distributed with dif-
ferent supports. Martinez-Pardina [25] study the first price auction in which bidders’
valuations are common knowledge. They show that in equilibrium bidders whose
valuations are common knowledge randomize their bids. Chapter IV of this disser-
tation investigates Bayesian-Nash equilibria of sealed-bid first price auctions in the
independent private values environment with participation costs.
There are a branch of papers dealing with the existence and uniqueness of equilib-
rium of first price auctions. Many existing work focuses exclusively on the symmetric
equilibrium of an auction in which bidders are ex ante the same in the sense that
the joint distribution of buyers types is symmetric. With a symmetric distribution
of types, it is well known that there is only one symmetric equilibrium (Milgrom
and Weber [33], Maskin and Riley [26, 27, 28, 29]study the theory in the absence
of symmetry. They show that there can be no asymmetric equilibrium under the
assumption that reservation prices are drawn independently from a distribution with
finite support and positive mass at the lower endpoint. When drop the symmetry
assumption, Maskin and Riley [29] show that the same conditions above can guaran-
tee the uniqueness of equilibrium for two bidders’ case. For more than two bidders,
the uniqueness of equilibrium requires additional fairly mild assumptions that buy-
ers with the same reservation price have the same preferences, that absolute risk
aversion is non-increasing, and that the supports of the different buyers distributions
of reservation prices have the same upper endpoint. Lebrun [20] shows that if the
value cumulative distribution functions are strictly log-concave at the highest lower
extremity of their supports, in the asymmetric independent private values model the
uniqueness of the equilibrium of the first-price auction is guaranteed.
8C. Main Results of the Dissertation
Chapter II considers economic environments where bidders have private valuations
for the object and different participation costs that are common knowledge in second
price auctions. We identify two types of equilibria: monotonic equilibria in which
a higher participation cost results in a higher cutoff point for entering the auction
and submitting a bid, and neg-monotonic equilibria in which a higher participation
cost results in a lower cutoff point for entering the auction and submitting a bid. We
show that there always exists a monotonic equilibrium, and further that, it is unique
for concave distribution functions and strictly convex distribution functions under
some additional conditions. Uniqueness of the equilibria can greatly simplify the
world. When bidders’ distribution functions are strictly convex and the differences
among the bidders’ participation costs are sufficiently small, there is a neg-monotonic
equilibrium. There is no neg-monotonic equilibrium when the difference is sufficiently
large. In other words, if the difference in participation costs is sufficiently large, we
do not need to consider the existence of neg-monotonic equilibria.
Our study on auction with differentiated participation costs is not only more real-
istic, but also provides us deeper insight that would help us understand the existence
or non-existence of asymmetric equilibria well in auctions with equal participation
cost. This can be seen by studying the limit behavior of the monotonic and neg-
monotonic equilibria when bidders’ participation costs converge to the same value.
We show that, when the distribution function of valuation is concave, the monotonic
equilibrium converges to the symmetric equilibrium when bidders have the same par-
ticipation costs. However, when the distribution is strictly convex, the monotonic
equilibrium converges to the asymmetric equilibrium. In this case one neg-monotonic
equilibrium converges to a symmetric equilibrium, and another neg-monotonic equi-
9librium converges to an asymmetric equilibrium.
We also provide some comparative static analysis. It is shown that the cutoff
point is increasing in one’s own participation costs, but decreasing in opponents’
participation costs, and further, as the number of bidders increases, the cutoff points
of all bidders will increase.
Chapter III studies equilibria of second price auctions with general distribution
functions on valuations and participation costs. The special cases of this general
specification includes that either the valuations or participation costs are common
knowledge, as those have been investigated in previous literature.
Under a general two-dimensional distribution of the bidders’ participation costs
and valuations we prove that the equilibria always exist. When bidders have the same
distributions, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium. Moreover, we identify the
conditions under which we have a unique equilibrium in a simple two bidder economy.
Special cases in which multiple equilibria exist are also discussed. There may exist
an equilibrium in which one bidder never participates or an equilibrium in which one
bidder always participates.
As compared to the work by Laffont and Green [12], our general framework can
not only establish the existence of equilibrium and uniqueness of symmetric equi-
librium in the two-dimensional uniform setting, but can also do that in many other
two-dimensional settings such as truncated normal distributions, exponential distri-
butions etc. Not restricted to the symmetric equilibrium when all bidders are ho-
mogenous, our framework can deal with the asymmetric equilibria which have been
seen in literature with one-dimensional private information, like those in Tan and
Yilankaya [40].
In Chapter IV, we investigate Bayesian-Nash equilibria of sealed-bid first price
auctions in the independent private values environment with participation costs. We
10
assume bidders know their valuations and participation costs before they make their
decisions. Participation costs are assumed to be the same across all the bidders.
When bidders are homogenous, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium. We
show that there is no other equilibrium when valuation distribution functions are
concave. However, when valuation distribution functions are elastic at the symmetric
equilibrium, there always exists an asymmetric equilibrium. It may be remarked that,
when a distribution function is strictly convex, it is elastic everywhere, specifically
at the symmetric equilibrium, and therefore there exists an asymmetric equilibrium.
Moreover, when bidders are in two different groups, the cutoffs used by one group
can always be different from those used by the other group.
We also consider the existence of equilibria in an economy with heterogenous
bidders in the sense that the distribution functions are different. Specifically, we
consider the case where one distribution (called a weak bidder) is first order dominated
by another (called a strong bidder). We concentrate on equilibria that the bidders in
the same group use the same threshold. We show that there is always an equilibrium in
which the strong bidders are more likely to enter the auction by using a smaller cutoff
point for valuations. When the distribution functions are concave, the equilibrium is
unique. However, when the distribution functions for the weak bidders are strictly
convex, and the participation costs are sufficiently large, there exists an equilibrium
in which weak bidders are more likely to enter the auction.
In all chapters, the existence of multiple equilibria has important consequences for
the strategic behavior of bidders and the efficiency of the auction mechanism. When
an auction has a participation cost, a bidder would expect less bidders to submit their
bids. When the equilibrium is unique, every bidder has to follow the that equilibrium
and has no other choices. However, when multiple equilibria exist, bidders may
choose an equilibrium that is more desirable. In this case, some bidders may form a
11
collusion to cooperate at the entrance stage by choosing a smaller cutoff point that
may decrease the probability that other bidders enter the auction, and consequently,
may reduce the competition in the bidding stage. An asymmetric equilibrium may
become more desirable when an auction can run repeatedly. Tan and Yilankaya [41]
investigate the ratifiability of efficient collusive mechanisms in second-price auctions
with participation costs. Beside that, an asymmetric equilibrium may be ex-post
inefficient. The item being auctioned is not necessarily allocated to the bidder with
the highest valuation.
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CHAPTER II
SECOND PRICE AUCTIONS WITH DIFFERENTIATED PARTICIPATION
COSTS
This chapter studies equilibria of second price auctions with differentiated participa-
tion costs. We consider equilibria in independent private values environments where
bidders’ entry costs are common knowledge while valuations are private information.
We identify two types of equilibria: monotonic equilibria in which a higher partici-
pation cost results in a higher cutoff point for submitting a bid, and neg-monotonic
equilibria in which a higher participation cost results in a lower cutoff point. We show
that there always exists a monotonic equilibrium, and further, that the equilibrium
is unique for concave distribution functions and strictly convex distribution functions
with some additional conditions. There exists a neg-monotonic equilibrium when the
distribution function is strictly convex and the difference of the participation costs
is sufficiently small. We also provide comparative static analysis and study the limit
status of equilibria when the difference in bidders’ participation costs approaches zero.
A. Introduction
The study of participation costs in auctions mainly focuses on the second price auction
due to its simplicity of bidding behavior. In standard second price auctions, bidding
one’s own valuation is a weakly dominant strategy. There is also another equilibrium
in standard second price auctions as shown in Blume and Heidhues [1]: the bidder
with the highest value bids his true value and all others bid zero. This is referred to as
the asymmetric bidding equilibrium in the standard second price auction. However,
in second price auctions with participation costs, it is still true that if a bidder finds
participating optimal, he cannot do better than bidding his true value. Therefore, in
13
this chapter we only consider equilibria in which potential bidders use cutoff strategies;
i.e., bid their true values if they are greater than the corresponding cutoff points, do
not participate otherwise.1 All of our results about the uniqueness or multiplicity of
the equilibria should be interpreted accordingly.
Green and Laffont [12] were the first to study the second price auction with
participation costs in a general framework where bidders’ valuations and participa-
tion costs are both private information. However, their proof of the existence and
uniqueness of an equilibrium is incomplete additionally having imposed a restrictive
assumption of uniform distributions for both values and participation costs. There
has been some recent work in the literature on equilibria of the second price auc-
tion with participation costs in simplified versions where either only valuations or
participation costs are private, while the other is assumed to be common knowledge.
Campbell [5] considered the equilibria in second price auctions in an economic
environment with equal participation costs when bidders’ values are private informa-
tion and participation costs are common knowledge. He focused on the coordination
of equilibrium choice when multiple equilibria exist. Tan and Yilankaya [40] also
studied equilibria of second price auctions in an economic environment with equal
participation costs. They proved that the equilibrium is unique and symmetric when
bidders’ distribution functions for values are concave. They also considered the case
in which bidders are asymmetric in the sense that they have different valuation distri-
bution functions while maintaining identical participation costs. SSome others, such
as Samuelson [37], McAfee and McMillan [30,31], Levin and Smith [21], Stageman
[38], and Menezes and Monterio [32] also studies auctions with participation costs.
All of these studies assume bidders’ participation cost are the same.
1There may exist an equilibrium in which bidders do not bid their true value when
they participate. See the example given in Remark 4 below.
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The assumption of equal participation costs, however, is stringent and unrealistic
in many situations. For instance, bidders may have different transportation costs for
traveling to auction spots. Bidders may also have different ability to learn more
information about the auctions. Some bidders can easily know valuations of other
potential bidders while others do not. Thus, it may be more general for one to study
individuals’ behavior in second price auctions with different participation costs which
may include the equal participation costs as a special case when the difference of
participation costs approach zero.
Differentiated participation costs may also have additional implications. First,
they can be used to distinguish bidders. Bidders can use this information to decide
whether or not to participate in the auction. One can analyze how a bidder’s cutoff
point will be affected by others’ participation costs. Secondly, while Tan and Yi-
lankaya [40] mainly considered bidding behavior inside the same group, they did not
consider how the interaction among the different groups would determine and affect
the equilibrium behavior.
Kaplan and Sela [16] studied equilibria of the second price auction with participa-
tion costs when bidders’ participation costs are private information, while valuations
are common knowledge. They considered the existence of type-symmetric equilibria.
This chapter aims to investigate the equilibria when bidders have differentiated
participation costs, an analysis which will be more applicable in reality. By consider-
ing bidders with different participation costs, we can investigate how equilibria vary
as participation costs change. We can also study the limit behavior of the equilibria
as the difference in participation costs approaches zero.
In this chapter, we identify two types of equilibria: monotonic equilibria in which
a higher participation cost results in a higher cutoff point for entering the auction
and submitting a bid, and neg-monotonic equilibria in which a higher participation
15
cost results in a lower cutoff point for entering the auction and submitting a bid. We
show that there always exists a monotonic equilibrium, and further that, it is unique
for concave distribution functions and strictly convex distribution functions under
some additional conditions. Uniqueness of the equilibria can greatly simplify the
world. When bidders’ distribution functions are strictly convex and the differences
among the bidders’ participation costs are sufficiently small, there is a neg-monotonic
equilibrium. There is no neg-monotonic equilibrium when the difference is sufficiently
large. In other words, if the difference in participation costs is sufficiently large, we
do not need to consider the existence of neg-monotonic equilibria.
Our study on auction with differentiated participation costs is not only more real-
istic, but also provides us deeper insight that would help us understand the existence
or non-existence of asymmetric equilibria well in auctions with equal participation
cost. This can be seen by studying the limit behavior of the monotonic and neg-
monotonic equilibria when bidders’ participation costs converge to the same value.
We show that, when the distribution function of valuation is concave, the monotonic
equilibrium converges to the symmetric equilibrium when bidders have the same par-
ticipation costs. However, when the distribution is strictly convex, the monotonic
equilibrium converges to the asymmetric equilibrium. In this case one neg-monotonic
equilibrium converges to a symmetric equilibrium, and another neg-monotonic equi-
librium converges to an asymmetric equilibrium.
We also provide some comparative static analysis. It is shown that the cutoff
point is increasing in one’s own participation costs, but decreasing in opponents’
participation costs, and further, as the number of bidders increases, the cutoff points
of all bidders will increase.
The organization of the chapter is as follows: In Section B, we describe a general
setting of economic environments. In Section C, we focus on two bidders with the same
16
distribution functions and different participation costs to investigate the existence,
uniqueness, and limit properties of the equilibria and to make a comparative analysis.
In Section D, we extend our basic results to more general economic environments by
relaxing the assumptions made in Section C. Concluding remarks are provided in
Section E. All the proofs are presented in Section F.
B. The Setup
We consider the independent values economic environment with one seller and n ≥ 2
potential buyers (bidders). The seller is risk-neutral and has an indivisible object to
sell to one of the buyers. The seller values the object as 0. The auction format is
the sealed-bid second price auction format (see Vickrey [44]). However, in order to
submit a bid, bidder i must pay a participation cost ci. Buyer i’s valuation for the
object is vi, which is private information to the other bidders. It is assumed that vi
is independently distributed with a cumulative distribution function Fi(v) that has
continuously differentiable density fi(v) > 0 everywhere with support [0, 1]
2. We
will study the equilibrium behavior mainly for the case where bidders have the same
distribution functions and then consider the general case of the different distribution
functions. The participation costs ci ∈ (0, 1] for all i are common knowledge.
Each bidder knows his value, participation cost, and the distributions of the
others’ valuations. If participating in auction, he is required to pay a non-refundable
participation fee. The bidder with the highest bid wins the object and pays the
second-highest bid. If there is only one person in the auction, he wins the object and
pays 0. If the highest bids are equal for more than one bidder, then he pays his own
bid and gains nothing.
2Here “0” denotes the value is zero while “1” is a normalization of the highest
possible valuation among all bidders.
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In this second price auction mechanism with participation costs, the individually
rational action set for any type of bidder is {No} ∪ [0, 1], where “{No}” denotes
not participating in the auction. Bidder i incurs the participation cost if and only
if his action is different from “{No}”. Let bi(vi, c) denote bidder i’s strategy where
c = (c1, ..., cn).
If a bidder finds participating in this second price auction optimal, he cannot
do better than bidding his true valuation (i.e., bidding his true valuation is a weakly
dominant strategy). Therefore, we can restrict our attention to Bayesian-Nash equi-
libria in which each bidder uses a cutoff strategy denoted by v∗i (c), i.e., he bids his
valuation if it is greater than or equal to the cutoff point3 and does not enter other-
wise. An equilibrium strategy of each bidder i is then determined by the cutoff point
for his valuation, which is the minimum valuation bidder i needs to cover the cost.
Thus the bidding decision function of each bidder is characterized by
bi(vi, c) =
 vi if v
∗
i (c) ≤ vi ≤ 1
No otherwise.
For notational convenience, we simply denote v∗i (c) = v
∗
i .
Remark 1 When v∗i ≤ 1, bidder i will participate in the auction whenever his true
value satisfies v∗i ≤ vi ≤ 1. However, when bidder i’s expected revenue is always less
than his participation cost ci for any vi ∈ [0, 1], he will never participate in the auction.
In this case, his equilibrium strategy (action) is “{No}”. For notional convenience,
and also for simplicity of discussion, we use v∗i > 1 to denote the equilibrium strategy
of “{No}”. Thus allows us to use a unified notation v∗i to denote an equilibrium
strategy of bidder i, including the equilibrium of “{No}”. The rationale behind using
3In Milgrom and Weber [33], the term of “screening level” is used instead of using
“cutoff point.”
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v∗i > 1 to denote the equilibrium strategy of “{No}” is the following: If we find a
value v∗i such that bidder i’s expected revenue is equal to his participation cost ci by
allowing the upper bound of the support to be greater than one, we will end up with
a value v∗i that is greater than one. But the true value is actually less than or equal
to one, and thus v∗i > 1 is equivalent to the equilibrium strategy of “{No}.”
From now on we focus exclusively on cutoff points, since they are sufficient to
describe equilibria. We define them with following formal definition:
Definition 1 For the economic environment under consideration, an equilibrium is
a cutoff point vector (v∗1, v
∗
2, ..., v
∗
n) ∈ Rn+ such that each bidder i action’s is optimal,
given others’ cutoff strategies.
We then immediately have the following result:
Lemma 1 v∗i ≤ 1 for at least some i.
Since bidders with higher participation costs are less likely to participate in the
auction, one may come to the intuition conclusion that bidders with higher partici-
pation costs may have higher cutoff points to participate in the auction. One may
also perceive that bidders with the same participation costs will use the same cut-
off point when their distribution functions are the same. However, as we will show
in the chapter, it is possible that a bidder with a higher participation cost may ac-
tually have a lower cutoff point to enter the auction. To study these possibilities,
we may distinguish two types of equilibria: monotonic equilibria and neg-monotonic
equilibria.
Definition 2 An equilibrium (v∗1, v
∗
2, . . . , v
∗
n) ∈ Rn+ for the economic environment un-
der consideration is called amonotonic equilibrium (resp. neg-monotonic equilibrium)
if, for any two bidders i and j, ci < cj implies v
∗
i < v
∗
j (resp. v
∗
i ≥ v∗j ).
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As usual, when bidders’ distribution functions are the same; i.e., F1(·) = F2(·) =
. . . = Fn(·) = F (·), we can define the usual symmetric and asymmetric equilibria.
Definition 3 An equilibrium (v∗1, v
∗
2, . . . , v
∗
n) ∈ Rn+ is called a symmetric equilibrium
(resp. asymmetric equilibrium) if, for any two bidders i and j, ci = cj implies v
∗
i = v
∗
j
(resp. v∗i 6= v∗j ).
Remark 2 Campbell [5] and Tan and Yilankaya [40] studied the existence of sym-
metric and asymmetric equilibria for the second price auctions with the same partic-
ipation costs. The terminology of “monotonic” used here means that two variables
c and v∗ vary in the same direction: a higher participation cost results in a higher
cutoff point. When bidders’ distribution functions are the same, as one will see in
Section D, v∗1 = v
∗
2 cannot be an equilibrium, provided bidders’ participation costs
are different. Thus, ci < cj implies v
∗
i > v
∗
j for every neg-monotonic equilibrium, and
ci < cj implies v
∗
i < v
∗
j for every monotonic equilibrium. However, when bidders’
distribution functions are different, as we will show below, v∗1 = v
∗
2 may be an equi-
librium although bidders’ participation costs are different. That is, we have a special
neg-monotonic equilibrium with v∗i = v
∗
j even when ci < cj.
Example 1 We give an simple example to understand the notion of monotonic and
neg-monotonic equilibria. Suppose there is one object for sale to two bidders. Both
bidders value it at 1. The participation costs are c1 < c2 < 1. If both bidders enter,
they both have negative payoffs. There are two pure strategy equilibria: (bidder 1
enters, bidder 2 stays out) and (bidder 1 stays out, bidder 2 enters), which correspond
to two equilibrium cutoff points (v∗1 = c1, v
∗
2 > 1) and (v
∗
1 > 1, v
∗
2 = c2). That is, the
former one is monotonic and the latter one is neg-monotonic.
Remark 3 When multiple equilibria exist, bidders may also use mixed strategies.
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For simplicity, in this chapter we focus only on the pure strategy, not the mixed
strategy of using different cutoff points.
C. Two Bidders with Different Participation Costs
In this section we consider an economy with two bidders who have different partici-
pation costs c1 and c2 with c1 < c2, and have the same distribution function F (v) on
[0, 1], where the costs are common knowledge and valuations are private information.
We first assume, provisionally, that a monotonic equilibrium (v∗1, v
∗
2) exists, i.e.,
v∗1 < v
∗
2. By Lemma 1, we must have v
∗
1 ≤ 1. When bidder 1’s valuation is v1 = v∗1, his
expected revenue is given by v∗1F (v
∗
2) + 0(1− F (v∗2)), where F (v∗2) is the probability
bidder 2 will not participate in the auction. Indeed, when he participates in the
auction and bidder 2 does not participate in the auction, his value is v∗1. When
bidder 2 participates in the auction, it must be the case that v2 ≥ v∗2. Then bidder 1
cannot get the object since v2 ≥ v∗2 > v∗1 = v1, and thus his revenue is zero. Therefore,
his expected revenue from the auction is v∗1F (v
∗
2). The zero net-payoff (equilibrium)
condition then requires that
c1 = v
∗
1F (v
∗
2). (2.1)
When bidder 2’s participation cost is too large, he may never participate in the
auction, no matter what his valuation is. In this case, bidder 1 uses v∗1 = c1 as his
cutoff point, and bidder 2’s expected payoff must satisfy
F (c1) +
∫ 1
c1
(1− v)dF (v) = c1F (c1) +
∫ 1
c1
F (v)dv < c2;
i.e., the expected revenue he obtains from participating even when his value is 1 is
less than his participation cost, given bidder 1 uses c1 as the cutoff point. Thus we
have v∗2 > 1. Then, we may have a monotonic equilibrium with v
∗
1 = c1 and v
∗
2 > 1.
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Now suppose v∗2 ≤ 1. Then, when bidder 2’s valuation is v2 = v∗2, his expected
revenue is
v∗2F (v
∗
1) +
∫ v∗2
v∗1
(v∗2 − v)dF (v),
where the first part is the expected revenue when bidder 1 does not enter the auction,
and the second part is the expected revenue when both bidders participate in the
auction. Note that bidder 2 will lose the object if v1 > v
∗
2. The zero expected
net-payoff (equilibrium) condition then requires that
v∗2F (v
∗
1) +
∫ v∗2
v∗1
(v∗2 − v)dF (v) = c2. (2.2)
Integrating by parts in the left side of (2.2), we have
v∗1F (v
∗
1) +
∫ v∗2
v∗1
F (v)dv = c2. (2.3)
Note that, from (4.2) and (2.3), one can see the claim in Remark 2 is true:
It is impossible for both bidders to use the same cutoff point v∗1 = v
∗
2 = v
∗ when
their participation costs are different. Indeed, suppose not. Then we must have
c1 = v
∗F (v∗) by (4.2) and c2 = v∗F (v∗) by (2.2). Thus c1 = c2, which contradicts the
fact that c2 > c1.
Before we proceed to investigate the existence and uniqueness of the monotonic
equilibrium, it is necessary to introduce more notation. Campbell [5] and Tan and
Yilankaya [40] showed the existence and uniqueness of the symmetric cutoff point
v∗i = v
s when bidders have the same participation cost. In our model, if both bidders
have the same participation cost c1, we have v
s
1F (v
s
1) = c1, and then we can find the
symmetric equilibrium cutoff point vs1. Now, if both bidders have the participation
cost c2, we can find the symmetric equilibrium cutoff point v
s
2 by solving v
s
2F (v
s
2) = c2.
Such vs1 ≤ 1 and vs2 ≤ 1 do exist and are unique since the defined function m(v) =
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vF (v) is monotonically increasing, m(0) = 0, and m(1) = 1.
The following lemma shows the relationship between a monotonic equilibrium
and symmetric equilibria.
Lemma 2 Suppose (v∗1, v
∗
2) is a monotonic equilibrium, (v
s
1, v
s
1) and (v
s
2, v
s
2) are sym-
metric equilibria associated with participation costs c1 < c2, respectively. Then, we
have v∗1 < v
s
1 < v
s
2 < v
∗
2.
This lemma shows that, when bidders have different participation costs, the cutoff
point for the bidder with the lower participation cost at the monotonic equilibrium
is lower than the cutoff point at the symmetric equilibrium when bidders have the
same lower participation cost c1.
To find a monotonic equilibrium, we define the following two cutoff reaction
function equations.
xF (y) = c1 (2.4)
xF (x) +
∫ y
x
F (v)dv = c2 (2.5)
with x < y, where x corresponds to v∗1, and y corresponds v
∗
2. It can be easily seen
that we have x ≥ c1 and y ≥ c2. They can be regarded as cutoff reaction functions
because (2.4) shows how bidder 1 will choose a cutoff point x, given bidder 2’s action
y. Equation (2.5) shows how bidder 2 will choose a cutoff point y, given bidder 1’s a
action x. A monotonic equilibrium (v∗1, v
∗
2) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] is obtained when x and y
satisfy these two equations simultaneously.
From (2.4), we have x = x(y) = c1
F (y)
. Then dx
dy
= − c1f(y)
F 2(y)
< 0. This implicitly
defines y as a decreasing function of x, denoted by y = y(x). We now substitute
y = y(x) into the left side of (2.5) and let
h(x) = xF (x) +
∫ y(x)
x
F (v)dv − c2.
23
Substitute x = x(y) into the left side of (2.5) and let
λ(y) =
c1
F (y)
F (
c1
F (y)
) +
∫ y
c1
F (y)
F (v)dv.
Then λ′(y) = F (y)− c1
F (y)
c1
F 2(y)
f(y)f( c1
F (y)
). Since x = c1
F (y)
, by substitution, we have
λ′(y) = F (y)− x
2
F (y)
f(y)f(x).
To consider the existence of neg-monotonic equilibria in which the cutoff points
satisfy v∗2 < v
∗
1 whenever c1 < c2, we can follow the above process similarly. Also by
Lemma 1, we have v∗2 ≤ 1.
For bidder 2, when v2 = v
∗
2, his expected revenue is given by v
∗
2F (v
∗
1) and the
zero profit condition requires that
c2 = v
∗
2F (v
∗
1). (2.6)
For bidder 1, it is possible that v∗1 > 1, i.e., bidder 1 will never participate.
Again, this requires that
F (c2) +
∫ 1
c2
(1− v)dF (v) = c2F (c2) +
∫ 1
c2
F (v)dv < c1.
In this case, we have a neg-monotonic equilibrium with v∗1 > 1 and v
∗
2 = c2.
Now suppose the above inequality cannot be true. Then bidder 1 chooses a cutoff
point v∗1 ∈ [0, 1]. When his valuation is v1 = v∗1 ≤ 1, he participates in the auction
and receives a zero net-payoff so that
v∗1F (v
∗
2) +
∫ v∗1
v∗2
(v∗1 − v)dF (v)− c1 = 0.
Integrating by parts, we get
c1 = v
∗
2F (v
∗
2) +
∫ v∗1
v∗2
F (v)dv. (2.7)
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Since the distribution function F (v) is non-decreasing, we have
c1 > v
∗
1F (v
∗
2). (2.8)
In order for (2.6), (2.8), and c2 > c1 to be consistent, it requires that
v∗2F (v
∗
1) > v
∗
1F (v
∗
2)
or
F (v∗1)
v∗1
>
F (v∗2)
v∗2
. (2.9)
To find neg-monotonic equilibrium, through (2.6) and (2.7), we define the two
cutoff reaction functions
y(x) = c2/F (x)
φ(x) =
c2
F (x)
F (
c2
F (x)
) +
∫ x
c2
F (x)
F (v)dv.
Again, we use x to correspond to v∗1 and y to correspond to v
∗
2. Note that we
have x ≥ y ≥ c2.
From Campbell [5] and Tan and Yilankaya [40], we know that when two bidders
have the same participation cost c2 and F (v) is strictly convex, there exists a unique
symmetric equilibrium x = y = vs2 that satisfies y = x = c2/F (x) and an asymmetric
equilibrium (x0, y0) with x0 > v
s
2 and y0 < v
s
2, indicating that φ(x) intersects with c2
when x = vs2 and x = x0. Also, by the uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium, v
∗
1 ≥ vs2 if
it exists. Let cm be the minimum of φ(x) =
c2
F (x)
F ( c2
F (x)
)+
∫ x
c2
F (x)
F (v)dv in the interval
[vs2, 1].
We then have the following proposition on the existence and uniqueness of equi-
libria:
Proposition 1 (Existence and Uniqueness Theorem) For the independent pri-
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vate values economic environment with two bidders who have different participation
costs c2 > c1, we have the following conclusions:
(1) There always exists a monotonic equilibrium.
(2) Suppose F (.) is concave. Then the equilibrium is unique and mono-
tonic.
(3) Suppose F (.) is strictly convex. Then
(3.i) the monotonic equilibrium is unique when f(v)
F (v)2
is non-
increasing,
(3.ii) the neg-monotonic equilibrium is unique when c1 = cm,
(3.iii) there is no neg-monotonic equilibrium when c1 < cm,
and
(3.iv) there are at least two neg-monotonic equilibria when
cm < c1 < c2.
The formal proof can be found in Section F of this chapter. Here we provide some
intuition as to why the results are true. To investigate the existence and uniqueness
of the equilibria, we first note the extreme case where there may be an equilibrium in
which one bidder will never participate in the auction. We then exam how functions
λ(y) and φ(x) intersect with c2 and c1, respectively. The existence of a monotonic
equilibrium can be established by the intermediate value theorem. The uniqueness of
the monotonic (neg-monotonic) equilibrium comes from the fact that λ(y) and φ(x)
intersect with c2 and c1, respectively, at most once on the interval y ∈ [vs1, 1] and
[vs2, 1]. When F (.) is concave, λ(y) is a monotonic increasing function, and thus the
monotonic equilibrium is unique. When F (.) is strictly convex, we can also show the
unique monotonic equilibrium and the existence and uniqueness of neg-monotonic
equilibria for some types of convex distribution functions.
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Fig. 1. Uniqueness for Convex Case
Remark 4 There are some facts that may be mentioned for understanding the con-
tents and proof of Proposition 8:
1. For any strictly convex power functions and exponential functions,
f(v)
F (v)2
is a non-increasing function of v. Thus, the set of such strictly
convex functions is not empty. A figure can be used for understanding
why there is a unique monotonic equilibrium for this type of strictly
convex distribution. In Figure 1, λ(y) starts from vs1 with negative
slope. When λ′(y) = 0 has at most one solution, λ(y) intersects with c2
at most one time, indicating that the monotonic equilibrium is unique.
2. From the proof in the Section F, one can see that it is always true that
c2 > cm. Then, as long as c2−c1 is sufficiently small, we have c2 > c1 >
cm. Thus, we can conclude that when c2−c1 is sufficiently small, there
are two neg-monotonic equilibria that are given by (x1, y1) and (x2, y2)
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with y1 = y(x1), y2 = y(x2), and y1 < y2 < v
s
2 < x1 < xm < x2 < x0.
Thus, when F (.) is not concave, the existence of a neg-monotonic equi-
librium depends on the difference of participation costs, c2 − c1. For
instance, when c1 = 0.3, c2 = 0.32, and F (v) =
v+v3
2
(which is strictly
convex), we have one monotonic equilibrium (0.3753, 0.8911) and two
neg-monotonic equilibria (0.6995, 0.6142) and (0.8301, 0.4564). How-
ever, when c1 = 0.3, c2 = 0.4, and F (v) =
v+v3
2
, we only have one
monotonic equilibrium (0.3003, 0.9994). Thus, this example demon-
strates that there are multiple neg-monotonic equilibria when c2 − c1
is sufficiently small, and there is no neg-monotonic equilibrium when
c2 − c1 is large enough.
3. Figure 2 can help us to understand the proof in Section F and the
points mentioned above. φ(x) starts from y = vs2 with negative slope.
When c2−c1 is small enough, it intersects with c1; i.e., a neg-monotonic
equilibrium exists. When c2−c1 is big enough so that c1 < cm, φ(x) and
c1 can not intersect; i.e., no neg-monotonic equilibrium exists. From
the figure, when c1 is close to c2, there are at least two intersection
points for y = φ(x) and y = c1, which means there are at least two
neg-monotonic equilibria, say, (x1, y1) and (x2, y2).
4. Campbell [5] and Tan and Yilankaya [40] showed that there exists an
asymmetric equilibrium when distribution functions are strictly con-
vex. However, our result shows that the strict convexity of the dis-
tribution function alone is not a sufficient condition for the existence
of a neg-monotonic equilibrium, unless the difference c2 − c1 is small
enough. In fact, this result implies that one can refine equilibria and
always eliminate non-equilibria by making participation costs for bid-
28
ders sufficiently different when necessary.
5. In the proof of Proposition 8, the condition that F (.) is concave can
be weakened to F (v) ≥ vf(v) for all v ∈ [c1, 1], and the condition
that F (.) is strictly convex can be weakened to F (v) < vf(v) for all
v ∈ [c2, 1].
6. A non-truth-telling equilibrium may exist when bidders do not use
weakly dominant bidding strategies even if they participate. For ex-
ample, suppose bidder 1 bids zero when he enters and bidder 2 bids
1 when he enters. For bidder 1, he only wins when bidder 2 does not
enter, hence in equilibrium v∗1F (v
∗
2) = c1. Now for bidder 2, he always
wins once he enters and pays nothing. At equilibrium we have v∗2 = c2.
Thus v∗1 =
c1
F (c2)
. So if bidders do not use dominant bidding strategy
when they enter, we may have other cutoff equilibria.
The intuition for the existence of neg-monotonic equilibria when F (.) is strictly
convex and c2 − c1 is sufficiently small is: when bidder 2 uses a smaller cutoff v∗2
to enter the auction, the expected payoff for bidder 1 with a lower value to enter
the auction is small even when he wins the auction. This is true because bidder
1’s expected payment to the seller, which is equal to the expected value of bidder
2’s valuation, is high as F (.) is strictly convex. In this case, bidder 1 would stay
out of the auction by using a larger cutoff point, and thus we have a neg-monotonic
equilibrium. This can only happen when c2−c1 is sufficiently small which makes none
of two bidders has obviously advantage over another. When c2 − c1 is big enough,
bidder 2 will be in a disadvantage as compared to bidder 1, and thus bidder 2 has
to use a bigger cutoff than bidder 1. When F (.) is concave, the above argument
cannot be applied. Now the expected payment of bidder 1 to the seller when he wins
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is small since bidders tend to have small valuations. Bidder 1 with lower value may
also benefit from participating in the auction which can prevents bidder 2 enters the
auction with a smaller cutoff value.
Fig. 2. Existence of Counter-Monotonic Equilibria for Convex Case
One may wonder what would happen at the limits of monotonic and neg-monotonic
equilibria as c2 − c1 → 0. Should a monotonic equilibrium converge to a symmetric
equilibrium or a neg-monotonic equilibrium converge to an asymmetric equilibrium
when c2 → c1?
For instance, suppose c1 is constant at, 0.30, and let c2 decrease from some point
until c2 = c1 = 0.3. Will there be any convergence behavior for monotonic and
neg-monotonic equilibria in this case? Do they converge to a symmetric equilibrium
or an asymmetric equilibrium (if it exists) for a given distribution function? Some
numerical experiments are given in Table I.
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Table I. Sequences of Monotonic and Neg-Monotonic Equilibria
c1 c2 F (v) =
√
v F (v) = v2
0.3 0.3 (0.4481, 0.4481) (0.6694, 0.6694) (0.3425, 0.9358) (0.9358, 0.3425)
0.3 0.31 (0.4387, 0.4675) (0.6845, 0.6616) (0.3327, 0.9426) (0.9318, 0.3570)
0.3 0.32 (0.4303, 0.4861) (0.7000, 0.6530) (0.3237, 0.9627) (0.9271, 0.3723)
0.3 0.33 (0.4226, 0.5038) (0.7162, 0.6434) (0.3155, 0.9751) (0.9216, 0.3886)
0.3 0.34 (0.4156, 0.5210) (0.7332, 0.6323) (0.3079, 0.9870) (0.9150, 0.4061)
0.3 0.35 (0.4091, 0.5376) (0.7517, 0.6193) (0.3009, 0.9985) (0.9068, 0.4256)
0.3 0.36 (0.4032, 0.5537) (0.7725, 0.6038) (0.3000, 1.0000) (0.8963, 0.4418)
0.3 0.37 (0.3976, 0.5694) (0.7984, 0.5804) (0.3000, 1.0000) (0.8805, 0.4773)
0.3 0.38 (0.3923, 0.5847) NA (0.3000, 1.0000) NA
From the table, when F (v) =
√
v, which is concave , we only have the monotonic
equilibrium and is unique. Tan and Yilanyaka [40] proved that when F (.) is con-
cave there is only one unique symmetric equilibrium and no asymmetric equilibrium.
Then is natural that, when c2 converges to c1, the unique monotonic equilibrium will
converge to the unique symmetric equilibrium, as can be seen from Table 1.
However, when F (v) = v2, which is a strictly convex distribution function, we
can see from the table that when c2 − c1 is small enough, there exist one monotonic
and two neg-monotonic equilibria, but when c2 − c1 is big enough, there is only one
monotonic equilibrium. We can also see from the table, somewhat surprisingly, that
unlike the monotonic equilibrium, one sequence of neg-monotonic equilibria converges
to the symmetric equilibrium, while the other sequence of monotonic equilibria con-
verges to the asymmetric equilibrium. Thus, the notion of monotonic/neg-monotonic
equilibrium is not a trivial generalization of symmetric/asymmetric equilibria.
Actually, these limit relationships among monotonic/neg-monotonic equilibria
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and symmetric/asymmetric equilibria are true for general concave and strictly convex
functions.
Proposition 2 (Limit Theorem) For the independent private values economic en-
vironment with two bidders with participation costs c2 > c1, we have the following
conclusions:
(1) Suppose F (.) is concave. The unique monotonic equilibrium (no neg-
monotonic equilibrium) converges to the unique symmetric equilibrium
as c2 − c1 → 0.
(2) Suppose F (.) is strictly convex and f(v)
F (v)2
is a non-increasing function
of v. The unique monotonic equilibrium converges to an asymmetric
equilibrium as c2 − c1 → 0.
(3) Suppose F (.) is strictly convex. When c2 − c1 → 0, there are two
neg-monotonic of which one converges to the unique symmetric equi-
librium, and the other converges to an asymmetric equilibrium.
Some intuition can be given here for the convergence results of the equilibria. By
the continuity of the reaction function, as the participation costs c1 and c2 converge,
the set of equilibria will converge to the set of equilibria when c1 = c2. In particular,
if we focus on the equilibrium in which bidder 1 uses the smallest cutoff point among
all bidder 1’s equilibrium cutoffs (which is necessarily a monotonic equilibrium), this
will converge to the equilibrium for c1 = c2 in which bidder 1 uses the smallest cutoff
among all of bidder 1’s equilibrium cutoffs. Thus, if the equilibrium is unique when
c1 = c2, and there is a unique monotonic equilibrium for all c1 and c2 in the sequence,
that equilibrium sequence must converge to the symmetric equilibrium. However, if
there are asymmetric equilibria when c1 = c2, then the equilibrium in which bidder 1
uses the smallest cutoff must converge to the asymmetric equilibrium in which bidder
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1 uses the smaller cutoff. Hence, if the monotonic equilibrium is unique, then it will
converge, and the equilibrium that converges to the symmetric equilibrium must be
neg-monotonic.
From Figures 1 and 2, one can see that, as c2 − c1 → 0, any monotonic/non
monotonic equilibrium converges along the bidders’ reaction curves determined by
λ(y) and φ to the nearest equilibrium, whether it is symmetric or asymmetric.
Fig. 3. Uniform Case
Before finishing this section, we examine the effects of changes in participation
costs on equilibrium behavior.
Proposition 3 (Comparative Static Theorem) For the independent private val-
ues economic environment with two bidders, suppose the values of bidders are drawn
from a concave distribution function F (.) and the participation costs c1 and c2 are
common knowledge. Then an increase in participation cost ci increases i’s cutoff point
v∗i but decreases the opponent’s cutoff point v
∗
j for j 6= i.
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In fact, when F (v) is uniform, we can derive the unique equilibrium explicitly, and
analyze equilibrium behavior directly. The condition for v∗2 > 1 implies c2 >
1
2
+ 1
2
c21.
In Figure 3, above the parabola c2 =
1
2
+ 1
2
c21 and inside the square (the shaded
area) is the area where bidder 2 will never participate (v∗2 > 1) and bidder 1 uses
v∗1 = c1 as his cutoff point. In the area between c1 = c2 and the parabola, we have
c1 < c2 ≤ 12 + 12c21. In this case, there is a unique monotonic equilibrium with v∗1 ≤ 1
and v∗2 ≤ 1 that can be solved explicitly.
Using (4.2) and (2.3) under the uniform distribution, we have
(P1)

v∗2 > v
∗
1
c1 = v
∗
1v
∗
2
1
2
(v∗1
2 + v∗2
2) = c2.
Solving these equations, we have v
∗
1 =
1
2
(
√
2(c1 + c2)−
√
2(c2 − c1))
v∗2 =
1
2
(
√
2(c1 + c2) +
√
2(c2 − c1)).
We can also require here that v∗2 ≤ 1 to see what conditions should be satisfied.
From 1
2
(
√
2(c1 + c2) +
√
2(c2 − c1)) ≤ 1, we immediately have c2 ≤ 12 + 12c21, which is
exactly the same condition required for v∗2 ≤ 1.
Since
∂v∗1
∂c1
= (2
√
c1 + c2)
−1 + (2
√
c2 − c1)−1 > 0
∂v∗2
∂c2
= (2
√
c1 + c2)
−1 + (2
√
c2 + c1)
−1 > 0,
the equilibrium cutoff points are increasing functions in their own participation costs;
the higher a bidder’s own participation cost is, the less likely he will participate in
the auction and submit the bid.
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Also, since c1 + c2 > c2 − c1, we have
∂v∗1
∂c2
= (2
√
c1 + c2)
−1 − (2√c2 − c1)−1 < 0
∂v∗2
∂c1
= (2
√
c1 + c2)
−1 − (2√c2 − c1)−1 < 0.
The cutoff point of each bidder is a decreasing function of the other’s participation
cost. The intuition behind this is clear. The higher your opponent’s participation
cost is, the less likely he will participate in the auction. Thus, it is more likely you
will win the object, so your expected net-payoff tends to be higher. Consequently,
you will be more willing to participate in the auction, so your cutoff point will be
lower.
Remark 5 Here we express the comparative statics in terms of c1 and c2. We can
also express these in terms of v∗1 and v
∗
2:
∂v∗1
∂c1
=
v∗2
v∗2
2−v∗12
> 0,
∂v∗2
∂c1
= − v∗1
v∗2
2−v∗12
< 0,
∂v∗1
∂c2
= − v∗1
v∗2
2−v∗12
< 0, and
∂v∗2
∂c2
=
v∗2
v∗2
2−v∗12
> 0.
More generally, suppose we have a monotonic equilibrium (v∗1, v
∗
2) for the costs
(c1, c2). Now choose (c
′
1, c
′
2) satisfying c
′
1 ≥ c1 and c′2 ≤ c2. Note that bidder 1’s best
response when bidder 2’s cutoff is in [c2, v
∗
2] must lie in [v
∗
1, 1] since c1 has weakly
increased and bidder 2’s best response when bidder 1’s cutoff is in [v∗1, 1] must lie
in [c2, v
∗
2] since c2 has weakly decreased. Thus for costs (c
′
1, c
′
2), the sets [v
∗
1, 1] for
bidder 1 and [c2, v
∗
2] for bidder 2 are closed under best response. So there must be
an equilibrium in which each bidder uses a cutoff point from his specified set. That
is, when one bidder’s cost increases and the other’s decreases, there is necessarily a
new equilibrium in which the former uses a greater cutoff point and the latter uses a
smaller cutoff. Of course when F (.) is concave, which gives us a unique equilibrium,
we obtain the above result.
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D. Extensions
In the previous section, we studied the equilibrium behavior for an economic environ-
ment with two bidders and the same continuously differentiable distribution functions
defined on the support [0, 1]. In this section, we briefly discuss some extensions by
relaxing these assumptions.
1. Two Types of Bidders with Different Participation Costs
In this subsection we extend the model in Section 3 to a more general economic envi-
ronment where there are two types of bidders. Type 1 possesses lower participation
costs c1. The number of bidders in this type is n1. Type 2 possesses higher participa-
tion costs c2 > c1. There are n2 bidders in this type. The total number of bidders is
n = n1 + n2. For simplicity, we only consider the type-symmetric equilibrium by as-
suming that that bidders with the same participation cost use the same cutoff point.
We will consider the type-asymmetric equilibrium next subsection.
Again, we first assume, provisionally, that a monotonic equilibrium exists. By
Lemma 1, we have v∗1 ≤ 1. As discussed in Section 3, for each bidder in type 1, when
his valuation is v1 = v
∗
1, he is indifferent between participating in the auction and not
participating in the auction. Thus we have the zero net-payoff equation
c1 = v
∗
1F (v
∗
1)
n1−1F (v∗2)
n2 . (2.10)
For each bidder in type 2 who has participation cost c2 and uses v
∗
2 as his decision
point to participate, if v∗2 > 1 ( i.e., type 2 bidders never participate) then v
∗
1 = v
′
1,
where v′1 is determined by c1 = v
′
1F (v
′
1)
n1−1. For this to be an equilibrium strategy
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of “{No}”, by the same reason as in last section, we need
v′1F (v
′
1)
n1 +
∫ 1
v′1
F (v)n1dv < c2;
i.e., given the strategy of type 1 bidders, the expected revenue of any type 2 bidder
participating in the auction is less than his participation cost even when his value
is 1. Then, v∗1 = v
′
1 for each bidder in type 1 and v
∗
2 > 1 for each bidder in type 2
comprise a monotonic equilibrium.
When a type 2 bidder chooses a cutoff point v∗2 ≤ 1, and v2 = v∗2, we have
c2 = v
∗
2F (v
∗
1)
n1F (v∗2)
n2−1 + F (v∗2)
n2−1
∫ v∗2
v∗1
(v∗2 − v)d(1−
∫ 1
v
dF (v))n1 ,
where the first part on the right side is the expected revenue when he is the only
bidder in the auction submitting the bid. The second part is the expected revenue
when he is the only type 2 bidder submitting a bid, and there is at least one bidder
in type 1 submitting a bid. (1− ∫ 1
v
dF (v))n1 is the probability that at least one type
1 bidder participates in the auction and bids at most v. Simplifying the equation, we
have
c2 = v
∗
2F (v
∗
1)
n1F (v∗2)
n2−1 + F (v∗2)
n2−1
∫ v∗2
v∗1
(v∗2 − v)dF (v)n1 . (2.11)
Note that, when n1 = n2 = 1, this reduces to equation (2.2). Integrating by
parts to equation (2.11), we have
c2 = v
∗
1F (v
∗
1)
n1F (v∗2)
n2−1 + F (v∗2)
n2−1
∫ v∗2
v∗1
F (v)n1dv. (2.12)
When a type-symmetric neg-monotonic equilibrium exists, by Lemma 1, we have
v∗2 ≤ 1. For bidders in type 1, if v′2F (v′2)n2+
∫ 1
v′2
F (v)n2dv < c1, where v
′
2 is determined
by c2 = v
′
2F (v
′
2)
n2−1, then we have v∗1 > 1. Bidders in type 1 never participate in the
auction. Then, in this case, v∗1 > 1 for bidders in type 1, and v
∗
2 = v
′
2 for bidders in
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type 2 compose a type-symmetric neg-monotonic equilibrium.
Suppose that v′2F (v
′
2)
n2 +
∫ 1
v′2
F (v)n2dv < c1 is not true. Then v
∗
1 ≤ 1. Similar to
the previous section, the zero net-payoff condition requires that
c2 = v
∗
2F (v
∗
2)
n2−1F (v∗1)
n1
c1 = v
∗
1F (v
∗
1)
n1−1F (v∗2)
n2 + F (v∗1)
n1−1
∫ v∗1
v∗2
(v∗1 − v)d(F (v))n2 . (2.13)
Integrating (2.13) by parts, we have
c1 = v
∗
2F (v
∗
2)
n2F (v∗1)
n1−1 + F (v∗1)
n1−1
∫ v∗1
v∗2
F (v)n2dv (2.14)
and thus
c1 > v
∗
2F (v
∗
2)
n2F (v∗1)
n1−1 + F (v∗1)
n1−1(v∗1 − v∗2)F (v∗2)n2 = v∗1F (v∗2)n2F (v∗1)n1−1.
In order for this to be consistent with c1 < c2, one necessary condition required is
c2 = v
∗
2F (v
∗
2)
n2−1F (v∗1)
n1 > v∗1F (v
∗
2)
n2F (v∗1)
n1−1,
or
F (v∗2)
v∗2
<
F (v∗1)
v∗1
, which is the same as in the case of two bidders.
Consider the following 2 equations:
c2 = yF (y)
n2−1F (x)n1
c1 = yF (y)
n2F (x)n1−1 + F (x)n1−1
∫ x
y
F (v)n2dv.
The first equation implicitly defines y as a function of x, denoted by y(x), which has
a fixed point vs2 determined by c2 = v
s
2F (v
s
2)
n1+n2−1. Then when x > vs2, we have
y < vs2.
Insert y(x) into the right side of the second equation and let
φ(x) = y(x)F (y(x))n2F (x)n1−1 + F (x)n1−1
∫ x
y(x)
F (v)n2dv.
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Let cm be the minimum of φ(x) = y(x)F (y(x))
n2F (x)n1−1 + F (x)n1−1
∫ x
y(x)
F (v)n2dv
in the interval [vs2, 1].
We then have the following proposition:
Proposition 4 (Existence and Uniqueness Theorem) For the independent pri-
vate values economic environment with two types of bidders who have different partic-
ipation costs c2 > c1, we have the following conclusions for type-symmetric equilibria:
(1) There is always a type-symmetric monotonic equilibrium.
(2) Suppose F (.) is concave. Then, the type-symmetric equilibrium is
unique.
(3) Suppose F (.) is strictly convex. Then,
(3.i) the type-symmetric monotonic equilibrium is unique if
f(v)
F 2(v)
and F (v)
vf(v)
are non-increasing,
(3.ii) the type-symmetric neg-monotonic equilibrium is unique
when c1 = cm,
(3.iii) there is no type-symmetric neg-monotonic equilibrium
when c1 < cm and
(3.iv) there are at least two type-symmetric neg-monotonic
equilibria when cm < c1 < c2.
As in the case of two bidders, when c2 − c1 → 0, we have similar convergence
results: When F (.) is concave, the unique type-symmetric monotonic equilibrium
(there is no type-symmetric neg-monotonic equilibrium) converges to the unique type-
symmetric equilibrium as c2−c1 → 0. When F (.) is strictly convex, f(v)F (v)2 and F (v)vf(v) are
non-increasing, the unique type-symmetric monotonic equilibrium converges to a type
asymmetric equilibrium as c2 − c1 → 0. When F (.) is strictly convex, there are two
39
type-symmetric neg-monotonic equilibria such that one converges to the unique type-
symmetric equilibrium, and the other converges to a type-asymmetric equilibrium as
c2 − c1 → 0.
We can similarly examine the effects of changes in costs and in numbers of bidders
on equilibrium behavior. For simplicity, we only consider the case of the uniform
distribution function. As in the last section, the comparative analysis can be obtained
for general distribution functions.
From (3.1) and (2.11), we have
c1 = v
∗
1
n1v∗2
n2 (2.15)
c2 = v
∗
1
n1+1v∗2
n2−1 + v∗2
n2−1
∫ v∗2
v∗1
vn1dv (2.16)
which gives us
c2 =
n1
n1 + 1
v∗1
n1+1v∗2
n2−1 +
1
n1 + 1
v∗2
n1+n2 . (2.17)
(2.15) and (2.17) provide the conditions that should be satisfied simultaneously
for the equilibrium cutoff points.
We then have the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Suppose the values of bidders are drawn from a uniform distribution
function F (.) and the participation costs c1 and c2 are publicly known information.
Then we have
1) an increase in participation cost ci increases i’s cutoff point v
∗
i , but
decreases his opponents’ cutoff point v∗j for i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
2) the cutoff points for both types of bidders increase when the number of
any type of bidder increases.
Proposition 5.(1) gives us results similar to those in previous section. A bidder’s
cutoff point is an increasing function of his own participation cost and a decreasing
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function of others’ participation costs. Proposition 5.(2) shows that more bidders in
the auction will increase the competitiveness among the potential bidders, and this
will reduce the possible payoff to each bidder. Thus, bidders will be less likely to
participate in the auction, and their value cutoff points will increase.
2. Type Asymmetric Equilibria
In this subsection we give a brief discussion on allowing asymmetric cutoff points
within a group. To allow such a possibility, we consider the simplest economy with
three bidders in the two groups. The first two bidders’ participation costs are the
same so that c1 = c2, and the third bidder’s participation cost is c3. For simplicity,
we assume that distribution functions are the same for all bidders. Let v∗1 and v
∗
2 be
the corresponding cutoff points for the two bidders in type 1 and v∗3 be the cutoff
point for type 2 bidder. We assume c1 = c2 < c3 and v
∗
1 < v
∗
2. There are three cases
to be considered.
Case 1: v∗1 < v
∗
2 < v
∗
3. Then we have
c1 = v
∗
1F (v
∗
2)F (v
∗
3),
c2 ≥ v∗2F (v∗1)F (v∗3) + F (v∗3)
∫ v∗2
v∗1
(v∗2 − v)dF (v),
c3 ≥ v∗3F (v∗1)F (v∗2) + F (v∗2)
∫ v∗2
v∗1
(v∗3 − v)dF (v) +
∫ v∗3
v∗2
(v∗3 − v)dF (v)2.
The above equations hold with equality when v∗i ≤ 1. On the right side of the third
equation, the first part is the revenue bidder 3 receives when the other two bidders
do not participate in the auction. The second part is the revenue he receives when
the highest bid of the other two is less than v∗2. This happens when bidder 2 does not
participate in the auction. The third part is the revenue when the others’ highest bid
is greater than v∗2 and less than v
∗
3.
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When F (v) is concave, we cannot have such an equilibrium. To see this, from the
first two equations, we have v∗1F (v
∗
2)F (v
∗
3) > v
∗
2F (v
∗
1)F (v
∗
3); i.e., we have
F (v∗2)
v∗2
>
F (v∗1)
v∗1
with v∗2 > v
∗
1, which cannot be true when F (v) is concave.
When F (v) is strictly convex, from the first two equations, we treat v∗3 as a
constant. Then it seems as if bidder 1 and bidder 2 possess participation costs c1
F (v∗3)
.
We know there is an equilibrium in which v∗1 < v
∗
2 and the equilibrium is a function
of v∗3. Inserting into the third equation, we can get v
∗
3. In particular, when v
∗
3 > 1,
bidder 3 never participates in the auction.
Case 2: v∗1 < v
∗
3 < v
∗
2. Then we have
c1 = v
∗
1F (v
∗
2)F (v
∗
3),
c3 ≥ v∗3F (v∗1)F (v∗2) + F (v∗2)
∫ v∗3
v∗1
(v∗3 − v)dF (v),
c2 ≥ v∗2F (v∗1)F (v∗3) + F (v∗3)
∫ v∗3
v∗1
(v∗2 − v)dF (v) +
∫ v∗2
v∗3
(v∗2 − v)dF (v)2.
When F (v) is concave, from the first and third equation above, we have v∗1F (v
∗
2)F (v
∗
3) >
v∗2F (v
∗
1)F (v
∗
3), which again cannot be true for v
∗
1 < v
∗
2. So v
∗
1 = v
∗
3. The problem can
be reduced to the type symmetric equilibrium. When F (v) is strictly convex, we can
treat v∗1 in the second and third equation as constant. From the discussion in Section
C, we know that when c3−c1 is sufficiently small, there exists an equilibrium in which
v∗2 < v
∗
3. A limiting case is when c3 = c1. As Tan and Yilankaya [40] point out, when
F (v) is strictly convex but not log-concave, there may exist equilibria with three or
more cutoff points.
Case 3: v∗3 < v
∗
1 < v
∗
2. The discussion for this is similar to Case 2.
Summarizing our discussion above and the results we obtain in Sections C and
D, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 6 For the independent private values economy with two groups and
42
three bidders, when F (.) is concave, we only have the unique type-symmetric mono-
tonic equilibrium. When F (.) is strictly convex, type-asymmetric equilibria exist.
3. Bidders with Different Valuation Distributions
We consider an economy where bidders have different valuation distributions F1(v)
and F2(v). Here Fi(v) is the probability that bidder i’s valuation is less than or equal
to v, and i = 1, 2. Tan and Yilankaya [40] considered a similar economic environment
where there are two groups of bidders with different valuation distributions but the
same participation costs. Miralles [34] studied equilibrium behavior when bidders’
valuation distributions can be ordered in a first order stochastic dominance ranking
but still retain the same participation cost.
Here, we allow both valuation distribution functions and participation costs of
bidders to be different. Again, we assume c1 < c2 and use x and y to refer the cutoff
points used by bidder 1 and 2, respectively. We want to investigate the existence of
equilibria and equilibria behavior.
To find a monotonic equilibrium, we need to consider the following two equations:
c1 = xF2(y)
c2 ≥ xF1(x) +
∫ y
x
F1(v)dv.
Again, the first equation implicitly defines x as a decreasing function of y, denoted
by x(y). We then have dx
dy
= −xf2(y)
F2(y)
. Also we know x(y) has a fixed point vs1 6= 0
determined by c1 = v
s
1F2(v
s
1). Since x(y) is monotonically decreasing, we have x < v
s
1
and y > vs1.
Inserting x(y) into the second equation and letting λ(y) = xF1(x) +
∫ y
x
F1(v)dv
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with x < y, we have
λ′(y) = F1(y) + xf1(x)
dx
dy
=
F1(y)F2(y)− x2f1(x)f2(y)
F2(y)
.
When F1(v) and F2(v) are both concave, we have
λ′(y) >
F1(y)F2(y)− xyf1(x)f2(y)
F2(y)
>
F1(y)F2(y)− F1(x)F2(y)
F2(y)
> 0,
which indicates that λ(y) is a monotonically increasing function.
For the existence of neg-monotonic equilibrium, we consider the following two
equations:
c2 = yF1(x)
c1 ≥ yF2(y) +
∫ x
y
F2(v)dv.
From the first equation we have y = c2
F1(x)
. Inserting it into the right side of the second
equation and letting φ(x) = yF2(y) +
∫ x
y
F2(v)dv with x ≥ y, by the same reason as
before, we have φ′(x) > 0 when both F1(v), F2(v) are concave. y = c2F1(x) also has a
fixed point vs2 determined by c2 = v
s
2F1(v
s
2). Since x(y) is monotonically decreasing,
we have y < vs2 and x > v
s
2.
We then have the following proposition:
Proposition 7 (Existence and Uniqueness Theorem) For a two-bidder econ-
omy with different continuously differentiable distribution functions F1(v) and F2(v)
and different costs c1 < c2, we have the following results:
(1) There always exists an equilibrium (v∗1, v
∗
2).
(2) Suppose F1(.) and F2(.) are both concave and F1(v) < F2(v) for all
v ∈ (0, 1). Then there exists a unique equilibrium that is monotonic.
(3) Suppose F1(.) and F2(.) are both concave and F1(v) > F2(v) for all
v ∈ (0, 1). Let vs1 and vs2 satisfy c1 = vs1F2(vs1) and c2 = vs2F1(vs2),
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respectively. Then, we have
i) If vs1 < v
s
2, there is a unique equilibrium that is monotonic;
ii) If vs1 > v
s
2, there is a unique equilibrium that is neg-
monotonic, satisfying v∗1 > v
∗
2;
iii) If vs1 = v
s
2 = v
s, there is a unique equilibrium that is a
special neg-monotonic equilibrium, satisfying v∗1 = v
∗
2 =
vs.
Remark 6 F1(v) < F2(v) for all v ∈ [0, 1] means that bidder 1 is a strong bidder
in the sense that there is a high probability that his valuation is higher than bidder
2’s valuation. A higher valuation together with a smaller participation cost makes
bidder 1 more likely to participate in the auction; i.e., he is more likely to choose
a lower cutoff point. However when F1(v) > F2(v) for all v ∈ (0, 1), bidders with
higher participation costs may have lower or identical cutoff points even though their
participation costs are higher.
When F1(v) > F2(v) for all v ∈ (0, 1), then, for each given value v, the proba-
bility that bidder 2 does not participate in the auction is less than that of bidder 1.
Thus, bidder 2 has an advantage in winning the bid and a disadvantage in the partic-
ipation cost. When the advantage can overbid the disadvantage, bidder 2 has a lower
cutoff point, rather than a higher one, resulting in the nonexistence of a monotonic
equilibrium. We can also interpret this in another way. F1(v) > F2(v) implies that
F1(v) is more concave than F2(v) and that bidder 1 is more risk averse than bidder 2.
This reduces his entrance probability by leading him to choose a higher cutoff point.
Remark 7 Unlike the results obtained in Section C, (3.iii) shows that when bidders’
distribution functions are different, v∗1 = v
∗
2 can be an equilibrium although bidders’
participation costs are different. That is, we have a special neg-monotonic equilibrium
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with v∗1 = v
∗
2 even when c1 < c2. When bidders’ distribution functions are the same,
as in Section C, this is impossible.
Thus, when bidders have different distributions on valuations, some of the pre-
vious results no longer hold true. The distributions of valuations have substantial
effects on types of equilibria.
4. Positive Lower Bound of Supports
The support of valuations also affects the existence of equilibria. When the lower
bound of the support of the valuation is not zero, there may be an equilibrium in
which one bidder always participates in the auction and the other never participates
in the auction.
Suppose the support of the distribution function F (v) is [vl, vh]. There are six
cases for consideration in studying equilibrium behavior of bidders:
Case 1. vh < c1 < c2. It is clear both bidders never participate in the auction.
Case 2. vl < c1 < vh < c2. Bidder 2 never participates in the auction. Bidder 1
participates in the auction if v1 ≥ c1 and does not otherwise.
Case 3. c1 < vl < vh < c2. Bidder 2 never participates, and bidder 1 always
participates.
Case 4. vl < c1 < c2 < vh. The analysis and results are the same as those in
Section C that deals with the special case where vl = 0 and vh = 1.
Case 5. c1 < vl < c2 < vh. We can have the following equilibrium: Bidder
1 always enters, and bidder 2 never enters. For this to be an equilibrium, we need
vh − vl < c2; that is, the maximum revenue bidder 2 gets from participating in the
auction must be smaller than his participation costs. When c2 ≤ vh − vl, bidder 2
will choose a cutoff point v∗2 ∈ [c2, vh]. If there is an equilibrium in which bidder 1
46
never participates, then bidder 2 uses v∗2 = c2. To have such an equilibrium, we need
vhF (c2) +
∫ vh
c2
(vh − v)dF (v) = c2F (c2) +
∫ vh
c2
F (v)dv < c1.
A sufficient condition for this is vh + c2F (c2) < c1 + c2.
Case 6. c1 < c2 < vl < vh. We can have the following equilibrium: Bidder 1
always participates in the auction, and bidder 2 never participates in the auction. For
this to be an equilibrium, we need vh − vl < c2. Bidder 2 always participates in the
auction, and bidder 1 never participates in the auction. For this to be an equilibrium,
we need vh − vl < c1. When both bidders choose a cutoff point inside the support of
valuations, we can use the same analysis as in Section C to investigate the equilibrium
behavior.
E. Conclusion
This chapter investigates equilibria of second price auctions when bidders have private
valuations and different participation costs that are common knowledge. We identify
two types of equilibria: monotonic and neg-monotonic equilibria. We show that there
always exists an equilibrium that is monotonic, and further that, it is unique when
F (.) is concave or when F (.) is strictly convex with additional restrictions.
We also consider the existence of neg-monotonic equilibria. We show that when
the distribution function of valuation is strictly convex and when the difference of par-
ticipation costs is sufficiently small, there is a neg-monotonic equilibrium. One policy
implication is that one may solve multiple equilibria by eliminating neg-monotonic
equilibria through differentiating participation costs significantly. We also show that
when the difference in participation costs goes to zero, the monotonic equilibria
of concave valuation distribution converge to the symmetric equilibrium, while the
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monotonic equilibrium of convex valuation distributions converges to the asymmetric
equilibrium. This is contradictory to our common intuition.
We provide some comparative static analysis. we show that the cutoff point is
increasing in one’s own participation cost but is decreasing in the opponents’ partici-
pation costs. We also show that as the number of bidders increases, the cutoff points
for all bidders will increase. This is consistent with the idea that more potential
bidders will increase competition among bidders and will thus reduce the expected
payoff of each buyer, with the natural consequence of reduced buyer participation.
We also consider some extensions of our basic model. We discuss equilibrium
behavior for the economic environment with two types of bidders, and get similar
results. However, when bidders are allowed to have different valuation distribution
functions, some of the results for the basic model are no longer true. We also extend
the basic model to the one with a positive lower bound of the support. In this case,
we may have an equilibrium in which some bidders always enter the auction.
F. Proofs of the Main Results
Proof of Lemma 1:
Suppose not. All bidders never participate in the auction (i.e., v∗i > 1 for all bidders
i). When bidder n knows the other n− 1 bidders will not participate in the auction
regardless of their valuations, then bidder n participates in the auction when his
value is greater than or equal to his participation cost. Then we have v∗n = cn ≤ 1, a
contradiction.
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Proof of Lemma 2:
First note that vs1 < v
s
2 by monotonicity of vF (v). When bidder 2 chooses never to
participate, then v∗1 = c1 < v
s
1 and v
∗
2 > 1. The above lemma holds obviously.
Now suppose v∗2 ≤ 1. We have
v∗1F (v
∗
1) +
∫ v∗2
v∗1
F (v)dv = c2 = v
s
2F (v
s
2).
Since v∗1F (v
∗
1) +
∫ v∗2
v∗1
F (v)dv = v∗2F (v
∗
2)−
∫ v∗2
v∗1
vf(v)dv, we have
v∗2F (v
∗
2)−
∫ v∗2
v∗1
vf(v)dv = vs2F (v
s
2).
Then vs2F (v
s
2) < v
∗
2F (v
∗
2). We must have v
s
2 < v
∗
2 by the monotonicity of vf(v). Also,
since we have v∗2 > v
s
1 and c1 = v
∗
1F (v
∗
2) = v
s
1F (v
s
1), for this equation to be true,
we must have v∗1 < v
s
1. Otherwise we have v
∗
1F (v
∗
2) > v
s
1F (v
s
1), a contradiction. So
v∗1 < v
s
1. Thus, we prove v
∗
2 > v
s
2 > v
s
1 > v
∗
1.
Proof of Proposition 8:
The proof of Proposition 8 is based on the following fives lemmas (from Lemma 3 to
Lemma 7).
Lemma 3 For the economic environment with two bidders, there always exists an
equilibrium that is monotonic; i.e., for c2 > c1, there exists a cutoff point vector
(v∗1, v
∗
2) such that v
∗
2 > v
∗
1.
Proof. When c1F (c1) +
∫ 1
c1
F (v)dv < c2, as we discussed above, bidder 2 will never
participate in the auction and thus v∗1 = c1 and v
∗
2 > 1 constitute a monotonic
equilibrium. Now we consider the case of c1F (c1) +
∫ 1
c1
F (v)dv ≥ c2.
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Given that the point vs1 determined by c1 = v
s
1F (v
s
1), we have x < v
s
1 and y > v
s
1
by noting that y = y(x) is a decreasing function. Since h(c1) = c1F (c1)+
∫ 1
c1
F (v)dv−
c2 ≥ 0 and h(vs1) = c1− c2 < 0, there exists a v∗1 ∈ [c1, vs1) such that h(v∗1) = 0. Thus,
v∗1 < v
s
1 and v
∗
2 = y(v
∗
1) > v
s
1 constitute a monotonic equilibrium.
Lemma 4 If F (.) is concave, there is a unique monotonic equilibrium.
Proof. Since F (.) is concave, we have F (v) ≥ vF ′(v) = vf(v) for any point v ∈ [0, 1],
and by noting y > x, we have
λ′(y) = F (y)− x
2
F (y)
f(y)f(x) > F (y)−F (x)xf(y)
F (y)
> F (y)−F (x)yf(y)
F (y)
≥ F (y)−F (x) > 0,
which indicates that λ(y) is monotonically increasing. First consider the case where
λ(1) = c1F (c1)+
∫ 1
c1
F (v)dv ≥ c2. Since λ(vs1)−c2 = c1−c2 < 0, then, by monotonicity
and continuity of λ and x(y), y = v∗2 ∈ (vs1, 1] is uniquely determined by λ(y)−c2 = 0,
as is x = v∗1 < v
s
1. Thus, the monotonic equilibrium is unique. Now suppose λ(1) < c2.
Then bidder 2 will never participate in the auction; thus x = v∗1 = c1 and v
∗
2 > 1 will
again be the unique monotonic equilibrium.
Lemma 5 If F (.) is concave, there is no neg-monotonic equilibrium, and thus the
equilibrium is unique and monotonic.
Proof. We first prove there is no neg-monotonic equilibrium in which v∗1 > 1. To see
this, notice that v∗1 > 1 requires c1 > c2F (c2) +
∫ 1
c2
F (v)dv. However when F (v) is
concave, we have
c1 > c2F (c2) +
∫ 1
c2
F (v)dv ≥ c2F (c2) + (1− c2)F (c2) = F (c2) ≥ c2
by noting that F (c2) ≥ c2 since F (c) = F (c×1+(1− c)0) ≥ cF (1)+(1− c)F (0) = c.
But this contradicts the fact that c1 < c2.
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We now show that there does not exist any neg-monotonic equilibrium with
v∗1 ≤ 1 either. Suppose not. We then have v∗2 < v∗1 and F (v
∗
1)
v∗1
>
F (v∗2)
v∗2
, which
contradicts the fact that F (v)
v
is a non-increasing function when F (.) is a concave
function. Thus, there does not exist any neg-monotonic equilibrium in either case.
Consequently, by Lemma 4, the equilibrium is unique, which is monotonic.
Lemma 6 Suppose F (.) is strictly convex and f(v)
F (v)2
is non-increasing. Then, there
is a unique monotonic equilibrium.
Proof. Notice that λ′(y) can be written as
λ′(y) = F (y)− x
2
F (y)
f(y)f(x) = F (y)[1− x
2f(x)f(y)
F (y)2
].
Since x
2f(x)f(y)
F (y)2
is a decreasing function in y by noting f(v) is an increasing function
by strict convexity of F (v) and x = c1
F (y)
, 1 − x2f(x)f(y)
F (y)2
is an increasing function in
y, as is λ′(y). Thus, there is at most one y = y0, if any, satisfying λ′(y0) = 0. Also,
notice that, when x = y = vs1,
λ′(vs1) = F (v
s
1)−
vs1
2
F (vs1)
f(vs1)f(v
s
1) < 0
by the strict convexity of F (v). Then λ(y) either decreases over the entire interval
[vs1, 1] (in this case y0 > 1) or decreases first over [v
s
1, y0] and then increases over [y0, 1]
if y0 ≤ 1. If λ(y) decreases over the entire interval [vs1, 1], then λ(y) < c2 for all
y ∈ [vs1, 1], which means bidder 2 never participates in the auction. Thus we have a
unique monotonic equilibrium with v∗1 = c1 and v
∗
2 > 1. On the other hand, if y0 ≤ 1,
λ(y) decreases first over [vs1, y0] and then increases over [y0, 1]. Thus λ(y) = c2 > c1
has at most one solution v∗2. If the solution exists, we have a unique monotonic
equilibrium with v∗1 ≤ 1 and v∗2 ≤ 1; otherwise the unique monotonic equilibrium is
given by v∗1 = c1 and v
∗
2 > 1.
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Lemma 7 Suppose F (.) is strictly convex. There exists a neg-monotonic equilibrium
when c1 = cm and at least two neg-monotonic equilibria when c1 > c1. There is no
neg-monotonic equilibrium when c1 < cm.
Proof. Since
φ′(x) = F (x) + y(x)f(y(x))y′(x)
and
y′(x) = −yf(x)
F (x)
,
we have
φ′(vs2) = F (v
s
2)− vs2f(vs2)
vs2f(v
s
2)
F (vs2)
=
F 2(vs2)− (vs2f(vs2))2
F (vs2)
< 0
by noting that vs2f(v
s
2) > F (v
s
2) by F (v) < vf(v) for all v ∈ [c2, 1] and vs2 ≥ c2, which
indicates that φ(x) is decreasing at x = xs2. Then φ(x) has a minimum value cm < c2
in the interval [vs2, 1] since φ(v
s
2) = c2. Let φ(xm) = cm.
When c1 < cm, we have φ(x) > c1 in the interval [v
s
2, 1]. Thus, there is no neg-
monotonic equilibrium with v∗1 ≤ 1 since the set {x|φ(x) = c1, vs2 ≤ x ≤ 1} is empty.
On the other hand, since φ(1) = c2F (c2) +
∫ 1
c2
F (v)dv ≥ cm > c1, we do not have a
neg-monotonic equilibrium at which bidder 1 never participates so that v∗1 > 1 is not
an equilibrium strategy for bidder 1.
When c1 = cm, since φ(xm) = cm, then x = xm, y = c2/F (xm) is the unique
neg-monotonic equilibrium. Note that when c1 = cm we do not have an equilibrium
in which bidder 1 never participates since φ(1) ≥ cm = c1.
When cm < c1 < c2, we have at least two neg-monotonic equilibria. To see this,
first notice that there exists an x1 ∈ (vs2, xm) such that φ(x1) = c1 by the continuity
of φ(x) and φ(xm) = cm < c1, φ(v
s
2) = c2 > c1. If φ(1) < c1, we have a neg-monotonic
equilibrium at which bidder 1 never participates and bidder 2’s equilibrium strategy
is v∗2 = c2. Otherwise if we have φ(1) ≥ c1, we can also find an x2 ∈ (xm, 1] such that
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φ(x2) = c1 by the continuity of φ(x) on x2 ∈ (xm, 1], φ(1) > c1 and φ(xm) = cm < c1.
Then (x1, c2/F (x1)) and (x2, c2/F (x2)) will be two neg-monotonic equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 2:
2.(1): When F (.) is concave, the monotonic equilibrium and symmetric equilib-
rium are both unique, so we have the result.
2.(2) From the proof of Lemma 6, we know that, when F (.) is strictly convex and
f(v)
F (v)2
is a non-increasing function of v, there is at most one y0 such that λ
′(y0) = 0;
λ(y) either decreases over the entire interval [vs1, 1] or decreases first over [v
s
1, y0] and
then increases over [y0, 1] if y0 ≤ 1. Thus, there is a unique monotonic equilibrium,
which is either given by v∗1 = c1 and v
∗
2 > 1 when λ(y) and c2 have no intersection, or
given by (v∗1, v
∗
2) with v
∗
1 < v
s
1 < y0 < v
∗
2 ≤ 1 when λ(y) and c2 have an intersection.
Here v∗2 is determined by λ(v
∗
2) = c2 and v
∗
1 = c1/F (v
∗
2). Thus, from Figure 1, one can
see that, when c2 → c1, we have an equilibrium given by an asymmetric equilibrium
(v∗′1 , v
∗′
2 ) with v
∗′
1 < v
s
1 < y0 < v
∗′
2 ≤ 1, where v∗′2 is determined by λ(v∗′2 ) = c1 and
v∗′1 = c1/F (v
∗′
2 ). So the unique monotonic equilibrium converges to an asymmetric
equilibrium.
2.(3) When F (.) is strictly convex and c2 − c1 is sufficiently small, there are
two neg-monotonic equilibria (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) with y1 = y(x1), y2 = y(x2), and
y1 < y2 < v
s
2 < x1 < xm < x2 < x0 as we showed in Lemma 7. Thus, from Figure
2, as c1 → c2, the neg-monotonic equilibrium (x1, y1) converges to the symmetric
equilibrium (vs2, v
s
2), and the other neg-monotonic equilibrium (x2, y2) converges to
the asymmetric equilibrium (x0, y0).
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Proof of Proposition 3:
First consider a change in c1. Taking derivatives with respect to c1 on both sides of
(4.2) and (2.3), we have
v∗1f(v
∗
2)
∂v∗2
∂c1
+ F (v∗2)
∂v∗1
∂c1
= 1,
F (v∗2)
∂v∗2
∂c1
+ v∗1f(v
∗
1)
∂v∗1
∂c1
= 0.
Solving for
∂v∗1
∂c1
and
∂v∗2
∂c1
, we have
∂v∗1
∂c1
=
F (v∗2)
F (v∗2)2 − v∗12f(v∗1)f(v∗2)
,
∂v∗2
∂c1
= − v
∗
1f(v
∗
1)
F (v∗2)2 − v∗12f(v∗1)f(v∗2)
.
Note that, since v∗1 < v
∗
2 and F (v) is concave, we have
F (v∗2)
2 − v∗12f(v∗1)f(v∗2) > F (v∗2)2 − v∗1v∗2f(v∗1)f(v∗2) > 0,
and thus we have
∂v∗1
∂c1
> 0 and
∂v∗2
∂c1
< 0.
We now consider the change in c2. Taking derivatives with respect to c2 on both
sides of (4.2) and (2.3) and solving for
∂v∗1
∂c2
,
∂v∗2
∂c2
, we have
∂v∗1
∂c2
= − v
∗
1f(v
∗
2)
F (v∗2)2 − v∗12f(v∗1)f(v∗2)
< 0,
∂v∗2
∂c2
=
F (v∗2)
F (v∗2)2 − v∗12f(v∗1)f(v∗2)
> 0
by noting that F (v∗2)
2 − v∗12f(v∗1)f(v∗2) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4:
The proof of Proposition 4 consists of the following lemmas:
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Lemma 8 For the economic environment with with two types of bidders, there always
exists a type-symmetric equilibrium that is monotonic; i.e., for c2 > c1, there exists a
cutoff point vector (v∗1, v
∗
2) such that v
∗
2 > v
∗
1.
Proof. Consider the following cutoff point reaction equations
c1 = xF (x)
n1−1F (y)n2 (2.18)
c2 = xF (x)
n1F (y)n2−1 + F (y)n2−1
∫ y
x
F (v)n1dv (2.19)
with x < y. From (2.18),
dx
dy
= − n2xf(y)F (x)
F (y)[F (x) + (n1 − 1)xf(x)] < 0,
which indicates that x is a decreasing function of y.
Given v′1 determined by c1 = v
′
1F (v
′
1)
n1 , when v′1F (v
′
1)
n1 +
∫ 1
v′1
F (v)n1dv < c2,
bidder 2 will never participate in the auction and thus v∗1 = c1 and v
∗
2 > 1 constitute
a monotonic equilibrium. So we only need to consider the case of v∗2 ≤ 1.
From (2.18), given vs1 determined by c1 = v
s
1F (v
s
1)
n1−1F (vs1)
n2 , we have x < vs1
and y > vs1 by noting that y = y(x) is a decreasing function. Also , by definition, we
have v′1 < v
s
1.
Let
h(x) = xF (x)n1F (y(x))n2−1 + F (y(x))n2−1
∫ y(x)
x
F (v)n1dv − c2.
Since h(v′1) = v
′
1F (v
′
1)
n1 +
∫ 1
v′1
F (v)n1dv − c2 ≥ 0 and h(vs1) = c1 − c2 < 0, there
exists a v∗1 ∈ [v′1, vs1) such that h(v∗1) = 0. Thus, v∗1 < vs1 and v∗2 = y(v∗1) > vs1
constitute a monotonic equilibrium.
Lemma 9 When F (.) is a concave distribution function, there is a unique type-
symmetric monotonic equilibrium.
55
Proof. Let
λ(y) = xF (x)n1F (y)n2−1 + F (y)n2−1
∫ y
x
F (v)n1dv
= F (y)n2−1(xF (x)n1 +
∫ y
x
F (v)n1dv).
We have
λ′(y) = (n2 − 1)F (y)n2−2f(y)(xF (x)n1 +
∫ y
x
F (v)n1dv)
+F (y)n2−1[F (y)n1 + n1xf(x)F (x)n1−1
dx
dy
],
= F (y)n2−2[(n2 − 1)f(y)
∫ y
x
F (v)n1dv + F (y)n1+1
+(n2 − 1)f(y)xF (x)n1 + n1F (y)xF (x)n1−1f(x)dx
dy
].
Inserting dx
dy
into λ′(y) and rearranging the terms, we have
λ′(y) = F (y)n2−2{(n2 − 1)f(y)
∫ y
x
F (v)n1dv + F (y)n1+1
−xf(y)F (x)n1 [ n1n2
(n1 − 1) + F (x)xf(x)
− (n2 − 1)]}
= F (y)n2−2f(y){(n2 − 1)
∫ y
x
F (v)n1dv +
F (y)n1+1
f(y)
−xF (x)n1 [ n1n2
(n1 − 1) + F (x)xf(x)
− (n2 − 1)]}.
For (2.18), when y = x = vs1 determined by c1 = v
s
1F (v
s
1)
n1−1F (vs1)
n2 , we have
λ′(vs1) = F (v
s
1)
n2−2{F (vs1)n1+1 − vs1f(vs1)F (vs1)n1 [
n1n2
(n1 − 1) + F (v
s
1)
vs1f(v
s
1)
− (n2 − 1)]}.
When F (.) is a concave distribution function, we have xf(x) ≤ F (x) and n1n2
(n1−1)+ F (x)xf(x)
−
(n2 − 1) < 1 for all x. Thus, for y > x
λ′(y) > F (y)n2−2[(n2 − 1)f(y)
∫ y
x
F (v)n1dv + F (y)n1+1 − yf(y)F (y)n1 ] > 0.
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So λ(y) is an increasing function of y when y > vs1. Then y = v
∗
2 > v
s
1 can be
uniquely determined by λ(y) = c2. This together with v
∗
2 = x(v
∗
2) < v
s
1 constitutes
a monotonic equilibrium. If for all y ∈ (vs1, 1] we have λ(y) < c2, then bidder 2
will never participate; i.e., v∗2 > 1 and v
∗
2 < 1 as determined by c1 = v
∗
1F (v
∗
1)
n1−1
compose a unique monotonic equilibrium. In either case we only have one monotonic
equilibrium.
Lemma 10 When F (.) is concave, there is no type-symmetric neg-monotonic equi-
librium.
Proof. We only need to show that there is no neg-monotonic equilibrium in which
v∗1 > 1. The case where there is no neg-monotonic equilibrium with v
∗
1 ≤ 1 is the
same as in Lemma 5. Suppose not. We then have
c1 > v
′
2F (v
′
2)
n2 +
∫ 1
v′2
F (v)n2dv ≥ F (v′2)n2 =
c2F (v
′
2)
v′2
≥ c2
by noting that F (v′2) ≥ v′2 since F (v) = F (v×1+(1−v)0) ≥ vF (1)+(1−v)F (0) = v.
But this contradicts the fact that c1 < c2.
Lemma 11 Suppose F (.) is strictly convex. If f(v)
F (v)2
and F (v)
vf(v)
are non-increasing
functions, then there is a unique type-symmetric monotonic equilibrium.
Proof. When F (.) is strictly convex, f(v) is an increasing function and vf(v) >
F (v) for all v. Then we have λ′(vs1) < 0. Let
λ′(y) = F (y)n2−2f(y){(n2 − 1)
∫ y
x
F (v)n1dv +
F (y)n1+1
f(y)
− xF (x)n1 [ n1n2
(n1 − 1) + F (x)xf(x)
− (n2 − 1)]} = 0.
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Then we have
F (y)n2−2f(y)(n2 − 1)
∫ y
x
F (v)n1dv
+ F (y)n1+n2−1[1− f(y)xF (x)
n1
F (y)n1+1
(
n1n2
(n1 − 1) + F (x)xf(x)
− (n2 − 1))] = 0.
When f(v)
F (v)2
is non-increasing, then f(y)
F (y)n1+1
is decreasing in y. Since F (x)
xf(x)
is non-
increasing and x(y) is decreasing, F (x)
xf(x)
is non-decreasing in y, and thus xF (x)n1 [ n1n2
(n1−1)+ F (x)xf(x)
−
(n2 − 1)] is decreasing in y.
Thus, there exists at most one y ∈ (vs1, 1] such that λ′(y) = 0. For the same
reason as in the proof of Lemma 6, we only have one unique monotonic equilibrium.
Remark 8 When n1 = n2 = 1, xF (x)
n1 [ n1n2
(n1−1)+ F (x)xf(x)
− (n2 − 1)] can be simplified to
x2f(x), which is a decreasing function of y; thus the second condition in the above
lemma is redundant.
Lemma 12 When F (.) is strictly convex, there exists a unique type-symmetric neg-
monotonic equilibrium when c1 = cm and at least two type-symmetric neg-monotonic
equilibria when cm < c1 < c2. There is no type-symmetric neg-monotonic equilibrium
when c1 < cm.
Proof. Consider φ(x) = y(x)F (y(x))n2F (x)n1−1 + F (x)n1−1
∫ x
y(x)
F (v)n2dv, where
y(x) is defined by c2 = yF (y)
n2−1F (x)n1 . We have
y′(x) = − n1yf(x)F (y)
F (x)[F (y) + (n2 − 1)yf(y)] ,
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and
φ′(x) = F (x)n1−2{(n1 − 1)f(x)
∫ x
y
F (v)n2dv + F (x)n1+1
−yf(x)F (y)n2 [ n1n2
(n2 − 1) + F (y)yf(y)
− (n1 − 1)]}
= F (x)n1−2f(x){(n1 − 1)
∫ x
y
F (v)n2dv +
F (x)n2+1
f(x)
−yF (y)n2 [ n1n2
(n2 − 1) + F (y)yf(y)
− (n1 − 1)]}.
When x = y = vs2, we have
φ′(vs2) = F (v
s
2)
n1−2f(vs2){
F (vs2)
n2+1
f(vs2)
− vs2F (vs2)n2 [
n1n2
(n2 − 1) + F (v
s
2)
vs2f(v
s
2)
− (n1 − 1)]}.
Since vs2f(v
s
2) > F (v
s
2) by the strict convexity of F (v), we have φ
′(vs2) < 0, which
indicates that φ(x) is decreasing at x = vs2. Thus φ(x) has a minimum value cm < c2
in the interval [vs2, 1] since φ(v
s
2) = c2. Let φ(xm) = cm.
When c1 < cm, we have φ(x) > c1 for x ∈ [vs2, 1]. However, for us to have a neg-
monotonic equilibrium, we need φ(x) ≤ c1. Therefore we do not have type-symmetric
neg-monotonic equilibria.
When c1 = cm, since φ(xm) = cm, then (x, y) is the unique neg-monotonic
equilibrium, where x = xm and y is determined by c2 = yF (y)
n2−1F (xm)n1 . Also
note that when c1 = cm, we do have a neg-monotonic equilibrium in which bidder 1
never participates since φ(1) ≥ c1.
When cm < c1 < c2, we have at least two type-symmetric neg-monotonic equi-
libria. Indeed, since φ(xm) = cm < c1 and φ(v
s
2) = c2 > c1, there is an x1 such that
φ(x1) = c1. On the other hand, when φ(1) < c1, we have a neg-monotonic equilibrium
in which bidder 1 never participates. When φ(1) ≥ c1, we can find x2 ∈ (xm, 1] such
that φ(x2) = c1 since φ(1) ≥ c1 and φ(xm) = cm < c1. Thus we can find at least two
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type-symmetric neg-monotonic equilibria.
Remark 9 The condition that F (.) is concave in Lemma 9 can be weakened to
F (v) ≥ vf(v) for all v ∈ [c1, 1] and the condition that F (v) is strictly convex in
Lemma 12 can be weakened to F (v) < vf(v) for all v ∈ [c2, 1].
Proof of Proposition 5:
5.(1):
Taking derivatives with respect to c1 on both sides of (2.15) and (2.17) and
making simplifications, we have
1 = n1v
∗
1
n1−1v∗2
n2 ∂v
∗
1
∂c1
+ n2v
∗
2
n2−1v∗1
n1 ∂v
∗
2
∂c1
,
0 = n1v
∗
1
n1v∗2
∂v∗1
∂c1
+ [
n1(n1 − 1)
n1 + 1
v∗1
n1+1 +
n1 + n2
n1 + 1
v∗2
n1+1]
∂v∗2
∂c1
.
Solving for
∂v∗1
∂c1
gives us
∂v∗1
∂c1
=
n1(n2 − 1)v∗1n1+1 + (n1 + n2)v∗2n1+1
n1(n1 + n2)(v∗1
n1−1v∗2
n2(v∗2
n1+1 − v∗1n1+1))
> 0
by v∗2 > v
∗
1. Then we have
∂v∗2
∂c1
= − n1v
∗
1
n1v∗2
n1(n1−1)
n1+1
v∗1
n1+1 + n1+n2
n1+1
v∗2
n1+1
∂v∗1
∂c1
< 0.
Now taking derivatives with respect to c2 on both sides of (2.15) and (2.17) and
making simplifications, we have
0 = n1v
∗
2
∂v∗1
∂c2
+ n2v
∗
1
∂v∗2
∂c2
,
1 =
v∗2
n2−2
n1 + 1
[n1(n1 + 1)v
∗
1
n1v∗2
∂v∗1
∂c2
+ (n1(n2 − 1)v∗1n1+1 + (n1 + n2)v∗2n1+1)
∂v∗2
∂c2
].
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Solving for
∂v∗2
∂c2
, we have
∂v∗2
∂c2
=
n1 + 1
(n1 + n2)(v∗2
n1+1 − v∗1n1+1)v∗2n2−2
> 0
by v∗2 > v
∗
1. Thus we have
∂v∗1
∂c2
= −n2v
∗
1
n1v∗2
∂v∗2
∂c2
< 0.
5.(2):
Note that (2.15) and (2.17) implicitly define v∗1 and v
∗
2 as functions of n1 and n2,
denoted by v∗1 = v
∗
1(n1, n2) and v
∗
2 = v
∗
2(n1, n2). Let
V∗n =
 ∂v∗1∂n1 ∂v∗1∂n2
∂v∗2
∂n1
∂v∗2
∂n2
 .
Taking logs of both equations and defining
H(n1, n2; v
∗
1, v
∗
2) =
 H1(n1, n2; v
∗
1, v
∗
2) = n1 ln(v
∗
1) + n2 ln(v
∗
2)− ln(c1)
H2(n1, n2; v
∗
1, v
∗
2) = ln(
v∗2
n1+n2
n1+1
) + ln(1 + n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1)− ln(c2),
we have
Hv∗ =
 ∂H1∂v∗1 ∂H1∂v∗2
∂H1
∂v∗1
∂H1
∂v∗2
 =

n1
v∗1
n2
v∗2
n1(1+n1)(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1 1
v∗2
1+n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1
n1+n2
v∗2
+
n1(n1+1)(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1 (− v
∗
1
(v∗2)2
)
1+n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1
 .
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Since
det(Hv∗) =
n1
v∗1
(
n1 + n2
v∗2
+
n1(n1 + 1)(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1(− v∗1
(v∗2)2
)
1 + n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1
)− n2
v∗2
n1(1 + n1)(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1 1
v∗2
1 + n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1
=
n1
v∗1
n1 + n2
v∗2
−
n1(n1 + 1)(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1
1 + n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1
n1
(v∗2)2
−
n1(1 + n1)(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1
1 + n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1
n2
v22
=
n1
v∗1
n1 + n2
v∗2
−
n1(1 + n1)(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1
1 + n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1
n2 + n1
(v∗2)2
=
n1(n1 + n2)
v∗2
(
1
v∗1
−
(1 + n1)(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1
1 + n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1
1
v∗2
)
=
n1(n1 + n2)
v∗1v
∗
2
1− (v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1
1 + n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1
and v∗1 < v
∗
2, at the equilibrium (v
∗
1, v
∗
2), we have det(Hv∗) > 0. Then, by the
Implicit Function Theorem, we have
V ∗n = −H−1v∗ Hn =
 ∂v∗1∂n1 ∂v∗1∂n2
∂v∗2
∂n1
∂v∗2
∂n2
 ,
where
Hn =
 ∂H1∂n1 ∂H1∂n2
∂H1
∂n1
∂H1
∂n2
 =
 ln(v
∗
1) ln(v
∗
2)
ln(v∗2) +
(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1+n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1(ln(v∗1)−ln(v∗2))
1+n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1
− 1
1+n1
ln(v∗2)

and
H−1v∗ =
1
det(H(v∗))

n1+n2
v∗2
+
n1(n1+1)(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1 (− v
∗
1
(v∗2)2
)
1+n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1
−n2
v∗2
−n1(1+n1)(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1 1
v2
1+n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1
n1
v∗1
 .
To determine the sign for each term in V ∗n , we ignore det(Hv∗) which is positive.
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The sign of
∂v∗1
∂n1
is determined by the opposite sign of the following term:
(
n1 + n2
v∗2
+
n1(n1 + 1)(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1(− v∗1
(v∗2)2
)
1 + n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1
) ln(v∗1)−
n2
v∗2
ln(v∗2)
−n2
v∗2
(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1 + n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1(ln(v∗1)− ln(v∗2))
1 + n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1
+
1
1 + n1
n2
v∗2
which can be simplified to
1
v∗2(1 + n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1)
[(n1 + n2 − n1(v
∗
1
v∗2
)n1+1) ln(v1)− n2 ln(v2) + n2
1 + n1
(1− (v
∗
1
v∗2
)n1+1)].
Let
f(v∗1) = n2(1−(
v∗1
v∗2
)1+n1)−(1+n1)n2 ln(v∗2)+ln(v∗1)[(1+n1)(n1+n2)−(1+n1)n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1]
be a function of v∗1, where 0 ≤ v∗1 ≤ v∗2 < 1.
From f(v∗2) = 0 and
f ′(v∗1) = −n2(1 + n1)(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1
1
v∗2
+
1
v∗1
(1 + n1)(n1 + n2)− 1
v∗2
(1 + n1)n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1
−(1 + n1)2n1(v
∗
1
v∗2
)n1
1
v∗2
ln(v∗1)
= −(1 + n1)2n1(v
∗
1
v∗2
)n1
1
v∗2
ln(v∗1) + (1 + n1)(n1 + n2)(
1
v∗1
− 1
v∗2
(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1),
we can see that both terms are positive when 0 ≤ v∗1 ≤ v∗2 < 1. Thus, f(v∗1) is
monotonic in the range 0 ≤ v∗1 ≤ v∗2 < 1; hence f(v∗1) < 0. Then we have −f(v∗1) > 0,
and thus
∂v∗1
∂n1
> 0.
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Now for
∂v∗2
∂n1
, we check the sign of
−
n1(1 + n1)(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1 1
v∗2
1 + n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1
ln(v∗1)
+
n1
v∗1
[ln(v∗2) +
(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1 + n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1(ln(v∗1)− ln(v∗2))
1 + n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1
− 1
1 + n1
],
which can be simplified to
− n1
v∗1(1 + n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1)
[(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1 ln(v∗1)− ln(v∗2) +
1− (v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1)
1 + n1
].
Let
f(v∗1) = (1− (
v∗1
v∗2
)1+n1)− (1 + n1) ln(v∗2) + (1 + n1) ln(v∗1)(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1.
We can check that
f(v∗2) = 0,
and
f ′(v∗1) = −(n1 + 1)(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1
1
v∗2
+
1
v∗2
(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1(1 + n1) + ln(v
∗
1)(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1(1 + n1)
2 1
v∗2
= ln(v∗1)(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1(1 + n1)
2 1
v∗2
is negative and it is monotonic over the domain. Thus
∂v∗2
∂n1
> 0.
Now for
∂v∗1
∂n2
, we check the sign of
−[(n1 + n2
v∗2
+
n1(n1 + 1)(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1(− v∗1
(v∗2)2
)
1 + n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1
− n2
v∗2
) ln(v∗2)].
It can be simplified to
−n1
v∗2
1− (v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1
1 + n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1
ln(v∗2) > 0.
Thus,
∂v∗1
∂n2
> 0.
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Now for
∂v∗2
∂n2
, we check the sign of
−[−
n1(1 + n1)(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1 1
v∗2
1 + n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1
+
n1
v∗1
] ln(v∗2)
that can be simplified to
−n1 ln(v
∗
2)
v∗1
1− (v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1
1 + n1(
v∗1
v∗2
)n1+1
> 0.
Thus,
∂v∗2
∂n2
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 7:
7.(1) Suppose by contradiction that there does not exist any type of equilibrium.
We then have no monotonic equilibrium. Thus, λ(y) > c2 = v
s
2F1(v
s
2) for all y ∈ [vs1, 1],
and particularly, we have λ(vs1) = v
s
1F1(v
s
1) > v
s
2F1(v
s
2). Then we have
vs1
vs2
>
F1(vs2)
F1(vs1)
.
Since there is no neg-monotonic equilibrium either, we have φ(x) > c1 = v
s
1F2(v
s
1) for
all x ∈ [vs2, 1], and particularly, we have φ(vs2) = vs2F2(vs2) > vs1F2(vs2). Then we have
vs1
vs2
<
F2(vs2)
F2(vs1)
. Combining these two cases, we have
F1(v
s
2)
F1(vs1)
<
vs1
vs2
<
F2(v
s
2)
F2(vs1)
.
Now we prove that these two inequalities cannot hold simultaneously. Indeed, if
vs1 ≤ vs2, then 1 ≤ F1(v
s
2)
F1(vs1)
<
vs1
vs2
≤ 1, which is impossible. On the other hand, if vs1 > vs2,
1 <
vs1
vs2
<
F2(vs2)
F2(vs1)
< 1, which is also impossible. Thus, there must exist an equilibrium
for any F1(v) and F2(v) under consideration.
7.(2) First note that λ(vs1) = v
s
1F1(v
s
1) < v
s
1F2(v
s
2) = c1 < c2 by F1(v) < F2(v)
and λ(y) is monotonically increasing by the concavity of F1(v) and F2(v). Thus,
if λ(y) < c2 for all y ∈ (vs1, 1], bidder 2 will never participate (i.e., v∗2 > 1), and
bidder 1 uses v∗1 = c1 as the cutoff point. Otherwise bidder 2 will use v
∗
2 > v
s
1
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which is determined by λ(y) = c2. Thus, in both cases, (v
∗
1, v
∗
2) compose a monotonic
equilibrium. Since λ(y) is monotonically increasing, such a monotonic equilibrium
must be unique.
Finally, we show there does not exist any neg-monotonic equilibrium. To do so,
we only need to focus on φ(x) with x > vs2. Since φ(v
s
2) = v
s
2F2(v
s
2) > v
s
2F1(v
s
1) = c1
and φ(x) is monotonic increasing, φ(x) > c1 for all x ∈ (vs2, 1]. Thus we do not have a
neg-monotonic equilibrium. Hence, there is a unique equilibrium that is monotonic.
7.(3.i) Suppose vs1 < v
s
2. We have φ(v
s
2) = v
s
2F2(v
s
2) > v
s
1F2(v
s
1) = c1. By φ
′(x) > 0
we have φ(x) > c1 for all x ∈ (vs2, 1]. Thus no neg-monotonic exists. Also, we have
λ(vs1) = v
s
1F1(v
s
1) < v
s
2F1(v
s
2) = c2. Then by the monotonicity of λ(y), there is a
unique equilibrium that is monotonic.
7.(3.ii) Suppose vs1 > v
s
2. We have λ(v
s
1) = v
s
1F1(v
s
1) > v
s
1F2(v
s
1) > v
s
2F2(v
s
2) = c2.
By λ′(y) > 0 we have λ(y) > c2 for all y ∈ (vs1, 1]. So no monotonic equilibrium
exists. On the other hand, we have φ(vs2) = v
s
2F2(v
s
2) < v
s
1F2(v
s
1) = c1. By φ
′(x) > 0,
if for all x ∈ (vs2, 1] we have φ(x) < c1, bidder 1 never participates in the auction (i.e.,
v∗1 > 1). Thus, v
∗
1 > 1 and v
∗
2 = c2 will be the unique neg-monotonic equilibrium.
Otherwise v∗2 > v
s
2 is uniquely determined by φ(x) = c1. Then v
∗
1 < v
s
2 and v
∗
2 > v
s
2
is the unique neg-monotonic equilibrium. Thus we have a unique equilibrium that is
neg-monotonic.
7.(3.iii) Now suppose vs1 = v
s
2 = v
s. We then have c1 = v
sF2(v
s) and c2 =
vsF1(v
s). Then λ(vs) = vsF1(v
s) = c2 and φ(v
s) = vsF2(v
s) = c1. Thus v
∗
1 = v
∗
2 = v
s
is the equilibrium that is a special neg-monotonic equilibrium. The uniqueness comes
from the monotonicity of λ(y) and φ(x).
66
CHAPTER III
SECOND PRICE AUCTIONS WITH TWO-DIMENSIONAL PRIVATE
INFORMATION ON VALUES AND PARTICIPATION COSTS
This chapter studies equilibria of second price auctions when values and participa-
tion costs are both privation information and are drawn from general distribution
functions. We consider the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. It is shown that
there always exists an equilibrium for this general economy, and further there exists a
unique symmetric equilibrium when all bidders are ex ante homogeneous. Moreover,
we identify a sufficient condition under which we have a unique equilibrium in a het-
erogeneous economy with two bidders. Our general framework covers many relevant
models in the literature as special cases.
A. Introduction
The study of participation costs in auctions mainly focuses on second price auctions
due to the simplicity of bidding behavior. In a standard second price auction, bidding
one’s true valuation is a weakly dominant strategy. There are also other equilibria in
the standard second price auction as shown in Blume and Heidhues [1] for example,
the bidder with the highest value bids his true value and all others bid zero. This is
referred as the asymmetric bidding equilibrium in the standard second price auction.
However, in second price auctions with participation costs, so long as a bidder finds
participating optimal, he cannot do better than bidding his true value. Therefore in
this paper we only consider equilibria in which each bidder uses a cutoff strategy;
i.e., bids his true if one finds participating optimal, does not participate otherwise.
All of our results about the uniqueness or multiplicity of equilibria, then, should be
interpreted accordingly.
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Laffont and Green [12] studied the second price auction with participation costs in
a general framework where bidders’ valuations and participation costs are both private
information. However, their proof on the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
is incomplete. They wanted to show the existence and uniqueness of symmetric
equilibrium via contract mapping theorem. However, the condition for that theorem
to hold does not satisfied. Besides, they imposed a restrictive assumption of uniform
distributions for both values and participation costs and only considered symmetric
equilibrium. Recently, some work in the literature has been done on equilibria of the
second price auction with participation costs in simplified versions where either only
valuations or participation costs are private.
Campbell [5] and Tan and Yilankaya [40] studied equilibria and their proper-
ties in an economic environment when bidders’ values are private information and
participation costs are common knowledge and the same. They did find asymmet-
ric equilibria when bidders are ex ante homogeneous. Uniqueness of the equilibrium
cannot be guaranteed. Some other studies, including Samuelson [37], Stegaman [38],
Levin and Smith [21], etc, also assumed that participation costs are the same across
players. While the assumption of equal participation costs is stringent and unrealis-
tic, Cao and Tian [3] investigated the equilibria when bidders may have differentiated
participation costs. They introduced the notions of monotonic equilibrium and neg-
monotonic equilibrium.
Kaplan and Sela [16] simplified the framework of Laffont and Green [12] in an-
other way. They studied equilibria of second price auctions with participation costs
when bidders’ participation costs are private information and drawn from the same
distribution function, while valuations are common knowledge.
Thus, up to now, the problem considered in Laffont and Green [12] has only been
answered in some special settings: either participation costs are commonly known or
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values are publicly known. However, in reality, it is possible that both the valuations
and participation costs are private information. Some participation costs are observ-
able to the seller such as the entry fee; some are unobservable to the seller such as
the learning costs. A natural way to deal with this is to allow both valuations and
participation costs of bidders are private information and their distribution functions
are general and may be different. This paper aims to give an answer to the question
raised in Laffont and Green [12] in a general framework.
This chapter studies equilibria of second price auctions with general distribution
functions on valuations and participation costs. The special cases of this general
specification includes that either the valuations or participation costs are common
knowledge, as those have been investigated in previous literature.
Under a general two-dimensional distribution of the bidders’ participation costs
and valuations we prove that the equilibria always exist. When bidders have the same
distributions, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium. Moreover, we identify the
conditions under which we have a unique equilibrium in a simple two bidder economy.
Special cases in which multiple equilibria exist are also discussed. There may exist
an equilibrium in which one bidder never participates or an equilibrium in which one
bidder always participates.
As compared to the work by Laffont and Green [12], our general framework can
not only establish the existence of equilibrium and uniqueness of symmetric equi-
librium in the two-dimensional uniform setting, but can also do that in many other
two-dimensional settings such as truncated normal distributions, exponential distri-
butions etc. Not restricted to the symmetric equilibrium when all bidders are ho-
mogenous, our framework can deal with the asymmetric equilibria which have been
seen in literature with one-dimensional private information, like those in Tan and
Yilankaya [40].
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The existence of asymmetric equilibria has important consequences for the strate-
gic behavior of bidders and the efficiency of the auction mechanism. When an auction
has a participation cost, a bidder would expect less bidders to submit their bids. When
symmetric equilibrium is unique, every bidder has to follow the symmetric cutoff and
has no other choices. However, when asymmetric equilibria exist, bidders may choose
an equilibrium they are more desirable. In this case, some bidders may form a collu-
sion to cooperate at the entrance stage by choosing a smaller cutoff point that may
decrease the probability that other bidders enter the auction, and consequently, may
reduce the competition in the bidding stage. An asymmetric equilibrium may become
more desirable when an auction can run repeatedly. Also, an asymmetric equilibrium
may be ex-post inefficient. The item being auctioned is not necessarily allocated to
the bidder with the highest valuation.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. In Section B, we describe a
general setting of economic environments. We establish the existence of equilibrium
in Section C. The uniqueness of equilibrium is discussed in section D. In section E we
give a brief discussion about the existence of multiple equilibria. Concluding remarks
are provided in Section F. All the proofs are relegated to the Section G.
B. The Setup
We consider an independent value economic environment with one seller and n buyers.
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The seller is risk neutral and has an indivisible object to sell
to one of the buyers. The seller values the object at zero. The auction format is the
sealed-bid second price auction (see Vickrey [44]). In order to submit a bid, bidder i
must pay a participation cost ci. Buyer i’s value for the object, vi, and participation
cost ci are private and independently drawn from the distribution function Ki(vi, ci)
70
with the support [0, 1] × [0, 1]. Let ki(vi, ci) denote the corresponding density func-
tion. In particular, when vi and ci are independent, we have Ki(vi, ci) = Fi(vi)Gi(ci)
and ki(vi, ci) = fi(vi)gi(ci), where Fi(vi) and Gi(ci) are the cumulative distribution
functions of bidder i’s valuation and participation cost, fi(vi) and gi(ci)
1 are the
corresponding density functions.
Each bidder knows his own value and participation cost before he makes his
entrance decision and does not know others’ decisions when one makes his own.2 If
bidder i decides to participate in the auction, he pays a non-refundable participation
cost ci and submits a bid. The bidder with the highest bid wins the object and pays
the second highest bid. If there is only one person in the auction, he wins the object
and pays 0. If there is a tie, the allocation is determined by a fair lottery. The bidder
who wins the object pays his own bid.
In this second price auction mechanism with participation costs, the individually
rational action set for any type of bidder is :{No}∪ [0, 1], where “{No}” denotes not
participating in the auction. Bidder i incurs the participation cost if and only if his
action is different from “{No}”.
If a bidder finds participating in this second price auction optimal, he cannot
do better than bidding his true valuation (i.e., bidding his true is a weakly domi-
nant strategy). Therefore, we can restrict our attention to Bayesian-Nash equilibria
in which each bidder uses a cutoff strategy; i.e., one bids his true valuation if his
participation cost is less than some cutoff point and does not enter otherwise. An
1When vi or ci takes discrete values, their density functions fi(v) and gi(ci) are
reduced to the discrete probability distribution functions, which can be represented
by the Dirac delta function. The density at the discrete point is infinity.
2We share the same assumptions as Lu [23] and Laffont and Green [12]. This
differs from the other branch of literature on endogenous entry and entry cost, which
assumes that bidders learn their valuations after incurring the entry costs, including
Tan [39] and Ye [43] among others.
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equilibrium strategy of each bidder i is then determined by the expected revenue of
participating in the auction c∗i (vi) when his value is vi
3. Let bi(vi, ci) denote bidder
i’s strategy. Then the bidding decision function can be characterized by
bi(vi, ci) =
 vi if 0 ≤ ci ≤ c
∗
i (vi)
No otherwise.
Remark 10 At an equilibrium, c∗i (vi) > 0 is a cost cutoff (critical) point such that
individual i is indifferent from participating in the auction or not. Bidder i will
participate in the auction whenever 0 < ci ≤ c∗i (vi). c∗i (vi) can be interpreted as the
maximal amount one would like to pay to participate in the auction. Note that at
equilibrium, we have c∗i (vi) ≤ vi.
The description of the equilibria can be slightly different under different infor-
mational structures on Ki(vi, ci):
(1) vi is a private information and ci is common knowledge to all bidders.
In this case, Ki(vi, ci) = Fi(vi). Campbell (1998), Tan and Yilankaya
[40] and Cao and Tian [3] studied this special case. The equilibrium is
described by a valuation cutoff v∗i for each bidder i. Bidder i submits
a bid when vi ≥ v∗i .
(2) ci is a private information and vi is common knowledge to all bidders.
In this case, Ki(vi, ci) = Gi(ci). Kalpan and Sela [16] investigated this
kind of economic environment. The equilibrium is described by a cost
cutoff point cost c∗i for each bidder i. Bidder i submits a bid when
ci ≤ c∗i .
3In equilibrium, c∗i (vi) depends on the distributions of all bidders’ valuations and
participation costs.
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C. The Existence of Equilibrium
Suppose, provisionally, there exists an equilibrium in which each bidder i uses c∗i (vi) as
his entrance decision making. Then for bidder i with value vi, when his participation
cost ci ≤ c∗i (vi), the bidder will participate in the auction and submit his weakly
dominant bid, or else he will stay out4. For bidder i, to submit a bid vi, he should
participate in the auction first; i.e., ci ≤ c∗i (vi). So the density of submitting a bid vi
is
fc∗i (vi)(vi) =
∫ c∗i (vi)
0
ki(vi, ci)dci.
Remark 11 When vi and ci are independent, bidder i with value vi will submit the
bid vi with probability Gi(c
∗
i (vi)) and stay out with probability 1−Gi(c∗i (vi)).
fc∗i (vi)(0) refers the probability (density) that bidder i does not submit a bid. Let
Fc∗i (vi)(vi) be the corresponding cumulative probability. Note that there is a mass at
vi = 0 for Fc∗i (vi)(vi).
For each bidder i, let the maximal bid of the other bidders be mi. Note that, if
mi > 0, at least one of other bidders participates in the auction. If mi = 0, no other
bidders or at most some bidders with value zero participate in the auction.
The revenue of participating in the auction for bidder i with value vi is given
by
∫ vi
0
(vi − mi)d
∏
j 6=i Fc∗j (mi), and thus the zero expected net-payoff condition for
bidder i to participate in the auction when his valuation is vi requires that
c∗i (vi) =
∫ vi
0
(vi −mi)d
∏
j 6=i
Fc∗j (mi).
4c∗i (vi) can be interpreted as the maximal amount that bidder i would like to pay
to participate in the auction when his value is vi.
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If mi = 0, none of the other bidders or at most some bidders with value zero
participate in the auction. The probability of the first case is
∏
j 6=i
Fc∗j (0) =
∏
j 6=i
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
c∗j (τ)
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ,
while the probability for the second case is neglected since the second case will not
affect the expected revenue of participating in the auction for a bidder with value
vi > 0.
Otherwise, at least one other bidder submits a bid. Then
∏
j 6=i
Fc∗j (mi) =
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ].
Thus, the cutoff curve for individual i, i ∈ 1, 2, ...n, can be characterized by
c∗i (vi) =
∫ vi
0
(vi−mi)d
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]+vi
∏
j 6=i
[
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
c∗j (τ)
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ].
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Now, integrating the first part by parts, we have
c∗i (vi) =
∫ vi
0
(vi −mi)d
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]
+ vi
∏
j 6=i
[
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
c∗j (τ)
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]
= (vi −mi)
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ] |vi0
+ vi
∏
j 6=i
[
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
c∗j (τ)
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]
+
∫ vi
0
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmi
= −vi
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
0
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ] + vi
∏
j 6=i
[
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
c∗j (τ)
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]
+
∫ vi
0
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmi
Since∫ 1
0
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ +
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
c∗j (τ)
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ = 1,
we have
c∗i (vi) =
∫ vi
0
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmi. (3.1)
Remark 12 When vi and ci are independent,Ki(vi, ci) = Fi(vi)Gi(ci) and ki(vi, ci) =
fi(vi)gi(ci), we have
c∗i (vi) =
∫ vi
0
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
Gj(cj(τ))fj(τ)dτ ]dmi.
Take derivative of equation (3.1) with respect to vi, we have
c∗i
′(vi) =
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
vi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]. (3.2)
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Notice that c∗i (0) = 0, thus the above equation is a functional differential equation
with the initial condition. Specially when vi and ci are independent,
c∗i
′(vi) =
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
vi
Gj(c
∗
j(τ))fj(τ)dτ ].
Lemma 13 c∗i (vi) has the following properties:
(i) c∗i (0) = 0.
(ii) 0 ≤ c∗i (vi) ≤ vi.
(iii) c∗i
′(1) = 1.
(iv)
dc∗i (vi)
dn
< 0.
(v)
dc∗i (vi)
dvi
≥ 0 and d2c∗i (vi)
dv2i
≥ 0
(i) means that, when bidder i’s value for the object is 0, the value of participating
in the auction for bidder i is zero and thus the cutoff cost point for the bidder to enter
the auction is zero. Then, as long as the bidder has participation cost bigger than
zero, he will not participate in the auction.
(ii) means that a bidder will not be willing to pay more than his value to partic-
ipate in the auction.
(iii) means that, when a bidder’s value is 1, the marginal willingness to pay to
enter the auction is 1. The intuition is that when his value for the object is 1, he will
win the object almost surely. Then the marginal willingness to pay is equal to the
marginal increase in the valuation.
(iv) states that the participation cutoff point is a nondecreasing function in the
number of bidders. As the number of bidders increases, the probability to win the
object will decrease, holding other things constant. More bidders will increase the
competition among the bidders and thus reduce the expected revenue.
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(v) states that the marginal willingness to pay is positive and increasing. The
intuition is that when a bidder’s value increases, the probability of winning the auction
increases. The willingness to pay increases and so is the marginal willingness to pay.
Definition 4 Given the economic environment and the properties described above, a
cutoff curve equilibrium is a n-dimensional plane compromised by (c∗1(v1), c
∗
2(v2), ...c
∗
n(vn))
that is a solution of the following equation system:
(P1)

c∗1(v1) =
∫ v1
0
∏
j 6=1[1−
∫ 1
m1
∫ c∗j (τ)
0 kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dm1
c∗2(v2) =
∫ v2
0
∏
j 6=2[1−
∫ 1
m2
∫ c∗j (τ)
0 kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dm2
...
c∗n(vn) =
∫ vn
0
∏
j 6=n[1−
∫ 1
mn
∫ c∗j (τ)
0 kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmn,
or equivalently the following differential equation system problem with initial condi-
tions:
(P2)

c∗1
′(v1) =
∏
j 6=1[1−
∫ 1
v1
∫ c∗j (τ)
0 kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ] with c
∗
1(0) = 0
c∗2
′(v2) =
∏
j 6=2[1−
∫ 1
v2
∫ c∗j (τ)
0 kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ] with c
∗
2(0) = 0
...
c∗n
′(vn) =
∏
j 6=n[1−
∫ 1
vn
∫ c∗j (τ)
0 kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ] with c
∗
n(0) = 0.
We then have the following result on the existence of equilibrium
(c∗1(v1), . . . , c
∗
i (vi), . . . , c
∗
n(vn))
for vi ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ {1, 2, ...n}.
Proposition 8 (The Existence Theorem) For the economic environment under
consideration, the integral equation system (P1) or the differential equation system
(P2) with initial conditions ci(0) = 0 for all i has at least one solution
(c∗1(v1), c
∗
2(v2), ...c
∗
n(vn)),
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i.e., there is always an equilibrium in which every bidder i uses his cutoff curve c∗i (vi).
The differential equation system above is a partial functional differential equation
system, but not a partial differential equation system. The derivatives of c∗i (vi) at
vi depends not only on vi itself, but also on the future path of c
∗
i (vj) with j 6= i
and vj ≥ vi. Beyond that, we have multiple variables in the functional differential
equation system which increases the difficulty to show the existence of equilibrium.
However, we can transfer the original differential equation system to the following
differential equation system
(P3)

c∗1(v) =
∫ v
0
∏
j 6=1[1−
∫ 1
m1
∫ c∗j (τ)
0 kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dm1
c∗2(v) =
∫ v
0
∏
j 6=2[1−
∫ 1
m2
∫ c∗j (τ)
0 kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dm2
...
c∗n(v) =
∫ v
0
∏
j 6=n[1−
∫ 1
mn
∫ c∗j (τ)
0 kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmn.
Lemma 14 Problem (P1) and problem (P3) are equivalently solvable in the sense
that
(1), if (c∗1(v1), c
∗
2(v2), ..., c
∗
n(vn)) is a solution to problem (P1), then (c
∗
1(v), c
∗
2(v), ..., c
∗
n(v))
is a solution to problem (P3).
(2), if (c∗1(v), c
∗
2(v), ..., c
∗
n(v)) to problem (P3), then (c
∗
1(v1), c
∗
2(v2), ..., c
∗
n(vn)) is a so-
lution to problem (P1).
Thus we have reduced the multiple variables functional differential equation sys-
tem to a single variable functional equation system.
Remark 13 When vi and ci are independent, the equilibrium is a n-dimensional
plane composed by (c∗1(v), c
∗
2(v), ...c
∗
n(v)) that is a solution of the following equation
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system:
(P4)

c∗1(v) =
∫ v
0
∏
j 6=1[1−
∫ 1
m1
Gj(c
∗
j(τ))fj(τ)dτ ]dm1
c∗2(v) =
∫ v
0
∏
j 6=2[1−
∫ 1
m2
Gj(c
∗
j(τ))fj(τ)dτ ]dm2
...
c∗n(v) =
∫ v
0
∏
j 6=n[1−
∫ 1
mn
Gj(c
∗
j(τ))fj(τ)dτ ]dmn,
or equivalently the following differential equation system problem with initial condi-
tions:
(P5)

c∗1
′(v) =
∏
j 6=1[1−
∫ 1
v
Gj(c
∗
j(τ))fj(τ)dτ ] with c
∗
1(0) = 0,
c∗2
′(v) =
∏
j 6=2[1−
∫ 1
v
Gj(c
∗
j(τ))fj(τ)dτ ] with c
∗
2(0) = 0,
...
c∗n
′(v) =
∏
j 6=n[1−
∫ 1
v
Gj(c
∗
j(τ))fj(τ)dτ ] with c
∗
n(0) = 0.
This general model with two-dimensional private values and participation costs
with general distribution functions is very general and contains many existing results
as special cases. In the following, for simplicity, we assume vi and ci are independent
to illustrate the generality of our setting.
Case 1. Suppose there is a subset, denoted by A, of bidders whose valuations
are common knowledge. Then for all i ∈ A¯ = N \ A, we have
c∗i (v) =
∫ v
0
∏
j∈A¯\{i}
[1−
∫ 1
mi
Gj(c
∗
j(τ))fj(τ)dτ ]
∏
j∈A\{i},vj>v
[1−Gj(c∗j(vj))]
×
∏
j∈A¯\{i},vj<v
[1−
∫ 1
mi
Gj(c
∗
j(τ))fj(τ)dτ ]dmi.
For all i ∈ A,
c∗i (vi) =
∫ vi
0
∏
j∈A¯\{i}
[1−
∫ 1
mi
Gj(c
∗
j(τ))fj(τ)dτ ]
∏
j∈A\{i},vj>vi
[1−Gj(c∗j(vj))]
×
∏
j∈A\{i},vj<vi
[1−
∫ 1
mi
Gj(c
∗
j(τ))fj(τ)dτ ]dmi.
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In this case, one needs to distinguish the difference between vi > vj and vj > vi,
since under these two situations the expected revenue has different expressions.
Example 2 Suppose n = 2 and v1 < v2 is common knowledge, we have two bidders.
Then for the bidder with value v1,
c∗2(v2) =
∫ v2
0
[1−
∫ 1
m2
G1(c
∗
1(τ))f1(τ)dτ ]dm2
=
∫ v1
0
[1−
∫ 1
m2
G1(c
∗
1(τ))f1(τ)dτ ]dm2
+
∫ v2
v1
[1−
∫ 1
m2
G1(c
∗
1(τ))f1(τ)dτ ]dm2
= v1(1−G1(c∗1(v1))) + (v2 − v1),
and
c∗1(v1) =
∫ v1
0
[1−
∫ 1
m1
G2(c
∗
2(τ))f2(τ)dτ ]dm1
=
∫ v1
0
[1−G2(c∗2(v2)]dm1 = v1(1−G2(c∗2(v2))).
which can be reduced to the formula obtained in Kaplan and Sela [16] when the cost
distribution functions are the same.
Case 2. On the contrary, suppose there is a subset, denoted by B, of bidders
whose participation costs are common knowledge, as discussed in Tan and Yilankaya
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[40] and Cao and Tian [3]. Let A¯ = N \ A. Then, for all i ∈ N , we have
c∗i (vi) =
∫ vi
0
∏
j∈B\{i}
[1−
∫ 1
mi
Gj(c
∗
j(τ))fj(τ)dτ ]
∏
j∈B¯\{i}
[1−
∫ 1
mi
Gj(c
∗
j(τ))fj(τ)dτ ]dmi
=
∫ vi
0
∏
j∈B\{i}
[1−
∫ 1
m∗j
Gj(c
∗
j(τ))fj(τ)dτ ]
∏
j∈B¯\{i}
[1−
∫ 1
mj
Gj(c
∗
j(τ))fj(τ)dτ ]dmi
=
∫ vi
0
∏
j∈B\{i},mj>v
[1−
∫ 1
mj
Gj(c
∗
j(τ))fj(τ)dτ ]
×
∏
j∈B\{i},mj<v
[1−
∫ 1
mj
Gj(c
∗
j(τ))fj(τ)dτ ]
×
∏
j∈B¯\{i}
[1−
∫ 1
mi
Gj(c
∗
j(τ))fj(τ)dτ ]dmi,
where m∗j is determined by c
∗
j(mj) = cj for j ∈ B. It may be remarked that c∗i (vi)
may have different functional forms when vi is in the different regions of vi > m
∗
j and
vi ≤ m∗j .
Example 3 Consider an economic environment with two bidders whose values are
drawn from the same continuous distribution function F (v). Bidders’ participation
costs are common knowledge and the same, c1 = c2 = c. This is an economy studied
in Tan and Yilankaya [40] for n = 2. Let c∗1(m
∗
1) = c
∗
2(m
∗
2) = c.
Then for bidder 1, we have
c∗1(vi) =
∫ vi
0
[1−
∫ 1
m1
G(c∗2(τ))f(τ)dm1]dτ.
As such, we have
c∗1(v1) =
∫ v1
0
[1−
∫ 1
m∗2
G(c∗2(τ))f(τ)dm1]dτ = F (m
∗
2)v1
when v1 < m
∗
2, and
c∗1(v1) =
∫ m∗2
0
[1−
∫ 1
m∗2
G(c∗2(τ))f(τ)dm1]dτ +
∫ v1
m∗2
[1−
∫ 1
m∗2
G(c∗2(τ))f(τ)dm1]dτ
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= F (m∗2)m
∗
2 +
∫ v1
m∗2
F (m1)dm1
when v1 ≥ m∗2.
Similarly, for bidder 2, we have
c∗2(v2) =
∫ v2
0
[1−
∫ 1
m2
G(c∗1(τ))f(τ)dτ ]dm2.
Then, we have c∗2(v2) = F (m
∗
1)v2 when v2 < m
∗
1, and c
∗
2(v2) = F (m
∗
1)m
∗
1+
∫ v2
m∗1
F (m2)dm2
when v2 ≥ m∗1.
We can use these equations to find the cutoff points. It is clear that there is a
symmetric equilibrium in which both bidders use the same cutoff point m∗1 = m
∗
2 =
m∗, which satisfies the equation
m∗F (m∗) = c.
Indeed, by the monotonicity of m∗F (m∗), the symmetric equilibrium exists and is
unique.
Now if we provisionally suppose that m∗1 < m
∗
2, then we should have
c∗1(m
∗
1) = m
∗
1F (m
∗
2) = c,
and
c∗2(m
∗
2) = m
∗
1F (m
∗
1) +
∫ m∗2
m∗1
F (m2)dm2 = c.
Tan and Yilankaya [40] showed that when F (v) is strictly convex, there exists m∗1 <
m∗2 satisfying the above two equations.
We can use Figure 4 to illustrate the equilibria in Example 3. There are three
curves in Figure 4. The middle curve indicates both bidders use the same cutoff point
c∗(v), and then they have the same cutoff point m∗. The curve most above is bidder
1’s reaction curve c∗1(v1). There is a kink at v1 = m
∗
2. Before this point, the curve is
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a straight line passing through the original point with slope F (m∗2). After m
∗
2, it is
a smooth curve with the slope changing along the curve, which is F (v). We can see
as v → 1, the slope goes to 1, which is consistent with properties of the cutoff curves
discribed in Lemma 13. The lowest curve is bidder 2’s reaction curve c∗2(v2). The
equilibrium is the intersection of the horizontal line c and each bidder’s cutoff curve.
Fig. 4. Symmetric & Asymmetric Equilibrium with Two Bidders
Case 3. When all participation costs are zero, Gi(c
∗
i (τ)) = 1 for all τ and all i.
Then
c∗i (v) =
∫ v
0
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
fj(τ)dτ ]dmi =
∫ v
0
∏
j 6=i
Fj(mi)dmi > 0,
and thus, a bidder with positive value for the object will always participate in the
auction and submit a bid. Under this circumstance the entrance equilibrium curve is
unique.
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Case 4. When all participation costs are 1, Gj(c
∗
j(τ)) = 0 for all c
∗
j(τ) < 1,
and thus c∗i
′(v) = 1. Considering the initial condition, we have c∗i (vi) = vi, i.e., a
bidder with value vi would like to pay at most vi to enter the auction. Now since the
designed participation cost is 1 for all bidders, then there will be no one participating
in the auction.
D. Uniqueness of Equilibrium
To investigate the uniqueness of the equilibrium c∗(v), we can focus on uniqueness of
the solution of (P3) by Lemma 14. We first consider the case that all bidders are ex
ante homogeneous in the sense that they have the same joint distribuiton functions of
valuations and participation costs and focus on the symmetric equilibrium in which
all bidders use the same cutoff curve, and then study the uniqueness of equilibrium
for a more general case. Then (P3) can be simply written as
c∗(v) =
∫ v
0
[1−
∫ 1
m
∫ c∗(τ)
0
kj(τ, c)dcdτ ]
n−1dm, (3.3)
and correspondingly we have
c∗′(v) = [1−
∫ 1
v
∫ c∗(τ)
0
k(τ, c)dcdτ ]n−1, c∗(0) = 0. (3.4)
We first give the uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium when all bidders are
ex ante homogeneous.
Proposition 9 (Uniqueness of Symmetric Equilibrium) For the economic en-
vironment under consideration in this section, suppose that all bidders have the same
distribution function K(v, c). There is a unique solution c∗(v) to integral equation
(3.3) or differential equation (3.4) with initial condition. Consequently, there exists
a unique symmetric equilibrium at which each bidder uses the same cutoff curve for
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his entrance decision making.
Remark 14 Uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium has been established in some
special cases.
1) In Campbell [5] and Tan and Yilankaya [40], when bidders have the
same participation cost and continuously differentiable valuation dis-
tribution function, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which
each bidder uses a same cutoff point vs for their entrance decision
making.
2) In Kaplan and Sela [16], when all bidders have the same valuations for
the object and continuously differentiable participation cost distribu-
tion functions, there is a unique symmetric cutoff point c∗.
3) More earlier, Laffont and Green [12] investigated the existence of equi-
libria when both valuation and participation costs are uniform dis-
tributed. They got the uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium un-
der the simple two-dimensional economic environment. However their
proof is incomplete.
Remark 15 Note that the above proposition only shows that the uniqueness of sym-
metric equilibrium when bidders are ex ante homogeneous. It does not exclude the
possibility of the asymmetric equilibrium. As those in Tan and Yilankaya [5], Kalpan
and Sela [16], there are some examples where ex-ante homogeneous bidders may use
different cutoffs which means the equilibria are not unique.
Now under the assumption of independence of vi and ci, We consider the unique-
ness of the functional differential equation system (P3). For simplicity we consider
a simple economy with only two bidders. The corresponding functional differential
equation system can be written as:
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(P6)
 c
∗
1
′(v) = [1− ∫ 1
v
G2(c
∗
2(τ))f2(τ)dτ ], c
∗
1(0) = 0,
c∗2
′(v) = [1− ∫ 1
v
G1(c
∗
1(τ))f1(τ)dτ ], c
∗
2(0) = 0.
Proposition 10 (Uniqueness of Equilibrium) In the two bidder economy with
Gi(c) is continuously differentiable on [0, 1] and δi = maxc gi(c), there is a unique
equilibrium when δi
∫ 1
0
(1− Fi(s))ds < 1.
When Gi(ci) is uniform on [0, 1], δi = 1 and
∫ 1
0
(1−Fi(s))ds < 1, we have a unique
equilibrium. Specially when bidders are ex ante homogenous, the unique equilibrium
is symmetric. To see this, consider the following examples.
Example 4 This example follows from Example 2. Assume that Gi(ci) is uniform
on [0, 1]. Then we have  c
∗
1(v1) = v1(1− c∗2(v2)),
c∗2(v2) = v2 − v1c∗1(v1).
There is a unique equilibrium given by c∗1(v1) =
v1(1−v2)
1−v21 and c
∗
2(v2) =
v2(1−v2)
1−v21 . Further
we can check that when v1 = v2 = v, the unique equilibrium is symmetric with
c∗1(v) = c
∗
2(v) =
v
1+v
.
Example 5 Now we assume Gi(c) and Fi(v) are both uniform on [0, 1]. At equilib-
rium we have
c∗1
′(v) = 1−
∫ 1
v
c∗2(τ)dτ,
c∗2
′(v) = 1−
∫ 1
v
c∗1(τ)dτ.
Then c∗1
′′(v) = c∗2(v) and c
∗
2
′′(v) = c∗1(v). Thus we have c
∗
1
(4)(v) = c∗1(v) and c
∗
2
(4)(v) =
c∗2(v) with c
∗
1(0) = 0, c
∗
1
′(1) = 1, c∗2(0) = 0 and c
∗
2
′(1) = 1. One can check that the
only equilibrium is c∗1(v) = c
∗
2(v) = ae
v − ae−v, where a = e
e2+1
.
86
E. Discussions
There are in general multiple equilibria in the setting under consideration. Examples
can be found in Campbell [5], Tan and Yilankaya [40], Cao and Tian [3] and Kaplan
and Sela [16] where either participation costs or valuations are common knowledge.
In this section we provide evidence for the multiplicity of equilibria even when both
the participation costs and valuations are private information.
Suppose the support of vi and ci to be [0, 1] × [, δ], where [, δ] is a subset of
[0, 1] and  > 0. To investigate the existence of equilibrium, we construct a new
density function k˜i(vi, ci) with support [0, 1] × [0, 1] which has the same density as
ki(vi, ci) on the interval [0, 1]×[, δ] and 0 otherwise and K˜i(vi, ci) is the corresponding
cumulative density function. The same as in Section C, the equilibrium cutoff curve
for individual i, i ∈ 1, 2, ...n, is given by
c∗i (vi) =
∫ vi
0
(vi−mi)d
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
k˜j(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]+vi
∏
j 6=i
[
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
c∗j (τ)
k˜j(τ, cj)dcjdτ ].
After integration by parts we have
c∗i (vi) =
∫ vi
0
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
k˜j(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmi.
Then
c∗i
′(vi) =
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
vi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
k˜j(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]. (3.5)
By the fixed point theorem, an equilibrium exists. However the uniqueness of the
equilibrium cannot be guaranteed. Specially when bidders are ex ante homogenous,
asymmetric equilibrium may exist.
One special type of asymmetric equilibrium is that some bidders may never
participate in the auction. This can happen when the support of participation costs,
c, has non-zero lower bound. Such an equilibrium can be called a corner equilibrium.
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One implication of such equilibrium is that in this economic environment, some of the
bidders can form a collusion to enter the auction regressively so that they can prevent
some others enter the auction and thus can reduce the competition among those who
participate in the auction which in turn will increase the benefits from participating.
The expected revenue of participating in the auction is a non-decreasing func-
tion of one’s true value. Thus the sufficient and necessary condition for a bid-
der to never participate is when his value is 1, participating in the auction still
gives him an expected revenue that is less than the minimum participation cost, ,
giving the strategies of other bidders. Formally, suppose in equilibrium, a subset
A = {1, 2, . . . , k} ⊂ {1, 2, 3 . . . , n} of bidders choose to participate in the auction
when their valuations are big enough and bidders in B = {k+1, . . . , n} choose never
participating in the auction. Then for all i ∈ A we have
c∗i (vi) =
∫ vi
0
∏
j 6=i,j∈A
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
k˜j(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmi.
For bidders in B never participate, it is required that for all j ∈ B,
c∗j(1) =
∫ 1
0
∏
i∈A
[1−
∫ 1
mj
∫ c∗i (τ)
0
k˜i(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmj < ,
which raises a requirement for the lower and upper bound of the participation costs
and the distributions of valuations and participation costs. To see this, we assume
that there are only two bidders and vi and ci are independent. The distribution
functions are F (vi) and G(ci) separately.
Suppose bidder 2 never participates, then bidder 1 enters if and only if v1 ≥ c1
and thus we have c∗1(v1) = v1. Given this, the expected revenue of bidder 2 when he
participates in the auction is
F () +
∫ δ

[(1− v2)G(v2) + (1−G(v2))]dF (v2) +
∫ 1
δ
(1− v2)dF (v2)
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when v2 = 1. We have three terms in the above equation. When bidder 1’s value is
less than  he will not enter the auction and bidder 2 will get revenue 1, the probability
is F (); the second term is the revenue when bidder 1’s value is between  and δ. For
any v2 ∈ (, δ), bidder 2’s revenue is 1− v2 when bidder 1 participates, and is 1 when
bidder 1 does not participate, the probabilities are G(v2) and 1 − G(v2) separately.
The third term is the revenue when bidder 1’s value is greater than δ and in this case
bidder 1 participates for sure.
In order to have a corner equilibrium, we need
F () +
∫ δ

[(1− v2)G(v2) + (1−G(v2))]dF (v2) +
∫ 1
δ
(1− v2)dF (v2) < . (3.6)
It can be seen that in the two homogenous bidders economy, when F (·) is concave,
there is no corner equilibrium. To see this, note that when F (·) is concave, we have
F (vi) ≥ vi, equation (4.1) can not hold; i.e, corner equilibrium does not exist.
Remark 16 if  = δ; i.e., ci is common knowledge to all bidders, (4.1) can be
simplified to F () +
∫ 1

(1− v2)dF (v2) < ; i.e., F () +
∫ 1

F (v2)dv2 < .
Example 6 Assume vi and ci to be joint uniform distributed (then they are inde-
pendent) and there are only two bidders. Suppose bidder 2 never participates. We
have c∗1(v1) = v1.
Then we have
c∗2
′(v2) = 1−
∫ 1
v2
G(c1(τ))dτ = 1−
∫ 1
v2
min{1,max{τ − 
δ −  , 0}}dτ,
which results
c∗2
′(v2) =

1− ∫ δ

τ−
δ−dτ −
∫ 1
δ
dτ = +δ
2
if v2 < 
δ − δ2−2δ−v22+2v2
2(δ−) =
δ2+v22−2v2
2(δ−) if  ≤ v2 < δ
v2 if v2 ≥ δ
.
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Given the above and the initial condition c∗2(0) = 0, we have
c∗2(v2) =

+δ
2
v2 if v2 < 
v32−3v22−3+3δ2v2
6(δ−) if  ≤ v2 < δ
δ2+δ+2+3v22
6
if v2 ≥ δ
.
For bidder 2 never participates, we need c∗2(1) =
δ2+δ+2+3
6
≤ , which is equivalent
to 2 + (δ − 6)+ δ2 + 3 ≤ 0. So when
(6− δ)−√−3(δ2 + 4δ − 8)
2
≤  ≤ (6− δ) +
√−3(δ2 + 4δ − 8)
2
,
the required condition is satisfied. For this to be true, we need δ2− 2δ+1 < 0 which
cannot be true.
However when F (·) is strictly convex, given proper  and δ, there may be an
equilibrium in which one bidder never participates while the other enters the auction
whenever his valuation is greater than his participation cost. As an illustration, we
assume F (vi) = v
2
i and G(ci) is uniformly distributed on [, δ]. (4.1) becomes
δ3 + δ2 + δ2+ 3 + 2
6
< .
One can check that when  = 0.5 and δ = 0.744, there exists a corner equilibrium. It
can be concluded that if there is a corner equilibrium in the homogenous two bidder
economy, there exists a corner equilibrium in which n − 1 bidders never participate
in the homogenous n bidder economy.
When the lower bound of valuation is positive and when bidders are ex ante
homogenous, there may exists an asymmetric equilibrium in which one bidder always
participates. To see this, suppose the ci is distributed on [cl, ch] with distributionG(ci)
and vi is distributed on [vl, vh] with distribution F (vi). Assume vh > vl > ch > cl.
Suppose we have an equilibrium in which bidder 1 always enter and bidder 2 never
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participates. Then bidder 1 always participates is a best response. For bidder 2’s
strategy to be a best response, we need∫ vh
vl
(vh − v1)dF (v1)− cl < 0,
the maximum expected revenue is less than the lowest participation cost. Integration
by parts we have ∫ vh
vl
F (v1)dv1 < cl.
One sufficiently condition for this to be true is vh − vl < cl.
F. Conclusion
This paper investigates equilibria of second price auctions with general distribution
functions of private values and participation costs. We show that there always exists
an equilibrium cutoff curve for each bidder. Moreover, when all bidders are ex ante
homogeneous, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium. In a simple two bidder econ-
omy, a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the equilibrium is identified. This
general two-dimensional framework covers many models as special cases.
We find evidence that multiple equilibria exist. Specifically, when bidders are ex
ante homogeneous, besides the symmetric equilibrium, there may be an equilibrium
at which one bidder always participates or never participates. Future research may
be focused on identifying sufficient conditions to guarantee the uniqueness of equilib-
rium but not only the uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium. Uniqueness of the
equilibrium has important policy implications. The seller can modify the economic
environment such that the economy has a unique equilibrium and thus have more
predictable power for the final outcomes. Welfare analysis with participation costs is
another interesting topic to be tackled.
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G. Proofs of the Main Results
Proof of Lemma 13:
Proof: (i) Letting vi = 0 in the expression of c
∗
i (vi), we have the result.
(ii) Since
c∗i (vi) =
∫ vi
0
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmi 6
∫ vi
0
dvi = vi
by the nonnegativity of
∫ c∗j (τ)
0 kj(τ, cj)dcj and∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ≤
∫ 1
mi
∫ 1
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ≤
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ = 1,
we have 0 ≤ c∗i (vi) ≤ vi.
(iii) Letting vi = 1 in (3.5), we have the result.
(iv) Since n is the number of bidders, as n increases, say, from n to n + 1, the
product term inside the integral will be increased by one more term. Also, note that
0 < 1− ∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0 kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ < 1. So given more bidders, c
∗
i (vi) will decrease.
(v)
dc∗i (vi)
dvi
=
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
vi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ] ≥ 0
by noting that ∫ 1
vi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ≤
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjd = 1.
We then have
d2c∗i (vi)
dv2i
=
∑
k 6=i
∏
j 6=i,j 6=k
[1−
∫ 1
vi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]
∫ c∗k(vi)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ≥ 0.
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Proof of Proposition 8:
Proof: For i = 1, 2, ...n, let
φi(c
∗(vi)) =
∫ vi
0
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmi
where c∗(v) = (c∗1(v1), c
∗
2(v2), . . . , c
∗
n(vn)). Then φi(c
∗) is a continuous function and
0 ≤ φi(c∗) ≤ vi by Lemma 13.(ii). Thus, φ1(.), φ2(.), · · · , φn(.) is a continuous map-
ping from the non-empty compact and convex domain [0, v1] × [0, v2] × · · · × [0, vn]
to itself, and therefore, by Brower’s Fixed Point Theorem, there exists c∗(v) =
(c∗1(v1), c
∗
2(v2), . . . , c
∗
n(vn)) such that c
∗
i (vi) = φi(c
∗(v)), and consequently, it is a solu-
tion to (P2) or (P3) with initial condition.
Proof of Lemma 14:
Proof: Suppose (c∗1(v1), c
∗
2(v2), ..., c
∗
n(vn)) is a solution to problem (P1), then we have
for any i ∈ {1, 2, ...n},
c∗i (vi) =
∫ vi
0
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmi,
then by changing the variable vi to v we have
c∗i (v) =
∫ v
0
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmi
for all i ∈ {1, 2, ...n}. So (c∗1(v), c∗2(v), ..., c∗n(v)) is a solution to (P3). On the contrary,
if (c∗1(v), c
∗
2(v), ..., c
∗
n(v)) is a solution to (P3), then we have for any i ∈ {1, 2, ...n},
c∗i (v) =
∫ v
0
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmi.
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Then by changing the variable v to vi in the i
th equation we have
c∗i (vi) =
∫ vi
0
∏
j 6=i
[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0
kj(τ, cj)dcjdτ ]dmi.
Thus (c∗1(v1), c
∗
2(v2), ..., c
∗
n(vn)) is a solution to (P1).
Proof of Proposition 9:
Proof: The existence of the symmetric equilibria can be established by the Brower’
Fixed point Theorem. Here we only need to prove the uniqueness of the symmetric
equilibrium. Suppose not, by way of contradiction, we have two different symmetric
equilibria x(v) and y(v) to the economic environment we consider. Then we have
x′(v) = [1−
∫ 1
v
∫ x(τ)
0
k(τ, c)dcdτ ]n−1
y′(v) = [1−
∫ 1
v
∫ y(τ)
0
k(τ, c)dcdτ ]n−1.
Suppose x(1) > y(1), then by the continuity of x(v) and y(v) we can find a v∗
such that x(v∗) = y(v∗) = c(v∗) and x(v) > y(v) for all v ∈ (v∗, 1] by noting that
x(0) = y(0).
Case 1: if k(v, c) > 0 with positive probabiltiy measure on (v∗, 1) × (c(v∗), 1),
then for τ ∈ (v∗, 1] we have∫ x(τ)
0
k(τ, c)dc >
∫ y(τ)
0
k(τ, c)dc
for τ ∈ (v∗, 1). Then we have x′(v∗) < y′(v∗) which is a contradiction to x(v) > y(v)
for v > v∗. So we have x(1) = y(1). By the same logic above we can prove that
x(v) = y(v) for all v ∈ [0, 1] and thus the symmetric equilibrium is unique.
Case 2: if k(v, c) > 0 with zero probabilty measure on (v∗, 1) × (c(v∗), 1), then
we have x′(v) = y′(v) for all v ∈ (v∗, 1]. By x(v∗) = y(v∗) we have x(v) = y(v) for all
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v > v∗, which is a contradiction to x(v) > y(v). Thus there is a unique symmetric
equilibrium.
Then in both cases we proved that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 10:
Proof: Define a mapping
(Pc)(v) =
∫ v
0
ds−
∫ v
0
∫ 1
s
 0 f1(τ)
f2(τ) 0

 G1(c1(τ))
G2(c2(τ))
 dτds,
where c = (c1, c2)
′.
Take any x(v) = (x1(v), x2(v))
′ and y(v) = (y1(v), y2(v))′ with x(v), y(v) ∈ ϕ
where ϕ is the space of monotonic increasing continuous functions defined on [0, 1]→
[0, 1]. Then we have
|(Px)(v) − (Py)(v)|
≤
∫ v
0
∫ 1
s
 0 g1(x̂1(τ))f1(τ)
g2(x̂2(τ))f2(τ) 0
 |
 x1(τ)− y1(τ)
x2(τ)− y2(τ)
 |dτds
=
∫ v
0
∫ 1
s
 0 g1(x̂1(τ))f1(τ)
g2(x̂2(τ))f2(τ) 0
 dτds sup
0<v≤1
|x(v)− y(v)|
≤
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
s
 0 g1(x̂1(τ))f1(τ)
g2(x̂2(τ))f2(τ) 0
 dτds sup
0<v≤1
|x(v)− y(v)|
≤
∫ 1
0
 0 δ1(1− F1(s))
δ2(1− F2(s)) 0
 ds sup
0<v≤1
|x(v)− y(v)|, (3.7)
where the first equality comes from mean value theorem, and x̂i(τ) is some number
between xi(τ) and yi(τ), δi is the maximum of gi(c), i = 1, 2. Thus when δi
∫ 1
0
(1 −
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Fi(s))ds < 1, the above mapping is a contraction, there exists a unique equilibrium.
An Alternative Proof for The Existence of Equilibria:
We give the proof of the existence of equilibrium based on (P3), the transferred single
variable functional differential equation system.
Proposition 11 (The Existence Theorem) For the general economic environment
under consideration in the paper, the integral equation system (P3) has at least one so-
lution (c∗1(v), c
∗
2(v), ...c
∗
n(v)); i.e., there is always an equilibrium in which every bidder
i uses his own cutoff curve c∗i (v).
To prove the above proposition we introduce the following lemma:
Lemma 15 (Schauder-Tychonov Fixed-point Theorem Cf. Smart (1980, p.15))
Let M be a compact convex nonempty subset of a locally convex topological space and
P :M →M be continuous. Then P has a fixed point.
Proof of Proposition 11:
Proof: Let hi =
∏
j 6=i[1−
∫ 1
mi
∫ c∗j (τ)
0 kj(τ, c)dcdτ ] andH = (h1, h2, · · · , hn)′. Define
M = {c ∈ ϕ | |c| ≤ n, |c(v1)− c(v2)| < n|v1 − v2|},
where ϕ is the space of continuous of function φ defined on [0, 1] → Rn with the
supremum norm. Then by Ascoli’s theoremM is compact andM is certainly convex.
Define an operator P :M →M by
(Pc)(v) =
∫ v
0
H(s, c(.))ds
To see P :M →M , note that
|(Pψ)(v1)− (Pψ)(v2)| ≤ |
∫ v1
v2
H(s, c(.))ds| ≤ n|v1 − v2|,
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and also it can be easily check that
|(Pψ)(v)− 0| ≤ n.
To see P is continuous, let φ ∈ M and let µ > 0 be given. We must find η > 0
such that ‖φ− ψ‖ < η implies ‖(Pφ)(t)− (Pψ)(t)‖ ≤ µ. Now
|(Pφ)(t)− (Pψ)(t)| = |
∫ t
0
[H(s, φ(s))−H(s, ψ(s))]ds|
and H is uniformly continuous so for the µ > 0 there is an η > 0 such that |φ(s) −
ψ(s)| < η implies |H(s, φ(s))−H(s, ψ(s))| ≤ µ and thus |(Pφ)(t)− (Pψ)(t)| ≤ µ by
noting that 0 < t ≤ 1 as required. Then by Lemma 15, there exists a fixed point;
i.e., a solution for the functional differential equation system, also the solution is
continuously differentiable.
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CHAPTER IV
FIRST PRICE AUCTIONS WITH PARTICIPATION COSTS
This chapter characterizes equilibria of first price auctions with participation costs
in the independent private values environment. We focus on the cutoff strategies
in which each bidder participates and submits a bid if his value is greater than or
equal to a critical value. It is shown that, when bidders are homogenous, there always
exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, and further, there is no other equilibrium when
valuation distribution functions are concave. However, when distribution functions
are elastic at the symmetric equilibrium, there exists an asymmetric equilibrium. We
find similar results when bidders are heterogenous.
A. Introduction
The studies of participation costs in auctions so far have mainly focused on the second
price auction due to its simplicity of bidding behavior in the interim information
acquisition setting.1 In second price auctions (Vickrey [44]), bidders cannot do better
than bidding their valuations when they find participating optimal. Much of the
existing literature investigates equilibria of second price auctions with participation
costs. Laffont and Green [12] study the second price auction with participation costs
in a general framework where bidders’ valuations and participation costs are both
private information and establish the existence of symmetric equilibrium with uniform
distribution. Gal et al. [11] study equilibria in a two dimensional framework with
more general distributions, focusing on symmetric equilibrium only. Campbell [5]
1There is also some work in the ex ante information acquisition setting, in which
bidders make the entrance decisions before they know their valuations (cf. McAfee
and McMillan [30, 31], Engelbrecht-Wiggans [9], Levin and Smith [21, 22] and
Chakraborty and Kosmopolov [7]).
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and Tan and Yilankaya [40] study equilibria and their properties of second price
auctions in an economic environment with equal participation costs when bidders’
values are private information. Cao and Tian [3] investigate equilibria in second price
auctions when bidders may have differentiated participation costs. They introduced
the notions of monotonic equilibrium and neg-monotonic equilibrium. Kaplan and
Sela [16] consider a private entry model in second price auctions in which they assume
all bidders’ valuations are common knowledge while participation costs are private
information.
Studies of first price auctions in the presence of participation costs, however,
have received little attention, although they are used more often in practice2, like the
auctions for tendering, particularly for government contracts and auctions for min-
ing leases. The difficulty partly lies in the fact that in first price auctions, bidding
strategies are not so explicit, as compared with the strategies in second price auctions.
Bidders in first price auctions no longer bid their true valuations. The degree of shad-
ing relies heavily on who others enter the auction and the information inferred from
the entrance behavior of those bidders. The effect of the information inferred on the
bidding strategy of first price auctions is greater than that on second price auctions.
Moreover, when bidders use different thresholds to enter an auction, the valuation
distributions updated from their entrance behavior are different so that there may
be no explicit bidding function and some bidders may use mixed strategies. As such,
it is more technically difficult to solve the cutoff strategy since it is determined by
the expected revenue of participating in the auction at the thresholds, which in turn
depends on the more complicated bidding functions of bidders who submit bids.
2Samuelson [37] studies the entrance equilibrium of first price competitive pro-
curement auctions and related welfare problem, focusing on the symmetric cutoff
threshold.
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There are some studies on equilibrium behavior in economic environments with
different valuation distributions which can be used to study the equilibria of first price
auctions with participation costs. Kaplan and Zamir [17, 18] discuss the properties of
bidding functions when valuations are uniformly distributed with different supports.
Martinez-Pardina [25] study the first price auction in which bidders’ valuations are
common knowledge. They show that in equilibrium bidders whose valuations are
common knowledge randomize their bids.
In this chapter, we investigate Bayesian-Nash equilibria of sealed-bid first price
auctions in the independent private values environment with participation costs. We
assume bidders know their valuations and participation costs before they make their
decisions. Participation costs are assumed to be the same across all the bidders.
When bidders are homogenous, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium. We
show that there is no other equilibrium when valuation distribution functions are
concave. However, when valuation distribution functions are elastic at the symmetric
equilibrium, there always exists an asymmetric equilibrium. It may be remarked that,
when a distribution function is strictly convex, it is elastic everywhere, specifically
at the symmetric equilibrium, and therefore there exists an asymmetric equilibrium.
Moreover, when bidders are in two different groups, the cutoffs used by one group
can always be different from those used by the other group.
The existence of asymmetric equilibria has important consequences for the strate-
gic behavior of bidders and the efficiency of the auction mechanism. When an auction
has a participation cost, a bidder would expect less bidders to submit their bids. When
symmetric equilibrium is unique, every bidder has to follow the symmetric cutoff and
has no other choices. However, when asymmetric equilibria exist, bidders may choose
an equilibrium that is more desirable. In this case, some bidders may form a collu-
sion to cooperate at the entrance stage by choosing a smaller cutoff point that may
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decrease the probability that other bidders enter the auction, and consequently, may
reduce the competition in the bidding stage. An asymmetric equilibrium may become
more desirable when an auction can run repeatedly. Also, an asymmetric equilibrium
may be ex-post inefficient. The item being auctioned is not necessarily allocated to
the bidder with the highest valuation.
We also consider the existence of equilibria in an economy with heterogenous
bidders in the sense that the distribution functions are different. Specifically, we
consider the case where one distribution (called a weak bidder) is first order dominated
by another (called a strong bidder). We concentrate on equilibria that the bidders in
the same group use the same threshold. We show that there is always an equilibrium in
which the strong bidders are more likely to enter the auction by using a smaller cutoff
point for valuations. When the distribution functions are concave, the equilibrium is
unique. However, when the distribution functions for the weak bidders are strictly
convex, and the participation costs are sufficiently large, there exists an equilibrium
in which weak bidders are more likely to enter the auction.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section B presents a gen-
eral setting of economic environment. Section C studies the existence and uniqueness
of equilibria for homogenous bidders. Section D studies equilibria for heterogenous
bidders. Concluding remarks are provided in Section E. All the proofs are presented
in Section F.
B. Economic Environment
We consider an independent private values economic environment with one seller and
n ≥ 2 risk-neutral buyers (bidders). The seller is also risk-neutral and has an indi-
visible object to sell to one of the buyers. The seller values the object as 0. Each
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buyer i’s valuation for the object is vi (i = 1, 2, ..., n), which is private information to
the other bidders. It is assumed that vi is independently distributed with a cumula-
tive distribution function Fi(·) that has continuously differentiable density fi(·) > 0
everywhere with support [0, 1].
The auction format is the sealed-bid first price auction. The bidder with the
highest bid wins the auction and pays the price equal to his bid. His payoff is equal
to the difference between his valuation and the price. The other bidders have zero
payoff from submitting a bid. If the highest bid is submitted by more than one bidder,
there is a tie which is broken by a fair lottery.
There is a participation cost, common to all bidders, denoted by c ∈ (0, 1).
Bidders must incur c in order to submit bids. It is assumed that each bidder knows
his own valuation and who will participate, but does not know the others’ valuations
so that we are in the interim information setting. Specifically, the timing of the game
is as follows:
• Nature draws a valuation vi for each bidder i and tells the bidder only what his
own valuation is.
• Bidder i decides whether or not to submit a bid. If he chooses to submit a bid,
he pays the participation cost c which is not refundable, otherwise the game
ends for him.
• All the bidders who pay the participation costs observe who others also partic-
ipate in the auction and submit bids. The item is awarded to the bidder who
submits the highest bid and pays his own bid. If more than one bidder submit
the highest bid, the allocation is determined by a fair lottery.
The individual action set for any bidder can be characterized as No ∪ [0, 1],
where “No” denotes not submitting a bid. Bidder i incurs the participation cost c if
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and only if his action is different from “No.” While it is always a weakly dominant
strategy to bid one’s true valuation in second price auctions, this is not true for first
price auctions. In first price auctions, a bidder may submit a bid that may not be
his true valuation. Nevertheless, given the strategies of all other bidders, a bidder’s
expected revenue from participating in the auction is a non-decreasing function of
his valuation. Thus bidders use the cutoff strategy3, i.e., a bidder submits a bid if
and only if his valuation is greater than or equal to a cutoff point and does not enter
otherwise4.
An equilibrium strategy whether to participate is then given by a profile of the
bidders’ cutoff points, which are a vector of the minimum valuations for each bidder
i to cover the cost. Let v∗ = (v∗1, . . . , v
∗
n) denote the profile of bidders’ cutoff points
and Si(v
∗) denote the set of bidders who also participate in the auction beside bidder
i. The bidding decision function bi(·) of each bidder is characterized by
bi(vi, v
∗, Si(v∗)) =
 λi(vi, v
∗, Si(v∗)) if 1 ≥ vi ≥ v∗i
No if vi < v
∗
i ,
where λi(vi, v
∗, Si(v∗)) is a contingent bidding function when bidder i participates
in the auction. Note that, if bidder i enters the auction while all the others do not
enter, bidder i will bid zero. If some other bidders also participate in the auction,
the bid depends on the cutoff points and the valuation distributions of all others.
For notational simplicity, we use bi(vi, v
∗) to denote bi(vi, v∗, Si(v∗)) and λi(vi, v∗) to
3In Lu and Sun [24], they show that for any auction mechanism with participation
costs, the participating and nonparticipating types of any bidder are divided by a
nondecreasing and equicontinuous shutdown curve. Thus in our framework, when
participation cost is given, the participating and nonparticipating types of any bidder
can be divided by a cutoff value and the threshold form is the only form of equilibria.
4In Milgrom and Weber [33], the term of “screening level” is used instead of using
“cutoff point.”
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denote λi(vi, v
∗, Si(v∗)) in the remainder of the chapter.
For the game described above, each bidder’s action is to choose a cutoff and
decide how to bid when he participates. Thus, a (Bayesian-Nash) equilibrium of the
game is composed of bidders’ cutoff strategies, together with participants’ bidding
strategies.
Formally, we have the following definitions:
Definition 5 An equilibrium
(v∗,b(vi, v∗)) = ((v∗1, b1(vi, v
∗)), . . . , (v∗n, bn(vi, v
∗))) ∈ R2n+
is a profile of cutoff points together with optimal bidding functions such that each
bidder i’s action is optimal, given others’ strategies.
Note that, once the cutoff points are given, for those bidders who participate in
the auction, the game is reduced to the standard first price auction and the optimal
bidding functions are uniquely determined (see Maskin and Riley [29]). As such, it
is sufficient for us to focus on cutoff points v∗ = (v∗1, . . . , v
∗
n) ∈ Rn+ to describe the
equilibrium. All of our results about uniqueness or multiplicity of equilibria, should
be interpreted in terms of cutoffs, accordingly.
As usual, when bidders’ distribution functions are the same; i.e., F1(·) = F2(·) =
. . . = Fn(·) = F (·), we introduce the definition of symmetric and asymmetric equilib-
ria focusing on the cutoffs:
Definition 6 For the economic environment with the same distribution functions,
an equilibrium v∗ = (v∗1, . . . , v
∗
n) ∈ Rn+ is a symmetric (resp. asymmetric) equilibrium
if the bidders have the same cutoff points; i.e., v∗1 = v
∗
2 = . . . = v
∗
n, (resp. different
cutoff points). Denote the symmetric equilibrium by vs = (v
s, . . . , vs).
Remark 17 It may be worth to mention the following remarks on the cutoff points:
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(1) v∗i > 1 means that bidder i will never participate in the auction,
no matter what his valuation is. This is the case where the bidder’s
revenue from participating in the auction is less than c even when
vi = 1.
(2) When v∗i < vi ≤ 1, bidder i will enter the auction and submit a bid
λi(vi, v
∗). When vi = v∗i , bidder i is indifferent between participating
in the auction and holding out. For discussion convenience, we assume
he enters the auction. When vi < v
∗
i , bidder i does not participate in
the auction.
(3) v∗i ≥ c.
(4) As shown in Cao and Tian [3], v∗i ≤ 1 for at least one bidder i.
Note that, once a bidder enters the auction, he can observe who has also entered
the auction and thus can update his belief about others’ valuation distributions. If
we observe that bidder i participates in the auction, it can be inferred that bidder
i’s value is bigger than or equal to v∗i . Then, by Bayes’s rule, bidder i’s value is
distributed on [v∗i , 1] with
Pr(ξ ≤ v|v ≥ v∗i ) =
Pr(v∗i ≤ ξ < v)
Pr(ξ ≥ v∗i )
=
Fi(v)− Fi(v∗i )
1− Fi(v∗i )
.
The corresponding density function is given by fi(v)
1−Fi(v∗i ) .
C. Homogenous Bidders
In this section we analyze the case in which bidders’ valuations are drawn from the
same distribution function; i.e., Fi(.) = F (.) for all i. We first study the symmetric
equilibrium. For any two bidders who use the same cutoff point vs, the supports
of their updated valuation distributions have the same lower bound when they both
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participate in the auction. Then the minimal bids they submit should be equal. Thus
when vi = v
s, bidder i can only win the item when all others do not participate. In
equilibrium we have
c = vsF (vs)n−1.
Since ρ(v) = vF (v)n−1 − c is an increasing function of v with ρ(0) < 0 and ρ(1) > 0,
there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium. To illustrate how the bidders submit
bids when they face different number of other bidders who enter the auction, consider
the following example:
Example 7 Suppose F (v) is uniform on [0, 1]. Then by vsF (vs)n−1 = c we have vs =
n
√
c. Then when vi ≥ n
√
c, bidding function for i is λi(vi, v
∗) = vi− vi− n
√
c
1+Si(v∗)
if Si(v
∗) ∈
{1, 2, · · · , n − 1} and zero if Si(v∗) = 0. Otherwise, bidder i will not participate in
the auction. Hence, the unique symmetric equilibrium is ( n
√
c, n
√
c · · · , n√c) and the
bidding function is given by
bi(vi, v
∗) =
 λi(vi, v
∗) 1 ≥ vi ≥ n
√
c
No vi < n
√
c,
where
λi(vi, v
∗) =
 0 if Si(v
∗) = 0
vi − vi− n
√
c
1+Si(v∗)
if Si(v
∗) ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n− 1}.
Now we consider the existence of asymmetric equilibria. Suppose there are only
two different cutoff points used by the bidders. Bidders i = 1, . . . ,m use v∗1 and
bidders j = m + 1, . . . , n use v∗2 as the cutoff point. Without loss of generality, we
assume v∗1 < v
∗
2. By Remark 1, we must have v
∗
1 ≤ 1. Thus we divide the bidders
into two types or groups. Bidders in type 1 use v∗1 and bidders in type 2 use v
∗
2 as
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their cutoffs separately.
When bidder i in group 1 participates in the auction, his updated valuation
is distributed on [v∗1, 1] with cumulative distribution function Gi(v) =
F (v)−F (v∗1)
1−F (v∗1) ,
and when bidder j in group 2 participates in the auction, her updated valuation is
distributed on [v∗2, 1] with cumulative distribution function G2(v) =
F (v)−F (v∗2)
1−F (v∗2) . The
two distributions have the same upper bounds and different lower bounds. Thus
if both types of bidders participate in the auction, the bidders are involved in an
asymmetric first price auction in the sense that they have valuation distributions
with different supports. To get the expected revenue at the cutoffs, we need to know
how the bidders bid when there are both types of bidders participating in the auction.
Assume that a bidder with zero probability of winning bids his true value when
he participates5. Then, by Maskin and Riley [29], there is a unique optimal bidding
strategy, which is characterized in the following lemma:
Lemma 16 Suppose k1 bidders in type 1 whose values are distributed on the interval
[v∗1, 1] with cumulative distribution function G1(v) =
F (v)−F (v∗1)
1−F (v∗1) and k2 bidders in
type 2 whose values are distributed on the interval [v∗2, 1] with cumulative distribution
function G2(v) =
F (v)−F (v∗2)
1−F (v∗2) participate in the auction, where v
∗
1 < v
∗
2. Let b =
max argmaxb(F (b)−F (v∗1))k1(F (b)−F (v∗2))k2−1(v∗2− b). The optimal inverse bidding
functions v1(b) and v2(b) are uniquely determined by
(1) v1(b) = b for v
∗
1 ≤ b ≤ b;
5Without this assumption a bidder with value vi, who in optimum has zero prob-
ability of winning, can sometimes bid more than his value. However, this bidding
strategy can be eliminated by a trembling-hand argument. Once a bidder bids above
his value, he may have a positive probability to win the object which gives him a
negative revenue. For a bidder, bidding below his value when he has zero probabil-
ity of winning can also be supported in an optimal bidding strategy. However the
allocation is the same as the optimal bidding strategy where he bids his value. For
simplicity, we eliminate it.
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(2) for b < b ≤ b, the inverse bidding functions are determined by the
following differential equation system:
k1f(v1(b))v′1(b)
F (v1(b))−F (v∗1) +
(k2−1)f(v2(b))v′2(b)
F (v2(b))−F (v∗2) =
1
v2(b)−b
(k1−1)f(v1(b))v′1(b)
F (v1(b))−F (v∗1) +
k2f(v2(b))v′2(b)
F (v2(b))−F (v∗2) =
1
v1(b)−b .
with boundary conditions v2(b) = v
∗
2, v1(b) = b and v1(b) = v2(b) = 1.
By Lemma 16, bidders in type 2 have an advantage in distribution so that they
can benefit from the auction. Indeed, for a bidder in type 2 with any value on her
support, she has a positive probability to win the auction. However, bidders in type
1, when v1 ∈ [v∗1, b), have no chance to win the auction when any bidder in type 2
also submits a bid. From the above lemma, when there are two bidders using the
same cutoff participating in the auction, the bidder with the value at the cutoff has
zero expected revenue from the auction.
Remark 18 When there are k bidders in type 1 and one bidder in type 2 partici-
pating in the auction, the lower bound of the bid submitted by bidders in type 2 is
max argmaxb(F (b)− F (v∗1))k(v∗2 − b).
Bidder i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} with vi = v∗1 can only win the object when none of the
others enters the auction. He bids zero when he is the only participant. Indeed, if
another bidder i′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . ,m} participates, we have vi′ ≥ vi = v∗1,
so λi′(vi′ , v
∗) ≥ λi(vi, v∗). Then bidder i gains zero revenue from the participation.
When any bidder j = m+1, . . . , n also enters the auction, we have vj ≥ v∗2 > v∗1 = v1,
bidder i will lose the auction for sure.
Thus, at equilibrium we then have
c = v∗1F (v
∗
1)
m−1F (v∗2)
n−m.
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For bidder j ∈ {m + 1, ..., n} with vj = v∗2, she can bid zero and has revenue v∗2
when none of others enters the auction. If other bidders in type 2 enter the auction,
she will lose the bid. If k ≤ m bidders in type 1 enter the auction, the optimal bid bk
for bid j is decided by
bk = max argmax
b
(F (b)− F (v∗1))k(v∗2 − b).
The first order condition for bk gives
bk +
F (bk)− F (v∗1)
kf(bk)
= v∗2.
bk is chosen with probability C
k
mF (v
∗
1)
m−k(1 − F (v∗1))k. Ckm is the combination
number for choosing k candidates from the n items that are available and Ckm =
m!
k!(m−k)! . Thus in equilibrium we have
c ≥ v∗2F (v∗1)mF (v∗2)n−m−1 + F (v∗2)n−m−1
m∑
k=1
CkmF (v
∗
1)
m−k(F (bk)− F (v∗1))k(v∗2 − bk),
where the first part is the expected revenue when none of others enters the auction,
which happens with probability F (v∗1)
mF (v∗2)
n−m−1; the second part is the expected
revenue when no bidders in type 2 enters the auction and there are exactly k ≤ m
bidders in the auction, which happens with probability F (v∗2)
n−m−1F (v∗1)
m−k. The
inequality holds whenever bidders in type 2 never participate in the auction, i.e.,
v∗2 > 1.
Summarizing our discussion, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 12 In an economic environment with n homogeneous bidders,
(1) there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which all bidders use the
same cutoff point vs that is determined by vsF (vs)n−1 = c;
(2) if F (·) is elastic at vs, i.e., F (vs) < vsf(vs), then, for any m ∈
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{1, 2, ..., n−1}, there exists an asymmetric equilibrium where m bidders
use the cutoff point v∗1 and the others use the other cutoff point v
∗
2 that
satisfy
c = v∗1F (v
∗
1)
m−1F (v∗2)
n−m,
c ≥ v∗2F (v∗1)mF (v∗2)n−m−1
+ F (v∗2)
n−m−1
m∑
k=1
CkmF (v
∗
1)
m−k(F (bk)− F (v∗1))k(v∗2 − bk),
with equality whenever v∗2 ≤ 1 and v∗1 < vs < v∗2, where
bk = max argmax
b
(F (b)− F (v∗1))k(v∗2 − b);
(3) if F (·) is concave, there exists no asymmetric equilibrium.
In words, when F (·) is elastic at the symmetric equilibrium, if the bidders are
randomly divided into two groups, there is an equilibrium where all bidders within
one group use the same cutoff that is different from the cutoff used by bidders in
the other group. One implication of this result is that some bidders can coordinate
by choosing a smaller cutoff threshold so that they can reduce the probability that
the others enter the auction which, in turn, can reduce the competition among the
bidders who participate in the auction. However, when F (·) is concave, there is no
such equilibrium.
Remark 19 When F (.) is strictly convex, it is elastic at any point on its support,
specifically at vs, and therefore there exists an asymmetric equilibrium. For instance,
when c = 0.1, F (v) = v2 and n = 2, there is a symmetric equilibrium (0.466, 0.466)
and an asymmetric equilibrium (0.141, 0.842).
The intuition for the existence of asymmetric equilibria when F (.) is strictly
convex is the following. When bidders in type 1 use a smaller cutoff v∗1 to enter the
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auction, the expected payoff for any bidder j in type 2 with a lower value to enter
the auction is smaller even when he wins the auction. This is true because bidder j’s
expected payment to the seller, which is equal to the expected value of the highest
valuation of bidders in type 1, is higher when F (.) is strictly convex. In this case,
bidders in type 1 would stay out of the auction by using a larger cutoff point, and
thus we have an asymmetric equilibrium. When F (.) is concave, the above argument
cannot be applied. Now the expected payment of bidder j to the seller when he wins
is smaller since other bidders tend to have smaller valuations. Bidder j with lower
value may also benefit from participating in the auction which can prevent bidders
in type 1 from entering the auction with a smaller cutoff value.
Remark 20 Further remarks can be given as follows:
(1) When the lower bound of support is positive, F (.) may be elastic
at vs even if F (·) is concave on its support. Thus we may have an
asymmetric equilibrium.
(2) Since v∗i ≥ c, the condition that F (·) is concave can be weakened to
F (v) ≥ vf(v) for all v ∈ [c, 1].
(3) As c→ 0, one can check that both symmetric equilibrium and asym-
metric equilibrium (if it exists) go to zero. Thus when c = 0, all
bidders participate in the auction.
(4) Similar to Cao and Tian [3, 4], one can study equilibrium properties
when bidders may have differentiated participation costs or when both
values and participation costs are private information.
It may be remarked that asymmetric equilibria inevitably lead to inefficient al-
location in first price auctions with participation costs. Indeed, like second price
auctions with participation costs, they are not efficient because the object may be
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not allocated to the bidder with the highest valuation when bidders use different
cutoff points. However, unlike second price auctions with participation costs, they
are not even weakly efficient (Miralles [34]). The bidder who wins the object may
not have the highest valuation among those who participate. To see this, suppose
λ1(·) and λ2(·) are the equilibrium bidding functions for any two bidders who use
different cutoff points. Suppose λ1(v) < λ2(v). By the continuity of the functions,
λ1(v+) < λ2(v−) when  is sufficiently small. Thus bidder 2 will win the object even
though he has a lower valuation. In conclusion, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 13 The first price auctions with participation costs are not efficient and
are not even weakly efficient at asymmetric equilibrium.
In reality, we can expect that when the auction can run repeatedly, bidders may
use asymmetric equilibria at earlier periods while using the symmetric equilibrium at
later periods. We now investigate the welfare effect of participation costs on sellers
when it is just one shot game, focusing on the symmetric equilibrium.6 When bidders
use the same threshold and participate in the auction, the optimal bidding function
is unique, which is symmetric and monotonic increasing, given by
λ(vi, vs) = vi −
∫ vi
vs
(F (y)− F (vs))k−1dy
(F (vi)− F (vs))k−1
when there are k ≥ 2 participants. Thus the seller’s expected revenue from the
auction is
R =
n∑
k=2
CknF (vs)
n−k
∫ 1
vs
(vi −
∫ vi
vs
(F (y)− F (vs))k−1dy
(F (vi)− F (vs))k−1 )k(F (vi)− F (v
s))k−1f(vi)dvi,
6The welfare analysis for the case of asymmetric equilibrium is much more com-
plicated. Letting the bidders know the number of other bidders who submit bids may
have different welfare implications for the sellers. We leave the welfare analysis at the
asymmetric equilibrium for future research.
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and consequently, we have
R = n(n− 1)
∫ 1
vs
(1− F (x))xf(x)F (x)n−2dx (4.1)
with integration by parts and changing the order of the integration in the double
integrals7.
There are several effects of increasing the magnitude of participation costs. First,
as c increases, the probability to have k participants decreases. Secondly, participants
bid more regressively. The reason is that to win the auction, a player has to bid
the expected value of the highest among his opponents with values between vs and
1. Lower participation reduces the expected revenue while more regressive bidding
increases it. One might conjecture that there exists an optimal participation cost
that will maximize the seller’s expected revenue. However from the equation above,
this is not true, which leads to the following result:
Proposition 14 At the symmetric equilibrium, the seller’s expected revenue decreases
as the participation cost c increases.
One implication of the above proposition is that in reality, the seller may give
the potential bidders some subsidy to encourage them to participate in the auction
to increase the expected revenue.
Remark 21 When participation costs are part of the seller’s revenue, like the entry
fee, the above conclusion no longer holds. In this case, the seller’s expected revenue
is
n(n− 1)
∫ 1
vs
(1− F (x))xf(x)F (x)n−2dx+ nc(1− F (vs)),
7See details in the Section F of this chapter.
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which is equivalent to
n(n− 1)
∫ 1
vs
(1− F (x))xf(x)F (x)n−2dx+ nvsF (vs)n−1(1− F (vs)).
First order condition vsf(vs) = 1− F (vs) determines the optimal entry fee from the
perspective of seller.
Remark 22 Menezes and Monteiro [32] consider first price auctions with participa-
tion costs. However, they adopt a different specification on information structure. A
bidder does not know who others are in the auction when he is to submit a bid. Be-
sides, they only focus on the symmetric equilibrium in which all bidders use the same
cutoff point (which is equal to vs) and submit bids via the same bidding function.
They mainly focus on comparing the revenue from first price auctions and second
price auctions and investigate the effect of the number of potential bidders on seller’s
revenue. Within their framework, when a bidder decides to participate in the auc-
tion, he will bid as if all others are in the auction since he cannot observe any other’s
entrance behavior and the bidding function is given by
λ∗(vi, vs) =
∫ vi
vs
(n− 1)yF (y)n−2f(y)dy
F (v)n−1
when v ≥ vs, and consequently the expected revenue is given by
R˜ =
∫ 1
vs
λ∗(vi, vs)nF n−1(x)f(x)dx,
which can be shown to be equivalent to (4.1). Thus at symmetric equilibrium, letting
the bidders observe or not observe who else participates will give the seller the same
expected revenue.
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D. Heterogenous Bidders
Now consider the case where we have n1 strong bidders with value distribution F1(·)
and n2 weak bidders with value distribution F2(·). The total number of bidders is
n = n1+n2. We concentrate on type-symmetric equilibrium in which all strong (resp.,
weak) bidders use the same cutoff point.
We first assume, provisionally, that the cutoff points v∗1 and v
∗
2 satisfy v
∗
1 < v
∗
2.
Then for a strong bidder i with vi = v
∗
1, he can only get the object when all the others
do not participate in the auction. (If any strong bidder i′ enters the auction, he must
have a value greater than v∗1 and thus bids higher than bidder i; or if any weak bidder
j enters, then it must be the case that vj ≥ v∗2 > v∗1. As seen in the previous section,
bidder i will lose the item for sure.) Thus, at equilibrium we have
c = v∗1F1(v
∗
1)
n1−1F2(v∗2)
n2 .
For a weak bidder j with vj = v
∗
2, we have the following three cases:
Case 1: All the other bidders do not enter the auction. Then bidder j
bids zero and gains a surplus of v∗2. The probability of this event is
F1(v
∗
1)
n1F2(v
∗
2)
n2−1. In this case the expected revenue for bidder j is
v∗2F1(v
∗
1)
n1F2(v
∗
2)
n2−1.
Case 2: At least another weak bidder enters. Then bidder j will lose the
auction, deriving zero revenue from participating.
Case 3: None of the other weak bidders enters and there are exactly
k ∈ {1, 2, ...., n1} strong bidders participating in the auction. In this
case bidder j with value v∗2 will submit a bid
bk = max argmax
b
[(F1(b)− F1(v∗1))k(v∗2 − b)].
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The first order condition for bk gives
bk +
F1(bk)− F1(v∗1)
kf1(bk)
= v∗2.
The probability of this event is Ckn1F1(v
∗
1)
n1−k(1 − F1(v∗1))k. The ex-
pected revenue in this case is Ckn1F1(v
∗
1)
n1−kF2(v∗2)
n2−1(F1(bk)−F1(v∗1))k(v∗2−
bk).
Then at equilibrium we have
c ≥ v∗2F1(v∗1)n1F2(v∗2)n2−1 +
n1∑
k=1
Ckn1F1(v
∗
1)
n1−kF2(v∗2)
n2−1(F1(bk)− F1(v∗1))k(v∗2 − bk).
Proposition 15 When F1(v) < F2(v) for all v ∈ (0, 1), there always exists a type-
symmetric equilibrium in which v∗1 < v
∗
2. Further, the type-symmetric equilibrium
v∗1 < v
∗
2 is unique when both distributions are concave.
Similarly for the case where v∗1 ≥ v∗2, at equilibrium we have
c = v∗2F2(v
∗
2)
n2−1F1(v∗1)
n1 ,
and
c ≥ v∗1F2(v∗2)n2F1(v∗1)n1−1 +
n2∑
k=1
Ckn2F2(v
∗
2)
n2−kF1(v∗1)
n1−1(F2(bk)− F2(v∗2))k(v∗1 − bk),
where the first part on the right side of the inequality is the expected revenue when
none of the others (no matter whether they are strong or weak bidders) participates in
the auction. The second part is the expected revenue when at least one weak bidder
participates and no other strong bidders participates.
Proposition 16 In the heterogenous economy involving any number of bidders,
(1) if F2(·) is concave, there is no type-symmetric equilibrium with v∗2 ≤ v∗1;
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(2) if F2(·) is strictly convex, there exists c∗ < 1 such that there exists a
type-symmetric equilibrium with v∗2 ≤ v∗1 for all c > c∗.
This result indicates that, when the participation cost is sufficiently large, strong
bidders may choose a higher cutoff point. The intuition behind this is that, when
c is sufficiently large and the weak bidder is more likely to have higher valuation,
the expected revenue of the strong bidder from entering the auction is low. Strong
bidders’ advantage in valuations is attenuated by the weak bidders’ value distribution
and a higher participation cost.
E. Conclusion
This chapter investigates (Bayesian-Nash) equilibria of sealed-bid first price auctions
with participation costs. We focus on equilibria in cutoff strategies. Once a bidder
participates in the auction, the bidding strategy depends on the valuation distribu-
tions and cutoff points of other bidders.
When bidders are ex-ante homogeneous with the same valuation distribution,
there always exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in which all bidders use the same
cutoff to enter the auction and there may also exist an asymmetric equilibrium. In
particular, there is no asymmetric equilibrium when F (·) is concave, and there exists
an asymmetric equilibrium when F (·) is elastic at the symmetric equilibrium. When
bidders can be ranked by their valuation distributions, we find that bidders with
higher probability to have higher valuations are more likely to enter the auction.
However the opposite can be obtained when the participation cost is sufficiently large
and weak bidders’s valuation distributions are strictly convex.
In the presence of participation costs, not all bidders will participate in the
auction and the seller’s expected revenue decreases as the participation costs increase.
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Then, it may be profitable for the sellers to subsidize the buyers to encourage their
participating in the auction. How to implement this should be a potentially interesting
question which will be left for future research.
F. Proofs of the Main Results
Proof of Lemma 16:
Proof. Denote the inverses of the bidding function as v1(b) with support [b1, b1] and
v2(b) with support [b2, b2]. Let (b, b] be the range in which a bidder has a positive
probability to win the object if he participants in the auction. First from Maskin and
Reiley [29], the upper endpoint of the support of the distributions of the valuations is
the the same for all bidders and thus the upper endpoints in the supports of all buyers’
equilibrium bid distributions are the same. Thus b1 = b2 = b and v1(b) = v2(b) = 1.
Also from Maskin and Reiley [29] we have b1 < b2 = b which indicates that the
minimum bid of a bidder in type 1 is always less than that of bidders in type 2 since
bidders in type 2 have an advantage in valuation distribution.
Below b, type 1 bidder has no chance to win the auction and bids his true value, so
v1(b) = b. For bidders in type 2, when v2 = v2(b) = v
∗
2, bidding b is his best strategy.
Again, from Maskin and Reiley (2003), b = max argmaxb(F (b) − F (v∗1))k1(F (b) −
F (v∗2))
k2−1(v∗2 − b).
In the interval [b, b], a bidder in type i bids b which is determined by the following
maximization problem:
max
b
(
F (vj(b))− F (v∗j )
1− F (v∗j )
)kj(
F (vi(b))− F (v∗i )
1− F (v∗i )
)ki−1(vi − b), j 6= i.
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First order conditions give us
k1f(v1(b))v′1(b)
F (v1(b))−F (v∗1) +
(k2−1)f(v2(b))v′2(b)
F (v2(b))−F (v∗2) =
1
v2(b)−b
(k1−1)f(v1(b))v′1(b)
F (v1(b))−F (v∗1) +
k2f(v2(b))v′2(b)
F (v2(b))−F (v∗2) =
1
v1(b)−b .
The boundary conditions for the differential equation system are v2(b) = v
∗
2,
v1(b) = b and v1(b) = v2(b) = 1.
Proof of Proposition 12:
Proof. (1) The existence and uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium is obvious. The
proof is omitted here.
(2) Suppose F (·) is elastic at vs so that F (vs) < vsf(vs). Consider the following two
equations:
c = xF (x)m−1F (y)n−m
c ≥ yF (x)mF (y)n−m−1 + F (y)n−m−1
m∑
k=1
CkmF (x)
m−k(F (bk)− F (x))k(y − bk).
where bk satisfies bk +
F (bk)−F (x)
kf(bk)
= y, x corresponds to the cutoff point used by
bidders in the first group, and y corresponds to the cutoff point used by bidders in
the second group. Let vs satisfy c = vsF (vs)m−1F (vs)n−m. Define x = φ(y) implicitly
from c = xF (x)m−1F (y)n−m. Notice that φ(y) is continuously differentiable and
φ(vs) = vs. Since x ≤ y we have x = φ(y) with y ≥ vs. Then we have
φ′(y) = − (n−m)f(y)xF (x)
(F (x) + (m− 1)xf(x))F (y) ,
and thus
φ′(vs) = − (n−m)v
sf(vs)
F (vs) + (m− 1)vsf(vs) .
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Define
h(y) = F (y)n−m−1[yF (φ(y))m+
s∑
k=1
CkmF (φ(y))
m−k(F (bk(y))−F (φ(y)))k(y−bk(y))]−c.
with y ≥ vs. Notice that h(y) is continuously differentiable and bk(y) = vs when
y = vs. So h(vs) = 0. In order to have an asymmetric equilibrium, we only need to
show that either there exists a y∗ ∈ (vs, 1] such that h(y∗) = 0 (in which case we have
v∗2 = y
∗ and v∗1 = h(v
∗
2) < v
s as our asymmetric cutoff equilibrium.) or h(1) < 0 (in
which case v∗2 > 1 and v
∗
1 = c. ). So if h(1) < 0, then it is done.
Suppose h(1) > 0. Since h(.) is continuous with h(vs) = 0 and h(1) > 0, when
h(y) is decreasing at vs, then there exists a y∗ ∈ (vs, 1] such that h(y∗) = 0. This is
true when F (·) is elastic at vs. Indeed,
h′(y) = I(y) + F (y)n−m−1[II(y) +
m∑
k=1
Cks (III(y) + IV (y))],
where
I(y) = (n−m− 1)F (y)n−m−2f(y)[yF (φ(y))m
+
m∑
k=1
F (φ(y))m−k(F (bk(y))− F (φ(y)))k(y − bk(y))],
II(y) = F (φ(y))m + y.mF (φ(y))m−1f(φ(y))φ′(y),
III(y) = (m− k)F (φ(y))m−k−1f(φ(y))φ′(y)(F (bk(y))− F (φ(y)))k(y − bk(y)),
IV (y) = F (φ(y))m−k[k[F (bk(y))− F (φ(y))]k−1(f(bk(y))b′k(y)− f(φ(y))φ′(x))(y − bk(y))
+ (F (bk(y))− F (φ(y)))k(1− b′k(y))].
120
When x = y = vs, we have bk(v
s) = vs. Then,
I(vs) = (n−m− 1)F (vs)n−m−2f(vs)vsF (vs)m = (n−m− 1)F (vs)n−2vsf(vs),
II(vs) = F (vs)m + vs.mF (vs)m−1f(vs)φ′(vs),
III(vs) = IV (vs) = 0
and thus
h′(vs) = F (vs)n−2[(n−m− 1)vsf(vs) +mvsf(vs)φ′(vs) + F (vs)].
Thus, h′(vs) < 0 if and only if
|φ′(vs)| = (n−m)v
sf(vs)
F (vs) + (m− 1)vsf(vs) >
(n−m− 1)vsf(vs) + F (vs)
mvsf(vs)
,
which is true when F (·) is elastic at vs. Indeed, when F (·) is elastic at vs we have
vsf(vs) > F (vs). So F (vs) + (m − 1)vsf(vs) < mvsf(vs) and at the same time
(n − m)vsf(vs) > (n − m − 1)vsf(vs) + F (vs). Then if h(1) > 0, we have an
asymmetric equilibrium in which v∗1 < v
s < v∗2 ≤ 1, otherwise there is an asymmetric
equilibrium in which bidders in group 2 never participate in the auction.
(3) When F (·) is concave, we prove the nonexistence of asymmetric equilibrium by
way of contradiction. Suppose there is an asymmetric equilibrium with v∗1 < v
∗
2. Then
c = v∗1F (v
∗
1)
m−1F (v∗2)
n−m,
c ≥ v∗2F (v∗1)mF (v∗2)n−m−1 + F (v∗2)n−m−1
m∑
k=1
CksF (v
∗
1)
m−k(F (bk)− F (v∗1))k(v∗2 − bk).
One necessary condition for the system of these equations above to hold is
v∗1F (v
∗
1)
m−1F (v∗2)
n−m ≥ v∗2F (v∗1)mF (v∗2)n−m−1,
i.e.,
F (v∗2)
v∗2
≥ F (v∗1)
v∗1
, which cannot be true when F (·) is concave and v∗2 > v∗1. Following
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the same procedures above, we can prove there is no asymmetric equilibrium in which
v∗1 > v
∗
2.
Proof of Equation (4.1):
Proof. Rewrite
R =
n∑
k=2
CknF (vs)
n−k
∫ 1
vs
(vi −
∫ vi
vs
(F (y)− F (vs))k−1dy
(F (vi)− F (vs))k−1 )k(F (vi)− F (v
s))k−1f(vi)dvi
as
R =
∫ 1
vs
{vi
n∑
k=2
CknF (vs)
n−kk(F (vi)− F (vs))k−1
−
∫ vi
vs
n∑
k=2
CknF (vs)
n−kk(F (y)− F (vs))k−1dy}dF (vi).
Integrating by parts for
∫ vi
vs
∑n
k=2C
k
nF (vs)
n−kk(F (y)− F (vs))k−1dy and making sim-
plifications, we have
R =
∫ 1
vs
∫ vi
vs
n∑
k=2
CknF (vs)
n−kk(k − 1)(F (y)− F (vs))k−2ydyf(vi)dvi
=
∫ 1
vs
∫ vi
vs
n∑
k=2
Ck−2n−2n(n− 1)F (vs)n−k(F (y)− F (vs))k−2ydyf(vi)dvi
= n(n− 1)
∫ 1
vs
∫ vi
vs
F (y)n−2ydyf(vi)dvi
= n(n− 1)
∫ 1
vs
(1− F (x))xf(x)F (x)n−2dx,
where the second line comes from the fact that Cknk(k − 1) = n(n− 1)Ck−2n−2 and the
last line comes from changing the order of integration in the double integral.
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Proof of Proposition 15:
Now consider the following two equations:
c = xF1(x)
n1−1F2(y)n2
c ≥ yF1(x)n1F2(y)n2−1 +
n1∑
k=1
Ckn1F1(x)
n1−kF2(y)n2−1(F1(bk)− F1(x))k(y − bk),
with c ≤ x ≤ y < 1, where x corresponds to the cutoff point used by the strong
bidders and y corresponds to the cutoff point used by the weak bidders. Let vs1 satisfy
vs1F1(v
s
1)
n1−1F2(vs1)
n2 = c. Note that θ(vs1) = v
s
1F1(v
s
1)
n1−1F2(vs1)
n2 is an increasing
function of vs1 with θ(1) = 1 > c, so we have v
s
1 < 1. For y ≥ vs1, define x = φ(y) from
c = xF1(x)
n1−1F2(y)n2 . Then x is a decreasing function of y and φ(vs1) = v
s
1. Now let
h(y) = yF1(φ(y))
n1F2(y)
n2−1 +
n1∑
k=1
Ckn1F1(φ(y))
n1−kF2(y)n2−1(F1(bk(y))− F1(φ(y)))k
(y − bk(y))− c.
Then h(y) is a continuous function of y ≥ vs1. The remainder of the proof is based on
the following two lemmas:
Lemma 17 There always exists a type-symmetric equilibrium with v∗1 < v
∗
2.
Proof. Note that we have x ≤ bk ≤ y. When y = vs1, we have bk = vs1. Then
h(vs1) = v
s
1F1(v
s
1)
n1F2(v
s
2)
n2−1 − c < vs1F1(vs1)n1−1F2(vs1)n2 − c = 0
since F1(v
s
1) < F2(v
s
2) by assumption. We also have
h(1) = F1(φ(1))
n1 +
n1∑
k=1
Ckn1F1(φ(1))
n1−k(F1(bk(1))− F1(φ(1)))k(1− bk(1))− c.
Now if h(1) ≥ 0, then by the mean value theorem, there exists a y = v∗2 ∈ (vs1, 1]
such that h(v∗2) = 0 so that there is an equilibrium in which v
∗
1 = φ(v
∗
2) < v
s
1 < v
∗
2 ≤ 1.
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Otherwise if h(1) < 0, then there is an equilibrium in which v∗1 = φ(1) < 1 and v
∗
2 > 1;
i.e., weak bidders never participate in the auction.
Lemma 18 When F1(·) and F2(·) are both concave and F1(v) < F2(v) for all v ∈
(0, 1), there exists a unique type-symmetric equilibrium with v∗1 < v
∗
2.
Proof. Suppose y ≤ 1. Substituting c = xF1(x)n1−1F2(y)n2 into
c = yF1(x)
n1F2(y)
n2−1 +
n1∑
k=1
Ckn1F1(x)
n1−kF2(y)n2−1(F1(bk)− F1(x))k(y − bk)
and making simplifications, we have
yF1(x)
n1 +
n1∑
k=1
Ckn1F1(x)
n1−k(F1(bk)− F1(x))k(y − bk)− xF1(x)n1−1F2(y) = 0. (4.2)
We claim that the above equation implicitly defines x as a strictly increasing function
of y. Consequently, it either has a unique intersection with x = φ(y) (which is
strictly decreasing), or it does not intersect with x = φ(y), in which case the unique
equilibrium is given by x = φ(1) and y > 1 (weak bidders never participate).
To see this, taking derivatives with respect to y (notice that bk is also a function
of y) on both sides of the above equation, we have
0 = F1(x)
n1 + n1yF1(x)
n1−1f1(x)
dx
dy
− xF1(x)n1−1f2(y)− F2(y)(F1(x)n1−1
+ (n1 − 1)xf1(x)F1(x)n1−2)dx
dy
+
n1∑
k=1
Ckn1{(n1 − k)F1(x)n1−k−1f1(x)(F1(bk)− F1(x))k(y − bk)
dx
dy
+ F1(x)
n1−k(F1(bk)− F1(x))k−1[(F1(bk)− F1(x))(1− b′k)
+ k(y − bk)(f(bk)b′k − f1(x)
dx
dy
)]},
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where
(F1(bk)− F1(x))(1− b′k) + k(y − bk)(f(bk)b′k − f1(x)
dx
dy
)
= F1(bk)− F1(x))− k(y − bk)f1(x)
dx
dy
by noting that F1(bk(y))− F1(x) = kf1(bk(y))(y − bk(y)). Thus we have
0 = F1(x)
n1 + n1yF1(x)
n1−1f1(x)
dx
dy
− xF1(x)n1−1f2(y)− F2(y)(F1(x)n1−1
+ (n1 − 1)xf1(x)F1(x)n1−2)dx
dy
+
n1∑
k=1
Ckn1F1(x)
n1−k−1f1(x)(F1(bk)− F1(x))k−1
(y − bk)
dx
dy
{n1(F1(bk)− F1(x))− kF1(bk)}
+
n1∑
k=1
Ckn1F1(x)
n1−k(F1(bk)− F1(x))k.
Then
dx
dy
=
F1(x)
n1 +
∑n1
k=1C
k
n1
F1(x)
n1−k(F1(bk)− F1(x))k − xF1(x)n1−1f2(y)
−n1yF1(x)n1−1f1(x)− II + F2(y)(F1(x)n1−1 + (n1 − 1)xf1(x)F1(x)n1−2)
with
II =
n1∑
k=1
Ckn1F1(x)
n1−k−1f1(x)(F1(bk)− F1(x))k−1(y − bk){n1(F1(bk)− F1(x))− kF1(bk)}
= I − α,
where
I = n1
n1∑
k=1
Ckn1F1(x)
n1−k−1f1(x)(F1(bk)− F1(x))k(y − bk),
α =
n1∑
k=1
Ckn1F1(x)
n1−k−1f1(x)(F1(bk)− F1(x))k−1(y − bk)kF1(bk) ≥ 0.
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Now we prove the denominator and numerator are strictly positive separately. First
we prove the numerator is positive. From equation (4.2), we have
yF1(x)
n1 − xF1(x)n1−1F2(y) = −
n1∑
k=1
Ckn1F1(x)
n1−k(F1(bk)− F1(x))k(y − bk).
When F2(·) is concave, we have
F1(x)
n1 +
n1∑
k=1
Ckn1F1(x)
n1−k(F1(bk)− F1(x))k − xF1(x)n1−1f2(y)
≥ F1(x)n1 +
n1∑
k=1
Ckn1F1(x)
n1−k(F1(bk)− F1(x))k − xF1(x)n1−1
F2(y)
y
.
Then,
yF1(x)
n1 + y
n1∑
k=1
Ckn1F1(x)
n1−k(F1(bk)− F1(x))k − xF1(x)n1−1F2(y)
= −
n1∑
k=1
Ckn1F1(x)
n1−k(F1(bk)− F1(x))k(y − bk)
+ y
n1∑
k=1
Ckn1F1(x)
n1−k(F1(bk)− F1(x))k
=
n1∑
k=1
Ckn1F1(x)
n1−k(F1(bk)− F1(x))kbk > 0.
So the numerator is positive.
We now prove the denominator is also positive. Again from (4.2) we have
−I − n1yF1(x)n1−1f1(x) = −n1f1(x)/F1(x)
n1∑
k=1
Ckn1F1(x)
n1−k(F1(bk)− F1(x))k(y − bk)
= −n1f1(x)/F1(x)(xF1(x)n1−1F2(y)− yF1(x)n1)− n1yF1(x)n1−1f1(x)
= n1f1(x)(−xF1(x)n1−2F2(y) + yF1(x)n1−1 − yF1(x)n1−1)
= −n1f1(x)xF1(x)n1−2F2(y).
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Then we have
−n1f1(x)xF1(x)n1−2F2(y) + F2(y)(F1(x)n1−1 + (n1 − 1)xf1(x)F1(x)n1−2)
= F2(y)(F1(x)
n1−1 − xf1(x)F1(x)n1−2) > 0
since F1(x) > xf1(x) by the concavity of F1(.). Thus we have
dx
dy
> 0. The uniqueness
of the equilibrium is established.
Proof of Proposition 16:
Proof. We first prove that when F2(·) is concave, there is no type symmetric equi-
librium with v∗1 ≥ v∗2. Suppose not. Then a necessary condition is
v∗2F2(v
∗
2)
n2−1F1(v∗1)
n1 ≥ v∗1F2(v∗2)n2F1(v∗1)n1−1,
or
F1(v
∗
1)
v∗1
≥ F2(v
∗
2)
v∗2
.
Note that when F2(·) is concave and v∗1 ≥ v∗2, we have F2(v
∗
2)
v∗2
≥ F2(v∗1)
v∗1
, and thus
F1(v∗1)
v∗1
≥ F2(v∗1)
v∗1
which cannot be true since F2(v
∗
1) > F1(v
∗
1) by assumption.
We now show that when F2(·) is strictly convex, there exists an equilibrium in
which v∗1 ≥ v∗2 when c is sufficiently large.
Let vs2 satisfy
c = vs2F2(v
s
2)
n2−1F1(vs2)
n1
and let vs1 satisfy
c = vs1F2(v
s
1)
n2−1.
For y ∈ [vs1, vs2], define x = φ(y) from c = yF2(y)n2−1F1(x)n1 . Then x is a decreasing
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function of y satisfying φ(vs2) = v
s
2 and φ(v
s
1) = 1. Now define
h(y) = φ(y)F2(y)
n2F1(φ(y))
n1−1 +
n2∑
k=1
Ckn2F2(y)
n2−kF1(φ(y))n1−1(F2(bk(y))− F2(y))k
(φ(y)− bk(y))− c.
There is the required equilibrium if ∃y ∈ [vs1, vs2] with h(y) = 0. Note that
h(vs2) = v
s
2F2(v
s
2)
n2F1(v
s
2)
n1−1 − c > vs2F2(vs2)n2−1F1(vs2)n1 − c = 0
since F2(v
s
2) > F1(v
s
1) by assumption. Since h(y) is continuous, we only need
h(vs1) = F2(v
s
1)
n2 +
n2∑
k=1
Ckn2F2(v
s
1)
n2−k(F2(bk(v
s
1))− F2(vs1))k(1− bk(vs1))− c < 0.
From the definition we know vs1 is a monotonically increasing function of c, denoted
by vs1(c). It is obvious that v
s
1(1) = 1 and v
s
1
′(c) = F2(v
s
1)v
s
1
c(F2(vs1)+(n2−1)f2(vs1)) . So we have
vs1
′(1) = 1
1+(n2−1)f2(1) . It suffices to show
ĥ(c) = F2(v
s
1(c))
n2 +
n2∑
k=1
Ckn2F2(v
s
1(c))
n2−k(F2(bk(v
s
1(c)))− F2(vs1(c)))k
(1− bk(vs1(c)))− c < 0
for some c. Note that we have ĥ(1) = 0 and
ĥ′(c) = n2F2(vs1(c))
n1−1f2(vs1(c))v
s
1
′(c)
+
n2∑
k=1
Ckn2 [(n2 − k)F2(vs1(c))n2−k−1f2(vs1(c))vs1′(c)
(F2(bk(v
s
1(c)))− F2(vs1(c)))k(1− bk(vs1(c)))
+ F2(v
s
1(c))
n2−k(k(F2(bk(v
s
1(c)))− F2(vs1(c)))k−1
(1− bk(vs1(c)))(f2(bk(vs1(c)))bk ′(vs1(c))
− f2(vs1(c))))vs1′(c)− (F2(bk(vs1))− F2(vs1))kbk ′(vs1(c))]− 1
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As c→ 1, we have bk(vs1(1))→ 1, and thus
ĥ′(1) = n2f2(1)vs1
′(1)− 1 = f2(1)− 1
1 + (n2 − 1)f2(1) > 0
when F2(·) is strictly convex. Hence, ∃c∗ < 1 s.t. ĥ(c) < 0 whenever c > c∗.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
This dissertation investigates the entry equilibria of auctions when bidders have par-
ticipation costs.
We began in Chapter II from second price auctions with differentiated partici-
pation costs in which we assume bidders only have private information about their
values while they have public information about all bidders’ participation costs. In
this setting We identify two types of equilibria: monotonic equilibria in which a
higher participation cost results in a higher cutoff point for submitting a bid, and
neg-monotonic equilibria in which a higher participation cost results in a lower cutoff
point. We show that there always exists a monotonic equilibrium, and further, that
the equilibrium is unique for concave distribution functions and strictly convex dis-
tribution functions with some additional conditions. There exists a neg-monotonic
equilibrium when the distribution function is strictly convex and the difference of the
participation costs is sufficiently small.
Then in Chapter III we consider an economic environment in which bidders hold
private information both in their values and participation costs. We consider the
existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. It is shown that there always exists an
equilibrium for this general economy, and further there exists a unique symmetric
equilibrium when all bidders are ex ante homogeneous. Moreover, we identify a
sufficient condition under which we have a unique equilibrium in a heterogeneous
economy with two bidders. Our general framework covers many relevant models in
the literature as special cases.
While bidding the true value is a dominant strategy when one decides to partic-
ipate in a second price auction, the same cannot be said to the first price auctions.
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In Chapter IV, we consider the entry equilibria of first price auctions with participa-
tion costs. We focus on the cutoff strategies in which each bidder participates and
submits a bid if his value is greater than or equal to a critical value. It is shown that,
when bidders are homogenous, there always exists a unique symmetric equilibrium,
and further, there is no other equilibrium when valuation distribution functions are
concave. However, when distribution functions are elastic at the symmetric equilib-
rium, there exists an asymmetric equilibrium. We find similar results when bidders
are heterogenous.
There are several directions of which the current research can be extended. First
in this research we only consider the pure strategy equilibria. Alternatively one can
consider the case of mixed strategy. Secondly, this research mainly focus on the
positive analysis. One can go further by investigating the normative analysis. As we
have found, there are multiple equilibria in some cases. Then one direct question is
which equilibrium is the best for the seller or for the society. How can we induce the
buyers to choose that equilibrium. Last but not the least, one can also consider the
question of designing the optimal auction that maximize the seller’s expected revenue
or the total surplus of the trade.
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